Key Takeaways
Treat climate change as a readiness threat, not a distant environmental issue
A military risk assessment. The Pentagon’s concern is not that climate change outranks Russia or China as a threat. It is that warming can damage bases, destabilize allies, and pull forces into emergencies, making those central defense missions harder. After the Trump administration withdrew federal climate guidance, military planners continued assessing the risks, even when public language became more muted. The tension surfaced in 2013, when Pacific commander Samuel Locklear defended climate impacts as relevant to security before a skeptical senator.
A multiplier, not a lone cause. The book uses threat multiplier for climate pressures that intensify existing problems, such as poverty, weak institutions, or political division. Drought does not mechanically produce war; it can make a strained society less able to absorb another shock. That distinction underpins the military’s risk-based argument for preparing even when precise outcomes remain uncertain.
The military lens makes climate change legible through consequences that defense institutions already track: readiness, infrastructure, and operational demand. That is a useful translation, especially when environmental arguments are dismissed as abstract or remote. It also has limits. A security framing can make human suffering matter chiefly when it threatens military capacity or national interests. The strongest reading preserves both views: defense planning offers a pragmatic case for preparation, while the people affected by drought, displacement, and disaster remain ends in themselves, not merely risk factors.
Prepare for disaster relief to become a recurring military assignment
A relief mission at scale. After Super Typhoon Haiyan devastated the Philippines in 2013, the United States launched Operation Damayan. At its peak, the effort involved about 14,000 U.S. personnel, 66 aircraft, and a carrier group. American forces cleared routes, moved supplies, restored services, and evacuated people. By the mission’s end, they had made more than 1,300 flights, delivered over 2,500 tons of aid, and evacuated more than 21,000 people.
From relief toward escalation. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, or HA/DR, means short-term emergency support intended to bridge the gap until local authorities can take over. Klare’s ladder of escalation describes how such missions can grow into longer, riskier operations when governments cannot recover, aid distribution sparks conflict, or several emergencies occur close together. The military’s preferred quick deployment and withdrawal may not be possible.
Operation Damayan shows why militaries are often called during disasters: they can move people, equipment, and supplies over great distances quickly. But a capable response can conceal a deeper weakness if local systems remain unable to take responsibility. Relief should therefore be judged not only by what arrives, but by whether civilian capacity can resume essential work. This does not diminish the value of military assistance. It clarifies that emergency logistics are a bridge, not a durable substitute for functioning public institutions.
Trace scarcity through grievance and governance before predicting conflict
Mali shows the chain. In the Sahel, drought and desertification threatened the Tuareg pastoralist way of life. The text reports that rainfall in Mali had fallen by about 30 percent over the preceding 15 years, while the desert’s southern edge advanced into grasslands. Herders moving in search of water and pasture came into conflict with farmers. Those pressures compounded older grievances: unequal aid, poverty, corruption, and broken government promises. Arms released after Libya’s collapse and the presence of extremist groups also shaped the conflict.
No single-cause story. U.S. analysts treated climate as one contributor to the Tuareg revolt, not its sole cause. The same logic applies to vulnerable states such as Nigeria and Pakistan, where resource stress intersects with political divisions and weak public response. Climate pressure matters most when institutions cannot allocate scarce necessities fairly or help people adapt.
This account is strongest when it resists the neat but misleading story that drought causes war. Scarcity is a pressure; the path from pressure to violence runs through land access, political exclusion, and government choices. That framing leaves room for agency: institutions can reduce the danger by sharing resources more fairly and addressing grievances before armed groups exploit them. It also cautions against treating climate forecasts as conflict forecasts. The conditions for violence are political as well as environmental.
Follow climate shocks through food, energy, and health networks
A shock travels. In 2010, extreme heat and wildfires in Russia destroyed roughly one-fifth of its wheat harvest. At the same time, floods damaged crops in Pakistan, drought affected Australia, and poor growing conditions hit China. Russia halted grain exports, global wheat prices rose sharply, and food-importing countries faced higher costs. In Mozambique, a sudden increase in bread prices helped trigger violent protests. Food-price stress also fed existing grievances in the Middle East and North Africa, amid the upheavals known as the Arab Spring.
Interdependence spreads risk. The book calls these climate shock waves: climate-related disruptions that travel through interconnected systems and harm countries far from the original event. The same vulnerability applies to energy supply chains, infectious disease, and migration. Climate was not the sole explanation for the political events described; policy choices, poverty, and existing tensions shaped how each shock unfolded.
The episode draws attention to a crucial distinction between a local hazard and a systemic crisis. A damaged harvest becomes an international security concern when trade, prices, and household hardship transmit its effects. Interdependence can provide access to supplies, but it can also carry disruption across borders. The practical question is not whether global exchange should be abandoned, but whether essential systems have enough flexibility to absorb interruptions. Treating price spikes as purely technical events also misses how quickly distribution can become a question of legitimacy.
