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Becoming Kim Jong Un

Becoming Kim Jong Un

A Former CIA Officer's Insights into North Korea's Enigmatic Young Dictator
Kim's nuclear arsenal protects a dynasty, and summit smiles may obscure what he will never trade.
by Jung H. Pak 2020 336 pages
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Key Takeaways

Treat Kim Jong Un as a calculating ruler, not a cartoon or a reformer

A surprising succession. When Kim Jong Un led his father’s funeral in 2011, many observers expected the young, inexperienced heir to be controlled by senior officials or quickly lose power. Instead, he removed or marginalized five members of the influential Gang of Seven within about two years, then concentrated authority in his own hands. The regime’s later diplomatic opening made him appear almost transformed, but it did not erase his record of repression or weapons development.

Adaptation is the point. Pak presents neither a madman nor a secret liberal. Kim can be personable in public, ruthless at home, and careful about avoiding actions that could threaten his rule. His flexibility makes him harder to predict, not easier to dismiss.

Analysis

What's striking is how biography corrects the easy labels without replacing them with a new caricature. Political psychology distinguishes a leader's temperament from the incentives built into the office: a calculating ruler can still take dangerous risks when survival, status, and domestic legitimacy are at stake. That distinction helps explain why charm at a summit does not prove peaceful intent, while threats do not necessarily signal a desire for war. The caution is that rationality is inferred from behavior, not directly observed. In a system this opaque, sound analysis should describe confidence levels, not claim access to Kim's private motives.

Read his nuclear arsenal as dynasty insurance, not a bargaining chip

Weapons protect the regime. North Korea’s nuclear project began under Kim Il Sung and expanded under Kim Jong Il. The Korean War had devastated the North, and the family’s leaders came to see outside threats, shifting alliances, and their own political vulnerability as enduring dangers. Nuclear weapons could deter attack, give the country international weight, and strengthen the ruling family’s claim to protect the nation.

The arsenal became personal. Kim Jong Un inherited a functioning program, accelerated missile and nuclear tests, and tied weapons to his own image and North Korea’s promised prosperity. Pak argues that this makes him less likely to trade the arsenal away than his father was. Deterrence may be central, but weapons also provide leverage and prestige, and their growth can create new incentives for coercion.

Analysis

The security dilemma is useful here: when one state builds weapons it regards as defensive, its neighbors may see an offensive threat and respond with military preparations. That response then appears to confirm the original fear. North Korea's history makes its security argument intelligible, but intelligibility is not proof that every weapons decision is defensive. The arsenal also serves domestic legitimacy and diplomatic leverage. Treating it as a simple bargaining asset misses those functions; treating it as purely defensive risks overlooking the danger its growing range and survivability create for others.

Trace Kim’s power to a family myth built into everyday life

A dynasty needs a story. Kim Il Sung’s guerrilla resistance to Japanese rule supplied a genuine nationalist foundation, which the regime later enlarged into a heroic origin story. After the Korean War, the state cultivated a personality cult that presented the leader as a father whose protection demanded loyalty. Portraits, monuments, school lessons, and public ceremonies made the family’s authority part of daily life.

Ideas became institutions. Juche, usually translated as self-reliance, helped justify national autonomy, sacrifice, and the leader’s authority. Suryong means the supreme, unitary leader. Songbun classifies citizens by family background and presumed political loyalty, shaping opportunities such as education and work. These structures made Kim Jong Un’s hereditary claim more than a family announcement: it was embedded in the political order he inherited.

Analysis

This account shows how legitimacy can be manufactured through repetition, ritual, and control of education, not merely imposed by force. It also connects to the sociology of institutions: once status determines schooling, employment, and family prospects, political categories become material facts in people's lives. The system is powerful partly because it makes loyalty seem necessary for ordinary survival. Yet a pervasive official story is not the same as universal belief. The book itself presents citizens who retain affection for Kim Il Sung while recognizing contradictions in the state, a reminder that outward conformity cannot be read as private conviction.

Use purges and patronage to understand why North Korean elites obey

Power has a price. Kim’s 2013 execution of his uncle Jang Song Thaek shocked observers because Jang was a senior relative with extensive bureaucratic and business connections. The public humiliation and punishment warned officials that family ties and past service offered no reliable protection. Pak reports that more than 340 senior officials were purged during Kim’s first five years in power, according to a South Korean think tank.

Loyalty pays, too. Officials and connected business networks depend on access to state positions, natural-resource revenues, and opportunities to make money. By replacing senior figures and redistributing their posts, Kim weakened rival networks and made privilege more dependent on his approval. Such purges can secure obedience, but they also discourage honest advice and make officials guess what the leader wants.

