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SoBrief
Can Democracy Work?

Can Democracy Work?

A Short History of a Radical Idea, from Ancient Athens to Our World
From Athens to Occupy, democracy keeps changing the answer to who should rule.
by James Miller 2018 320 pages
3.53
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Key Takeaways

Treat democracy as a contest over who governs, who belongs, and how power stays answerable.

One word, rival projects. Miller’s history rejects the comforting idea that democracy steadily evolved from Athens into today’s liberal states. For most centuries, democracy was treated as disorder; since the French Revolution, it has been claimed by systems as different as the United States and North Korea. The term’s persistence reflects a shared belief that legitimate power comes from the people, even when governments disagree about who “the people” are or how their will should be expressed. Popular sovereignty means that a people, rather than a monarch or ruling class, is the ultimate source of political authority.

A necessary distinction. Democracy and liberalism are not synonyms. Democracy concerns who holds political power; liberalism limits what power may do, protecting rights and individual freedoms. Majorities can support illiberal policies, while liberal protections can restrict popular choices. The modern democratic project remains unsettled because representative institutions often frustrate citizens, prompting recurring revolts that can renew participation or threaten legal order.

Analysis

The useful move here is to treat democracy as a contested claim to legitimacy, not a badge a country earns once and keeps. This resembles a problem in constitutional theory: authority needs both a source and limits. Popular consent answers who may rule, while rights and procedures address what rulers may do. Those principles can reinforce one another, but they can also collide. The distinction helps explain why appeals to “the people” alone do not settle whether a policy is just, inclusive, or accountable. It also cautions against dismissing every disruptive movement as anti-democratic merely because it challenges established institutions.

Athens made ordinary citizens rulers, but only by excluding most residents.

Participation by design. In classical Athens, citizens met in the Assembly at least forty times a year. Many offices, including the Council of 500, were filled by lottery, giving ordinary male citizens a direct share in governing rather than reserving office for the wealthy. The lottery also limited the advantages of family connections and campaign resources. Elected generals were an exception, since military command required experience. Athens was not a modern democracy: it had no universal human-rights framework, and women, enslaved people, and resident foreigners were excluded from political citizenship.

Power and its costs. Citizenship was a privilege held by a small fraction of the population, while the city depended on slavery and imperial power. Pericles combined popular leadership with military command and used imperial revenues to fund public works and pay citizens for some civic duties. The Assembly could also reverse itself: after first voting to punish the rebellious city of Mytilene harshly, citizens reconsidered the next day and chose a less sweeping punishment. Participation enabled collective judgment, but did not guarantee humane or consistent decisions.

Analysis

Athens demonstrates that participation is not simply a matter of counting votes. Lotteries distributed access to office, while frequent assemblies made civic service part of ordinary life. Modern experiments with sortition, the selection of decision-makers by lot, draw on the same insight: a group chosen this way may better reflect the public than a group dependent on fundraising and electioneering. But the Athenian example also makes the boundary question unavoidable. A highly participatory system for insiders can coexist with severe domination of outsiders. The measure of democratic inclusion is therefore not only how much power citizens exercise, but how many people are denied the title.

A revolution’s dilemma. In August 1792, Parisian neighborhood assemblies helped depose the king, insisting that sovereignty belonged to the people themselves, not to monarchs or distant lawmakers. The uprising was a real exercise of popular power, but it came with lethal violence. The question was how a large, divided country could preserve direct participation without making permanent insurrection its only check on government.

Condorcet’s bridge. His proposed constitution connected local assemblies to regional bodies and a national legislature. Citizens could raise laws for reconsideration and demand a new constitutional convention, while national institutions prevented Paris alone from claiming to speak for France. Condorcet’s related Jury Theorem argued that a group can make better decisions than an individual expert when voters have some relevant knowledge, vote independently, and choose sincerely. His constitution was rejected. A later Jacobin constitution was approved but suspended as revolutionary dictatorship and the Terror took hold. The revolution helped establish representative democracy: elected delegates govern, while citizens retain ways to scrutinize or replace them.

Analysis

The central design challenge is not choosing between direct and representative democracy as if one must eliminate the other. It is building reliable links between public initiative and institutions capable of making decisions at scale. Condorcet’s proposal recognized that local assemblies could surface issues without each assembly claiming authority over the whole nation. His voting theorem adds an important qualification: numbers help only when people can access information, think independently, and avoid strategic voting. That is a demanding set of conditions, not a promise that crowds are wise by nature. The French case shows how emergency powers can exploit the gap between popular legitimacy and durable safeguards.