Expect warming to sharpen old rivalries over Arctic resources and shared rivers
New access, old competition. Retreating Arctic ice opens routes and makes resource development easier. The U.S. Geological Survey estimated that the region north of the Arctic Circle holds about 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30 percent of its undiscovered natural gas. Russia, the United States, China, and other states have increased attention to the region. The book describes military exercises and deployments that reflect concern about competition over shipping lanes, resources, and disputed claims.
Water can be strategic. Farther south, the Brahmaputra rises in China and flows into India. Both countries depend on shared Himalayan river systems, while glaciers that help sustain river flows are retreating. Disputes over dams or diversion could intensify existing border tensions. The author does not present great-power war as inevitable. Warming may aggravate rivalries and scarcity, making restraint and cooperation harder under pressure.
These examples reveal two different routes by which climate change can enter geopolitics. In the Arctic, melting ice creates access to resources and transport routes. In the Himalayas, glacier loss threatens water supplies on which large populations depend. In both settings, environmental change meets pre-existing disputes, rather than inventing them from scratch. That distinction helps avoid treating conflict as destiny. Resource pressure can encourage zero-sum thinking, but the political choices around access, information sharing, and negotiation still shape whether competition escalates.
Design civilian infrastructure to fail less catastrophically when storms hit
Failures cascade. Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria struck in close succession in 2017, forcing the U.S. military to assist across Texas, Florida, and Puerto Rico while other forces fought wildfires. In Puerto Rico, Maria damaged roads, power, water, and communications systems. Five weeks after the storm, about 11,400 military and Guard personnel were still supporting relief work. The island’s official death toll was later revised from 64 to 2,975.
A complex catastrophe. The Pentagon uses this term for a disaster in which failures in connected infrastructure overwhelm local response and disrupt essential services. A power outage can disable hospitals, water treatment, fuel supply, and communications at once. The military can provide logistics and engineering support, but the events show how much public life depends on systems that can fail together.
The infrastructure lesson extends beyond stormproofing individual buildings. A community can lose essential services through linked failures, even when no single breakdown explains the full emergency. Planning around these connections makes preparation more realistic: power, water, transport, and communications need to be considered as a system. The military’s capacity to respond is valuable, but relying on it for prolonged recovery carries costs and cannot replace robust civilian infrastructure. Resilience is partly the ability to keep one failure from becoming five.
Protect military bases, because flooded runways can disable global strategy
The launch platforms matter. A 2018 Pentagon survey covered more than 3,500 installations; over half reported exposure to at least one climate-related impact. Drought affected 782 facilities, strong winds 763, severe flooding 706, and wildfires 210. These bases are not peripheral property. They support training, supply, aircraft, ships, and forces deployed abroad.
Damage interrupts readiness. Hurricane Michael devastated Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida in 2018, damaging facilities and some F-22 fighters that could not be evacuated in time. Other storms forced bases to evacuate people and equipment, then wait for repairs before resuming normal operations. The book argues that military facilities resemble civilian infrastructure in their dependence on roads, power, ports, and communications. Their exposure is therefore also a warning about nearby communities.
A base is not simply a collection of buildings. It is a node in a network of transport, maintenance, communication, and personnel, so damage can disrupt missions far from the storm itself. The survey’s breadth makes one point especially clear: vulnerability is distributed across the force, not confined to a single notorious installation. Risk maps and disclosure matter because they turn a vague future threat into decisions about siting, maintenance, and investment. Adaptation still requires choices about which assets are worth protecting and how.
Cut fuel dependence because logistics itself can become a battlefield weakness
Energy is operational. The Pentagon uses operational energy for the power used by military forces to carry out their missions. In Iraq and Afghanistan, fuel had to reach remote bases by convoy, exposing troops to attack and consuming resources to protect deliveries. That experience drove efforts to improve efficiency and develop local energy sources, including portable solar systems for deployed units.
Security and emissions can align. The Navy’s Great Green Fleet tested a fuel blend made mostly of petroleum with a smaller share of beef-fat biofuel. It was not a dramatic break from fossil fuels, but it illustrated how the military linked energy independence with lower emissions. Between fiscal years 2011 and 2016, DoD operational petroleum use fell nearly 20 percent. Its broader approach combined adaptation, reduced fuel dependence, and cooperation with partner militaries.
The energy initiatives are persuasive because they connect environmental benefits to immediate operational needs. A unit that uses less fuel may need fewer exposed supply runs; a base with local power has more options when the commercial grid fails. This alignment helps climate measures survive inside an institution organized around mission performance. The Great Green Fleet also shows the difference between a demonstration and a transition: a modest biofuel blend is evidence of experimentation, not proof that military energy use has been decarbonized.
Plan for simultaneous crises, not one disaster at a time
The nightmare is overlap. Klare’s most severe scenario is not one hurricane, failed state, or supply interruption in isolation. It is several emergencies occurring together: disasters abroad requiring relief, domestic infrastructure failing, and military bases losing capacity just as forces are needed elsewhere. The 2017 sequence of Harvey, Irma, and Maria, alongside western wildfires, offered a smaller-scale demonstration of how quickly military attention and equipment can be divided.
