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SoBrief
Dealmaking

Dealmaking

The New Strategy of Negotiauctions
Choose when to auction, negotiate, or redesign the deal, before the process costs you leverage.
by Guhan Subramanian 2020 243 pages
3.88
42 ratings
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Key Takeaways

Treat most important deals as auctions and negotiations at the same time

Two kinds of pressure. A negotiauction is a deal where pressure comes both from the other side of the table and from competitors seeking the same deal. Columbus spent years trying to persuade Spain to fund his westward voyage. The queen changed course only when the prospect of France taking the opportunity became real. He created the possibility of competition without actually reaching the French court.

Competition needs design. Cable & Wireless America had seven bidders, yet its auction stalled near $66 million. After the sellers changed the process, bids reached $168.3 million. Competition alone did not produce the result. The way it was introduced, and the rules bidders expected, mattered. Most consequential deals occupy this mixed territory, rather than fitting neatly into a private negotiation or a formal auction.

Analysis

The concept shifts attention from tactics inside a meeting to the architecture around it. In mechanism design, outcomes depend not only on what participants want, but also on the rules that shape their choices. The Columbus story makes that abstract point memorable: the rival mattered even before it made an offer. Yet perceived competition is not automatically beneficial. If parties suspect a manufactured rival or a process that keeps changing, trust and participation can collapse. The practical challenge is to create credible pressure without making the process feel rigged.

Choose the process by bidder quality, asset complexity, urgency, and trust

Four dimensions matter. The BASC framework organizes the choice between auction and negotiation around bidders, asset characteristics, seller circumstances, and context. A broad auction can help when many potential buyers are hard to identify, as happened when Cable & Wireless America canvassed strategic, financial, and international firms. A private negotiation can be better when only a few buyers qualify, or when the strongest bidder values the asset far more than the runner-up.

Fit beats habit. Auctions work best when the asset is easy to specify and price dominates. Negotiations leave more room to adapt a complex deal, protect secrecy, or build a relationship. Speed can favor an auction, as with a struggling company losing cash each day. Transparency can also matter more than price maximization, particularly in public procurement. No single process is best for every sale.

Analysis

This is a useful antidote to the reflex that more bidders always mean a better outcome. A process has operating costs: sellers must manage participants, and bidders may avoid a costly contest with little chance of winning. The framework also exposes trade-offs between economic efficiency and legitimacy. A public agency may accept a lower price to demonstrate equal treatment, while a company may prefer privacy to prevent employee or customer uncertainty. The framework is strongest as a checklist, not a formula. Its dimensions interact, and the same asset can call for different processes under different constraints.

Make bidders see a credible finish line before asking for best offers

Endless rounds invite caution. In the Cable & Wireless America sale, the rules could change at any point, so bidders had reason to stay in the process without revealing their best price. After an exhausting overnight auction, the high bid was only $66.2 million. The sellers then introduced elimination rounds, excusing the lowest bidder or bidders after each round. As the field narrowed and the end became more credible, offers rose through $70 million, $80 million, and $100 million, eventually reaching $168.3 million.

Commitment changes behavior. A finish line tells participants when their last opportunity to act will come. By contrast, a retailer that let losing contractors bid again after its formal auction taught them to hold back. Once it removed that extra round, bidders had reason to submit stronger offers from the start.

Analysis

A clear endpoint is a commitment device: it makes a promise about future procedure costly to break, which can make present behavior more candid. The lesson applies beyond auctions to hiring, procurement, and fundraising, where participants may ration effort if they expect another chance. Flexibility still has value when new information genuinely changes the deal. The danger is discretionary flexibility that benefits only the process setter. Predictable rules are not bureaucratic decoration; they are part of what participants are being asked to trust.

Set your bid by the real cost of losing, not asset value alone

Winning is not the only stake. In an all-pay auction, losing also costs a bidder something, such as letting a major competitor acquire a business. That expected loss belongs in the bidder's valuation. But shared uncertainty creates the winner's curse: when everyone estimates the same hidden value, the high bidder is especially likely to have guessed too high. In a classroom coin-jar exercise, the contents were worth about $16, while winning bids often landed in the mid-$30s.

Estimate the trade-off. Maximum bid of others, or MBOO, analysis asks how a higher bid changes the chance of winning and the profit if successful. In one example, a $600 bid had a 90 percent chance of earning $100, or $90 expected profit. An $800 bid had a 50 percent chance of earning $300, or $150 expected profit. Winning more often is not the same as bidding better.

Analysis

The distinction between the cost of losing and the emotional sting of losing is crucial. A competitor's acquisition can rationally harm a bidder's future position; a rival's victory at a charity auction usually does not. Both can feel urgent in the moment, but only one belongs in a sound valuation. MBOO analysis disciplines the familiar preference for certainty by making probability and margin visible together. Its weakness is that the probability of winning is often hard to estimate. The method improves structured judgment, not certainty.