Analysis

Authoritarian systems face a principal-agent problem: rulers need officials to carry out policy, but officials may build power of their own. Purges and patronage are ways to manage that danger, as well as displays of personal dominance. The tradeoff is an information problem. When disagreement becomes dangerous, leaders receive fewer warnings about policy failures and may mistake silence for consent. The book's account of Jang also shows that elite conflict can concern access to profits, not just ideological loyalty. That economic dimension matters because a purge changes who benefits from the system, not only who occupies an office.

Watch markets and information leaks, not just official propaganda

Survival built a market. During the famine of the 1990s, state food distribution failed and ordinary North Koreans turned to informal trade to stay alive. These markets, known as jangmadang, grew beyond the state’s ability to suppress them. By 2017, one South Korean institute counted more than 400 officially sanctioned markets, with estimates reaching 750 when informal venues were included. One estimate put market work at 70 to 80 percent of an average person’s income.

Money carries information. Trade creates contact with foreign goods, media, and ideas that contradict the official picture of a prosperous North. The state has tolerated markets while monitoring and regulating them, but greater consumer choice also raises expectations. The divide between Pyongyang’s showcase prosperity and widespread deprivation remains stark.

Analysis

Markets change more than prices. They create practical networks, bargaining skills, and channels through which information can travel, giving citizens forms of agency that a command economy tries to restrict. This resembles a broader pattern in political economy: states may permit informal activity because it supplies goods the government cannot, even as it weakens centralized control. Still, marketization should not be mistaken for an automatic path to political change. The regime can tax, license, and exploit trade, while unequal access may strengthen well-connected elites as much as it empowers ordinary sellers.

Treat cyberattacks as strategic weapons, not comic side plots

A movie became a warning. In 2014, hackers attacked Sony Pictures after the studio prepared to release a comedy depicting Kim Jong Un’s assassination. The breach exposed private company data and employees’ personal information, and threats against cinemas helped pressure the company to cancel a wide release before it reversed course. U.S. investigators attributed the attack to North Korea. The episode showed that the regime could reach beyond the peninsula without using conventional weapons.

Technology serves two fronts. The book describes cyber operations used for espionage, disruption, and revenue generation, including the 2016 theft of $81 million from Bangladesh Bank. At home, North Korea expanded phones and a domestic intranet while restricting access to the global Internet. The same technological push could modernize the country and strengthen surveillance.

Analysis

Cyber operations suit a weaker state because they can impose costs at a distance, complicate attribution, and exploit the dependence of richer societies on connected systems. That makes them strategically significant even when they do not cause physical destruction. The domestic intranet illustrates a related point: technology does not inherently liberalize politics; institutions determine who controls access and data. At the same time, attribution in cyberspace is difficult, and public accusations depend on technical evidence that cannot always be fully disclosed. Clear distinctions between demonstrated findings and intelligence judgments are especially important in this domain.

Judge summit theater by verifiable concessions, not personal chemistry

The image changed quickly. In 2018, Kim moved from missile threats to meetings with South Korean president Moon Jae-in, Chinese president Xi Jinping, and U.S. president Donald Trump. The summits made him appear approachable and helped shift attention toward peace. But the Singapore statement offered only a broad pledge to work toward denuclearization, without detailed steps or a verification process.

The substance stayed thin. At the 2019 Hanoi summit, talks ended without an agreement. Kim sought substantial sanctions relief in return for closing part of the Yongbyon nuclear complex, while the United States sought broader steps. Pak argues that Kim gained diplomatic status and softer pressure without surrendering his core arsenal. Friendly images and dramatic firsts mattered politically, but they were not evidence of disarmament.

Analysis

Summits are both negotiations and performances. Public recognition can itself be valuable to a leader, while vague language lets each side tell its domestic audience a favorable story. The institutional lesson is straightforward: personal rapport cannot substitute for agreed definitions, sequencing, inspections, and consequences for noncompliance. Yet spectacle is not necessarily empty. Meetings can reduce immediate tension and create channels for communication. The mistake is treating those benefits as proof of strategic convergence. A careful assessment separates crisis management, diplomatic recognition, and actual changes to weapons capability.

Separate capability from intent, and test every confident interpretation

Hard targets invite assumptions. North Korea restricts access, manipulates information, and surrounds observable facts with propaganda. Pak draws on intelligence analyst Richards Heuer to show why analysts must consider what they know, what they do not know, and how strongly the evidence supports a conclusion. A missile that can reach a target does not prove a leader intends to strike it; public friendliness does not prove a desire to disarm.