Treat scenarios as planning tools. The book argues that clustered climate events could strain transport, medical, and support forces, reducing the military’s ability to address other threats. This is a warning about plausible risk, not a forecast that every crisis will happen at once. Planning should therefore test whether essential services and military capacity can withstand overlapping demands, rather than assume each emergency arrives with time to recover from the last.
The book’s title points to a problem of concurrency: institutions often plan for discrete emergencies, while real systems can face several demands at once. Scenario exercises are useful when treated as stress tests, not prophecies. They can reveal hidden dependencies, such as a single base or supply route serving multiple missions. The harder question is how to preserve capacity without diverting unlimited resources toward worst cases. Good planning makes uncertainty explicit, identifies unacceptable points of failure, and leaves room to revise assumptions as conditions change.
Analysis
Klare’s central move is to translate climate change from an environmental issue into an operational one. The argument gains force by following a chain of consequences: physical hazards damage infrastructure, social and political vulnerabilities shape who suffers, and institutional weakness can turn hardship into instability or emergency demand. The military is a particularly revealing observer because its mission depends on functioning bases, reliable logistics, and available forces. Its concern is less a forecast of climate wars than a warning that climate pressures can degrade the conditions required for defense.
The book’s strongest analytical discipline is its threat-multiplier framing. Mali, food-price shocks, and river disputes are not presented as simple cases of climate causing conflict. Their outcomes depend on governance, inequality, strategic choices, and pre-existing antagonism. That is more credible than monocausal explanations, although the book’s security emphasis sometimes gives the military’s projected future role greater prominence than civilian prevention or local adaptation. Describing possible military missions can illuminate the stakes, but it can also make intervention seem more inevitable than the evidence warrants.
The ladder of escalating demands is best read as a planning model, not a prediction. Its value lies in showing how separate risks can interact: relief can become prolonged stabilization work, external crises can coincide with domestic disasters, and the military’s own facilities can be damaged as forces are needed elsewhere. This systems perspective is more useful than debating whether any single hurricane or uprising can be attributed to climate change. It directs attention toward resilience, redundancy, and the political capacity to distribute scarce resources fairly.
The proposed response is deliberately institutional: adapt bases and equipment, reduce energy vulnerability, and cooperate with foreign militaries. The energy examples show how mitigation can gain traction when it also improves readiness. Yet the broader lesson is not that the armed forces can solve climate change. It is that climate risk becomes national-security risk when vital systems are fragile, response capacity is overcommitted, and prevention is postponed. The military’s warning matters precisely because it is a warning about limits, not a claim of unlimited capacity.
Review Summary
Glossary
threat multiplier
Intensifies existing instabilityA way of describing climate change as a force that worsens existing vulnerabilities rather than independently causing a particular conflict. Drought, flooding, or food stress can intensify poverty, political division, and weak governance. Whether these pressures lead to violence depends on how institutions and communities respond.
ladder of escalation
Rising levels of military demandKlare’s model for arranging climate-related security scenarios by the demands they may place on the U.S. military. It begins with short-term disaster relief and extends toward prolonged operations amid state failure, disruptions to global systems, great-power conflict, and severe emergencies at home. It is a planning framework, not a prediction of a fixed sequence.
climate shock waves
Disruptions spreading through systemsClimate-related disruptions that begin in one or more places and travel through connected economic or social systems. A poor harvest can affect global food prices; an energy interruption or infectious disease outbreak can also cause consequences far from its source. The concept emphasizes how interdependence can transmit and amplify local shocks.
complex catastrophes
Cascading failures of essential systemsA term used by the Department of Defense for disasters that overwhelm local response and trigger linked failures in critical infrastructure. Loss of electricity, for example, can disrupt hospitals, water treatment, communications, and transportation. The resulting emergency affects public health, government functions, and the ability to deliver aid.
Defense Support of Civil Authorities
Military support for civilian emergenciesOften abbreviated DSCA, this is the U.S. military’s support to civilian authorities during domestic emergencies and disasters. It can involve rescue, transport, engineering, medical assistance, logistics, and delivery of essential supplies. The book warns that more frequent or prolonged operations can divert forces from other missions and strain readiness.
operational energy
Energy used to perform missionsThe Department of Defense’s term for energy consumed by military forces while carrying out day-to-day missions. It includes fuel for vehicles, aircraft, and ships, as well as power used by deployed forces. Klare describes efforts to reduce this demand as a way to improve energy security, limit vulnerable supply convoys, and lower emissions.
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
Emergency aid after disastersOften abbreviated HA/DR, this describes military assistance such as delivering food, water, and medical supplies after a disaster. These missions are generally intended to be temporary, with local authorities taking over recovery as soon as they can. They become more demanding when disasters overwhelm governments, aid distribution is contested, or several emergencies overlap.
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