Measure democracy by the boundaries of citizenship, not ballots alone.

An unfinished promise. The American founders generally preferred a republic governed by elected leaders to direct democracy, and the new Constitution restricted political participation. Thomas Jefferson’s language of equality challenged inherited privilege, but he enslaved people, and the republic tolerated slavery from its founding. The contradiction was not peripheral: its ideals of liberty and equal citizenship existed alongside the denial of both to millions.

Expansion with exclusions. Andrew Jackson’s campaigns helped make “democracy” a celebrated political identity and widened voting among white men. Yet Jackson also supported Native American removal and disregarded a Supreme Court ruling protecting Cherokee sovereignty. In 1842, Rhode Island’s Dorr rebellion challenged voting restrictions through an unauthorized people’s convention, but its proposed constitution excluded Black men. Across the country, restrictions based on race, property, and gender endured. The franchise expanded through conflict, not a smooth march toward inclusion; women gained the vote nationally in 1920, and barriers to Black voting continued long after.

Analysis

The history complicates the familiar equation of elections with democratic legitimacy. An election can be competitive among a narrow electorate, and the resulting government can still claim to represent an entire population. Political theory calls attention to this distinction between formal participation and effective membership. The Rhode Island episode is especially revealing: reformers could demand a broader franchise while drawing a racial boundary around the people they wanted to empower. That does not make electoral gains meaningless. It means each expansion must be judged by whose standing it recognizes, whose interests it hears, and whether new rules quietly preserve old exclusions.

Political equality stays thin when workers lack power over wealth and work.

The ballot was not enough. Britain’s Chartists linked political exclusion to working-class hardship. Their 1839 People’s Charter demanded votes for all men, secret ballots, equal districts, paid members of Parliament, and other reforms. More than 1.2 million signatures accompanied the petition, yet Parliament rejected it. Some Chartists pursued reform through petitions; others considered strikes and armed resistance.

Democracy’s social question. Later movements argued that a vote could not create equality while wealth and workplaces remained controlled by a few. Marx saw political democracy as inadequate without changing economic power. Giuseppe Mazzini joined self-government to national independence and a moral vision of international solidarity. The Paris Commune of 1871 briefly offered a workers’ government, then ended in a massacre. Its defeat became a symbol for later socialists, while also exposing the danger of treating revolutionary force as a shortcut to a just society. The argument endures: political rights matter, but material dependence can make those rights unequal in practice.

Analysis

This strand of the history anticipates a distinction between equal rights on paper and equal capacity to use them. A worker with little time, security, or access to decision-makers may possess the same vote as a wealthy citizen yet exert less influence over policy. The social-democratic answer is to connect political equality to bargaining power, public services, and economic rules. That connection is persuasive, but it leaves a hard question: how much economic equality can be pursued through state power without weakening political freedom? The Commune’s fate warns that egalitarian goals do not by themselves make a movement democratic in its methods.

Organization creates leverage. As voting rights widened in Europe, political parties gave citizens a way to organize competing interests and influence national government. Germany’s Social Democratic Party became a powerful electoral force, supported by unions and an extensive hierarchy of professional organizers. Such structures helped movements persist beyond a single protest and compete for office.

The leadership trap. Robert Michels called the tendency for organizations to concentrate power in a small leadership group the “iron law of oligarchy.” Large groups need coordination, expertise, and continuity, but those needs can let leaders control information and decisions. The Russian soviets began as workers’ and soldiers’ councils, yet their fluid assemblies proved vulnerable to direction by executive committees and, after Lenin’s return, Bolshevik control. “Democratic centralism” promised elected accountability alongside binding central decisions, but in practice concentrated authority in the party. Democracy’s institutions can preserve participation while also narrowing who actually decides.

Analysis

Michels identifies a recurring organizational tradeoff, not a reason to abandon organization. Coordination lowers the cost of collective action, but it also creates roles with more information, time, and influence than ordinary members possess. This is familiar in firms, unions, and advocacy groups as well as political parties. The relevant question is whether leaders can be challenged: are decisions visible, can members replace officials, and can dissent survive without expulsion? The soviet example shows why a participatory origin is no guarantee of democratic control. The form of an institution matters less than the distribution of power inside it.

Treat polls and media as political machinery, not transparent windows onto public will.