Two biases distort judgment. Mirror-imaging means assuming another leader wants what one would want in similar circumstances. Vividness bias gives outsized weight to direct, memorable encounters, such as a warm summit, even when less dramatic evidence may be stronger. Kim’s shifts between provocation and diplomacy make both errors tempting.

Analysis

The distinction between capability and intent is central to sound risk analysis. Capability is often easier to observe; intent is inferred from actions, doctrine, incentives, and context, all of which can change. Bayesian reasoning offers a useful discipline: update confidence as evidence arrives, but give each piece weight according to its reliability rather than its emotional force. This also protects against the opposite error, dismissing a genuine change because past behavior dominates the frame. Humility does not mean refusing to make judgments. It means making judgments that remain revisable.

Reject preventive strikes when retaliation could devastate Seoul and Tokyo

A strike could escalate. Pak argues that an attack intended to punish or deter Kim could instead confirm his belief that nuclear weapons are necessary for regime survival. He might retaliate with conventional forces, use nuclear weapons if he believed an attack on his government was imminent, or misread the scale of the threat. A successor would not necessarily abandon the arsenal if Kim were removed.

The human cost is immense. Seoul lies close to the border and is vulnerable to North Korean artillery. A Congressional Research Service estimate cited in the book said North Korea could fire 10,000 artillery rounds per minute at the city and that 300,000 South Koreans could die within days. A wider conflict could also bring nuclear devastation and severe disruption to the region’s economy.

Analysis

Deterrence is not a guarantee of safety; it is a way of shaping an adversary's expectations under uncertainty. A preventive strike risks collapsing that uncertainty into a crisis where both sides fear losing the ability to act. Escalation theory highlights the danger of assuming that a limited attack will remain limited once the target interprets it as an existential threat. The case against a strike is strongest when paired with a credible alternative: defense, allied coordination, diplomacy, and measures that reduce the chance of accidental escalation. Avoiding war is not the same as accepting the status quo.

Pair sustained pressure with diplomacy, alliance unity, and information access

Pressure needs coordination. Pak’s proposed response combines sanctions enforcement with continued diplomatic channels, cooperation among the United States, South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, and preparations for future provocations. Divisions among those governments can give Kim room to weaken sanctions and negotiate separately with each partner. Economic incentives remain possible, but the book argues that they are unlikely to make him surrender weapons he sees as central to the regime’s survival.

People matter, too. Pak also calls for stronger attention to human rights and more access to outside information inside North Korea. The aim is not simply to pressure the leadership from abroad, but to challenge the information controls and internal assumptions that help sustain its rule. The strategy requires patience, consistent implementation, and an open door to talks.

Analysis

This approach treats foreign policy as a portfolio rather than a single lever. Sanctions can limit resources, alliances can reduce opportunities for coercion, and communication can manage immediate danger. Information access addresses a different level: the state’s ability to monopolize the story citizens hear about their lives and the outside world. These tools can reinforce one another, but they can also conflict. Broad pressure may deepen hardship for ordinary people, and information campaigns can be framed as hostile interference. Policy therefore needs clear humanitarian safeguards and realistic measures of success, not just evidence that pressure has been applied.

Analysis

Pak’s central achievement is to make Kim Jong Un legible without pretending that he is fully knowable. Biography explains why a young successor inherited unusual confidence and a political system built around the Kim family; history explains why the regime treats foreign threat, military power, and national survival as inseparable. The resulting portrait is not a diagnosis of personality so much as an account of incentives: nuclear weapons deter, advertise status, support domestic legitimacy, and give a weak state leverage over stronger rivals.

The strongest through-line is the interaction between coercion and adaptation. Kim uses purges to prevent elite networks from becoming independent, markets to compensate for the state’s economic failures, technology to extend surveillance and cyber reach, and diplomacy to change the international atmosphere. These are not signs of a coherent liberalizing project. They are instruments for preserving regime autonomy while making selective changes that serve it. The account also usefully distinguishes a leader’s ability to cause catastrophic harm from evidence that he seeks catastrophe.

The evidence, however, is necessarily uneven. North Korea is opaque, so conclusions about private intentions rely on public behavior, defectors, intelligence assessments, and regime messaging. The book generally signals uncertainty, but its strategic interpretation can still make the regime appear more unified and purposeful than an information-starved bureaucracy may be. Its policy perspective also centers American and allied security. North Koreans appear as people harmed by repression and famine, but also as a possible source of pressure on the leadership. Their agency deserves consideration in its own right, not only as a tool of statecraft.