Trade across issues when different forecasts can make both sides better off

Prepare beyond the price. The Frasier renewal shows why dealmakers should identify the parties, their interests, their alternatives, and the incentives of the individuals at the table. Paramount opened at $6 million per episode, NBC at $4.75 million, and they eventually agreed at about $5.4 million. The star wanted three more seasons partly to secure a place in television history, while NBC worried that ratings would fall.

Build a larger bargain. Instead of fighting only over price, the parties considered development funding and ratings-based increases or decreases. Such contingent terms let each side act on its own forecast while sharing the risk. In broader negotiations, MESOs, or multiple equivalent simultaneous offers, are two or three packages equally acceptable to the proposer. Asking which package the other side prefers can reveal priorities without demanding a full disclosure of interests.

Analysis

This section connects bargaining to information design. A package of terms can reveal what another party values more than a direct question, because preferences become visible in choices. Contingent payments can likewise turn disagreement about the future into a testable contract rather than a stalemate over whose forecast is correct. That approach depends on measures both sides can observe and cannot easily manipulate. Ratings, delivery dates, and performance targets may look objective while still inviting disputes over measurement. Creativity helps only when the resulting terms can be administered.

Make entry conditional when your participation gives the seller leverage

Negotiate the rules first. A setup move establishes the terms on which a participant will enter a competitive process. On Martha's Vineyard, Joe and Alice Townsend wanted a house but refused an open-ended bidding contest. They offered to participate only if the next round would be sealed, final, and based on precise dollar bids. They also required that a competing offer actually exist before their own bid was delivered.

Protect the conditions. When the other bidder submitted a bid defined as the Townsends' offer plus an unspecified amount, their written terms gave them grounds to demand a redo before their sealed offer was opened. They won at $1.484 million against the other bidder's $1.475 million. The book calls the principle pay me to play: if a participant's entry improves the seller's alternatives, that participant can seek process concessions in exchange.

Analysis

A setup move turns an often-invisible asset, access to a credible bidder, into something that can be bargained over. It is also a form of self-protection: the Townsends limited the seller's ability to use their enthusiasm to stimulate more bidding. Written conditions matter because memory and interpretation become unreliable under pressure. There is a limit, however. A process setter can reject the proposed terms, and a demand that is too restrictive may leave the participant outside a worthwhile deal. The move works only when entry has value to both sides.

Recombine buyers or assets when their strengths fit different pieces

Change what is being bought. A rearranging move changes the parties, the assets, or both, to create a more valuable combination. When ABN AMRO was for sale, Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander, and Fortis formed a consortium and planned to divide the bank's regional operations among themselves. A buyer interested in one part could join with partners who valued other parts, making a larger bid possible.

Separate complementary pieces. LKQ acquired Pittsburgh Glass Works for $635 million, although it was most interested in the aftermarket business. Ten months later it sold the original-equipment business to Vitro for $310 million. The transaction illustrates how different owners can value separate divisions differently. A seller can also arrange bidder pairings itself, or let bidders find partners. Controlling the introductions can help the seller capture more value; allowing direct contact may help buyers discover combinations the seller missed.

Analysis

Rearranging deals resembles coalition design: the best match may not be the single bidder with the deepest pockets, but a group whose members bring distinct assets, expertise, or uses. This can expand the total value available, not merely redistribute it. It also creates a governance problem. The coalition must agree on financing, control, and how gains will be divided, and those negotiations can consume the value they were meant to unlock. A process setter must weigh the information gained from letting bidders talk against the risk that they use their conversations to reduce competition.

Shut down rival bidding only with a timed, credible exit threat

Make the alternative real. A shut-down move cuts off competition from other bidders before the process naturally ends. It works only if the seller believes the buyer will actually leave. During the MCI sale, Verizon said it would stop participating if the board chose Qwest's offer, but its wording left room to keep bargaining. MCI's advisers read the statement as evidence that Verizon remained engaged. Qwest raised its bid to $30 per share, and Verizon later returned with a higher offer. The book estimates that the failed threat cost Verizon an additional $970 million.

Time it to the seller's options. An offer that can be refused briefly is most powerful when the seller's alternatives are weak. The same ultimatum that fails when six bidders are waiting may succeed after an auction stalls. A buyer's threat must be clear, credible, and matched to the seller's situation, or it can simply restart the bidding.