Citizens see fragments. Walter Lippmann argued that people cannot directly know the full complexity of modern public affairs. They rely on reports, simplified pictures, and pre-existing assumptions, which he called stereotypes. This makes “government by public opinion” more fragile than optimistic theories of enlightened citizens suggest. John Dewey accepted the problem but argued that education, inquiry, and local association could strengthen the public’s capacity to judge.

Opinion can be shaped. Edward Bernays presented public relations as a way to organize and influence public understanding. George Gallup’s scientifically sampled polls, which outperformed the mass postcard survey of the Literary Digest in 1936, gave public opinion a new measurable form. But polls simplify questions and can influence the attitudes they claim merely to record. Joseph Schumpeter offered a harder definition: modern democracy is competition among politicians for votes, not direct rule by a unified public. Measurement helps reveal opinion; it cannot make opinion independent of framing or power.

Analysis

The information problem is not solved by producing more data. A poll can describe a response to a particular question, but the wording, timing, sample, and available choices shape what that response means. Likewise, a media environment can make some concerns visible and others difficult to imagine. This connects democratic theory to cognitive psychology, where people use mental shortcuts to handle limited attention. Such shortcuts are unavoidable, but they can be exploited. Lippmann’s skepticism is valuable when it challenges fantasies of a fully informed public; it becomes limiting if treated as proof that experts alone can represent the public interest.

Use protest to reopen politics, then build institutions that can survive disagreement.

The square can awaken politics. In 2011, Occupy Wall Street used open assemblies and consensus decision-making to challenge economic inequality and the influence of financial elites. Participants experienced direct democracy as a vivid alternative to choosing among candidates selected by established parties. The movement helped put inequality back into public debate.

Consensus has a scale problem. In an assembly, consensus means seeking agreement rather than settling disagreement by majority vote; Occupy allowed a participant to block a proposal on principle. This could encourage careful listening, but meetings became long and logistical. Working groups and informal leaders acquired influence, while a demand for unanimity could give the most uncompromising position disproportionate power. A self-selected encampment also did not have to govern people who disagreed with it. Protest can expose problems and create political energy, but large, diverse societies need institutions that can make accountable decisions without pretending that everyone shares one view.

Analysis

Occupy’s strength was partly expressive: it made participation itself an argument about who should have a voice. Its weakness was not simply that meetings were inefficient. Consensus works best when participants share a commitment to the process and can leave without imposing costs on others. Public institutions cannot assume those conditions. The challenge is to preserve deliberation while accepting that disagreement may be lasting and that decisions still have to be made. Protest and institutional politics are therefore complementary tools. Protest can force neglected issues onto the agenda; accountable structures can negotiate them among people who did not choose to join the same movement.

Keep democracy aspirational, but anchor it in rights, pluralism, and truthful public life.

An ideal with tests. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights tied democratic legitimacy to participation, equal access to public service, and genuine elections. Yet the book’s period-specific measures show how far practice fell short: The Economist’s 2017 index classified only 4.5 percent of the world’s population as living in a full democracy. Such rankings are imperfect, but they make clear that democratic language and democratic performance are not the same.

A liberal safeguard. Miller’s conclusion favors pluralism: citizens need not share one faith or political vision to govern together, but must accept rights and procedures that protect opponents. Václav Havel adds that law alone cannot sustain freedom without honesty, responsibility, and concern for others. Democracy remains vulnerable to inequality, misinformation, secrecy, and leaders who claim exclusive authority to speak for “the people.” Its ideal is worth keeping, not as proof that a nation is already just, but as a standard citizens can use to challenge exclusion and abuse.

Analysis

An aspirational standard has value only if it can criticize its own institutions. Human-rights language, election indexes, and constitutional protections offer different ways to make that criticism concrete, though none captures the whole of democratic life. Liberal limits can protect minorities from majority rule, but they can also shelter decisions from public scrutiny when institutions become remote. The demanding balance is to preserve rights without treating the existing order as beyond revision. Havel’s emphasis on truthfulness adds an ethical dimension: political disagreement needs enough shared reality for arguments to be tested, rather than merely repeated as competing claims of identity.

Analysis

Miller’s history is organized around a productive tension: democracy promises collective self-rule, but the people are never a single, stable entity waiting to be consulted. They must be defined, organized, and heard through institutions, and those institutions inevitably select some voices, procedures, and interests over others. The book’s chronological episodes make this tension tangible. Athens distributes office through lotteries yet excludes most residents. Paris asserts popular sovereignty but cannot easily convert a city uprising into legitimate national authority. American elections widen participation while preserving racial and gender exclusions. Modern parties organize mass politics but generate leadership structures that can distance members from power.