The policy argument is therefore most persuasive when it rejects both magical thinking and fatalism. Summits alone cannot replace verification, and force can trigger the very conflict it is meant to prevent. Coordinated pressure, credible diplomacy, and attention to information control offer a more realistic combination, provided they remain sensitive to humanitarian consequences and the risks of miscalculation. The book’s enduring lesson is methodological: treat every dramatic change as evidence to assess, not as proof that the underlying strategic problem has disappeared.

Summary in 30 Seconds
Kim Jong Un uses nuclear weapons to deter attack, build international leverage, and reinforce his family's claim to rule. Purges weaken elite rivals, while patronage ties their fortunes to his approval. Markets sustain households and expose citizens to outside ideas, even as the state monitors them. Cyber operations extend the regime's reach. Diplomatic meetings cannot establish disarmament without verifiable steps, while a preventive strike risks catastrophic retaliation. Coordinated pressure, diplomacy, and access to outside information offer a less dangerous course.
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Review Summary

3.76 out of 5
Average of 1k+ ratings from Goodreads and Amazon.

Becoming Kim Jong Un receives mixed reviews, with an average rating of 3.77/5. Readers appreciate the insights into North Korean politics and Kim's leadership, praising the author's analysis and historical context. Some find it informative and well-researched, especially regarding Kim's interactions with other world leaders. However, critics argue it lacks new information, repeats content, and relies heavily on existing sources. The book's structure and writing style receive both praise and criticism. Overall, it's considered a solid overview for those interested in North Korean politics, despite some shortcomings.

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Glossary

juche

self-reliance ideology

A North Korean state ideology, often translated as self-reliance, developed under Kim Il Sung. It emphasizes national autonomy and distinctively Korean leadership, justifies sacrifice and hardship, and supports the ruling family’s claim to guide the country without outside interference. Pak describes it as a political tool as well as an ideology.

suryong

supreme unitary leader

The North Korean concept of a supreme leader who serves as the central authority of the state and political community. In Pak’s account, the term connects a paternal image of leadership to the demand for unified loyalty, helping place the Kim family above institutions and ordinary political accountability.

songbun

inherited loyalty classification

North Korea’s social classification system, based on a person’s family history and presumed political reliability. Its broad categories include core, wavering, and hostile groups. Songbun can affect access to education, employment, residence, and other opportunities, extending political judgments across generations.

songun

military-first policy

A North Korean policy associated especially with Kim Jong Il that gives priority to the military in national life and resource allocation. Pak explains that military-first politics helped present armed strength as essential to state survival, while legitimizing the diversion of resources toward military programs even as the population faced severe hardship.

byungjin

parallel development policy

Kim Jong Un’s policy of pursuing nuclear weapons development and economic growth at the same time. It promises that North Korea can become more prosperous without giving up its strategic arsenal. Pak presents the policy as central to Kim’s public image and an attempt to link military power with improved living standards.

jangmadang generation

market-raised generation

The generation of North Koreans who grew up as informal markets expanded after the state’s food distribution system failed during the famine. Many learned to depend on private trading and market income rather than state provision. Their daily experience of commerce and exposure to outside goods and media can conflict with official propaganda.

mirror-imaging

projecting one's own motives

An intelligence-analysis error in which observers assume another actor will behave as they themselves would under similar circumstances. Pak uses the concept to explain why U.S. leaders might assume Kim values economic opportunity or personal rapport in the same way they do, even when his priorities and understanding of national interest differ.

vividness bias

overweighting memorable evidence

A judgment error in which direct, striking experiences receive more weight than less vivid evidence, even when that less vivid evidence may be more informative. In Pak’s account, a warm face-to-face meeting with Kim can overshadow the record of weapons development, repression, and earlier negotiations.

About the Author

Jung H. Pak is a former CIA analyst and North Korea expert. Her background in intelligence and national security informs her writing on Kim Jong Un and North Korean politics. Pak's expertise is evident in her detailed analysis of the Kim dynasty and current geopolitical dynamics. She draws on her experience briefing high-level officials, including the US president, to provide insights into North Korea's leadership and strategic goals. Pak's work focuses on understanding Kim Jong Un's motivations and decision-making processes, offering a nuanced perspective on the enigmatic leader. Her writing style is described as accessible yet thorough, combining academic rigor with practical intelligence experience.

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