The strongest implication is that democracy should be evaluated on at least three levels: who is included in the political community, how citizens can influence decisions, and whether the resulting power is constrained by rights and accountability. These levels can conflict. More participation does not automatically mean more liberty, and more procedural restraint does not automatically mean more popular control. The distinction between democracy and liberalism is therefore not merely semantic; it clarifies a genuine institutional problem.

The narrative’s European focus is acknowledged, but it also limits the account of democracy as a global history. The book is most convincing as a history of an influential political vocabulary and its movement through European and American revolutions, institutions, and empires, rather than as a comprehensive account of every tradition of self-government. Its final emphasis on liberal pluralism is a reasoned response to the failures of coercive unity and consensus politics, not a simple resolution. Liberal institutions themselves can become remote, unequal, or captured. The lasting test is whether citizens retain real ways to contest authority, extend membership, and revise rules without having to choose between acquiescence and insurrection.

Summary in 30 Seconds
Democracy depends on who counts as a citizen, how people influence decisions, and what restrains power. Athens met about 40 times yearly but excluded women, enslaved people, and foreigners. The Chartists gathered over 1.2 million signatures for voting reform. Parties expand influence while concentrating leadership. Polls measure framed opinions, not pure public will. Only 4.5 percent of people lived in full democracies in 2017.
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Glossary

People as ultimate authority

The principle that political authority ultimately belongs to a people rather than to a monarch, inherited elite, or ruling class. In modern democratic movements, it raises practical questions about how the people express their will, whether through assemblies, elections, representatives, or revolt, and who is entitled to count as part of the people.

general will

Shared public interest

Rousseau’s term for interests citizens hold in common as members of a political community, distinct from the private desires of individuals. It is not simply whatever a majority happens to want. The concept assumes that people can identify shared aims, such as freedom and equality, and gives modern democratic theory a difficult problem: how can institutions recognize common interests without claiming to speak for everyone by force?

Condorcet Jury Theorem

When groups judge well

Condorcet’s mathematical argument that a group can be more likely than any individual member to reach a correct decision. The result depends on conditions: voters must each be more likely than chance to choose correctly, vote independently, and vote sincerely rather than strategically. The theorem supports the possible value of collective judgment, but does not guarantee that a crowd is wise when information or independence is lacking.

representative democracy

Elected delegates govern

A form of democracy in which citizens choose delegates to make public decisions on their behalf, rather than governing mainly through direct assembly. It emerged as a proposed way to combine popular legitimacy with the practical demands of governing a large society. Its democratic character depends on whether representatives remain accountable and whether citizens have meaningful ways to replace or challenge them.

iron law of oligarchy

Organizations concentrate power

Robert Michels’s claim that organizations tend to transfer practical control to a small leadership group. Coordination, expertise, and access to information give leaders advantages over ordinary members, even in organizations founded to promote equality. The idea describes a persistent risk rather than a fixed outcome: transparency, internal elections, and genuine possibilities of replacing leaders can constrain concentration of power.

democratic centralism

Central authority, elected internally

A model of party organization that combines elections and internal accountability with binding decisions from central leadership. In theory, officials are chosen through democratic procedures while the organization acts with unity once a decision is made. In the Russian revolutionary context described by Miller, the promise of democratic accountability gave way to concentrated party authority and dictatorship.

Collective Thinking

Build ideas together

A consensus-oriented practice used in assemblies such as Occupy Wall Street. Rather than treating debate as a contest in which one proposal defeats another, participants try to combine differing views into a decision acceptable to the group. The method emphasizes attentive listening and can deepen involvement, but it can also consume time, empower informal facilitators, and give a single objection the power to block action.

About the Author

James Miller is a professor of politics and the chair of liberal studies at the New School for Social Research in New York City. A prolific writer, he has authored several notable works, including Examined Lives, The Passion of Michel Foucault, and Flowers in the Dustbin: The Rise of Rock & Roll, 1947–1977, as well as Can Democracy Work? His work spans a wide range of subjects, from political philosophy and intellectual biography to cultural history. Miller is recognized as a prominent academic voice, contributing significantly to discussions on politics, liberal studies, and modern thought.

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