Analysis

The strategy depends on credible commitment, a concept shared by bargaining theory and organizational strategy. A threat has force when carrying it out is plausible, not merely when its language sounds severe. Ambiguity can be valuable when preserving flexibility matters, but it undermines a move whose purpose is to convince the other side that an opportunity is about to disappear. This is not an argument for issuing ultimatums casually. Walking away can destroy a valuable deal, and a reputation for empty threats can weaken future negotiations.

Match auction rules to bidder count, information, and incentives

Choose what bidders can observe. In an open-outcry auction, participants see current bids; in a sealed-bid auction, they do not. Open bidding can help a seller when bidders learn from competitors' offers, a pattern called affiliated signals. A field of roughly five or six serious bidders can support visible competition. With fewer bidders, sealed bids may be safer because participants cannot coordinate responses as easily, and a seller can preserve uncertainty about how many competitors exist.

Fit the format to the job. When speed is paramount, a Dutch auction starts high and drops until a buyer accepts the price. The flower market at Aalsmeer uses this method to sell millions of flowers and plants daily. In sealed-bid sales where due diligence is costly, a nonbinding first round can screen bidders before a smaller group submits final offers. The rules should make clear when bidding ends, so participants have no reason to save their strongest offer for a later round.

Analysis

Auction formats are incentive systems, not neutral containers. Visibility can encourage learning, but it can also help bidders monitor one another and sustain collusion. Secrecy can disrupt coordination, while also increasing uncertainty for participants who must make a costly decision with less information. The choice therefore turns on what kind of uncertainty the seller wants to create and what kind it can tolerate. The Aalsmeer example shows that speed can justify a format that sacrifices deliberation. For complex assets, however, speed may erase useful information and value-creating discussion.

Rules have legal consequences. A specific false claim about a competing offer can expose a seller or agent to a fraud claim. Vague statements about other interested buyers may be treated differently, and practices that are tolerated in one jurisdiction may be unlawful in another. A clear written promise about exclusivity or a final bidding round can also matter if the other side relies on it when entering the process.

Coordination is not automatically collusion. Buyers may sometimes use agents or form a consortium, but agreements that suppress competition can violate antitrust law. In the NCS HealthCare sale, a court invalidated a deal structure that locked shareholders into a lower offer after a much higher rival bid appeared. The lesson is not to improvise legal judgments at the table. Process terms, bidder cooperation, and claims about competition deserve legal review before they become irreversible.

Analysis

The law shapes the bargaining range before any dispute reaches a courtroom. A promise that can be enforced changes what parties can credibly offer; a promise that will be set aside may provide only temporary comfort. The book also highlights a tension between honoring negotiated commitments and directing assets to the bidder willing to pay most. Neither principle is costless: overriding a deal may help a current seller while making future buyers more reluctant to participate. Legal advice is especially important because rules vary by jurisdiction and because apparent procedural details can alter substantive rights.

Analysis

The book's central achievement is to make deal process visible. Negotiation advice often focuses on what people say across the table, while auction theory focuses on competition among bidders under fixed rules. Subramanian's synthesis shows that real transactions frequently combine both pressures, and that participants can bargain over the rules themselves. The concept is especially useful because it reframes process design as a source of leverage, not administrative housekeeping.

The strongest practical insights are conditional rather than universal: use open competition when it can reveal unknown buyers, shift toward private discussion when the remaining bidders value the asset differently, and make commitments that cause participants to act rather than wait. The cases make these choices concrete. The Townsends protected their bid by specifying the final round; the CWA sellers discovered that a vague process could keep bidders cautious; and LKQ created value by separating assets it did not value equally.

The book's method also calls for restraint. Its case studies reveal mechanisms and plausible counterfactuals, but they cannot establish how often a given move succeeds. A dramatic winning deal is memorable partly because unsuccessful attempts are less visible. The proposed taxonomy is best treated as a diagnostic map, not a predictive algorithm. Dealmakers still have to estimate private valuations, assess credibility, and account for legal and relational costs that resist clean calculation.

The deeper implication is that good dealmaking requires both strategic pressure and institutional trust. Competition can expose value, but a process that changes arbitrarily can suppress it. Private negotiation can uncover useful trades, but excessive secrecy can invite suspicion. The most sophisticated practitioner is therefore not simply the toughest bidder or the most inventive process setter. It is the person who understands which rule will make the other participants reveal, invest, or walk away, and who can sustain that rule long enough for the deal to work.

Summary in 30 Seconds
Deals often combine private bargaining with competition among bidders, so process design shapes both leverage and price. Choose an auction when broad competition or speed matters, and private negotiation when a few buyers, complex terms, or trust matter more. Set clear deadlines to discourage cautious offers. Bid according to the cost of losing as well as expected value, while guarding against overestimating shared uncertainties. Trade across terms, combine complementary buyers or assets, and get legal review of process promises and bidder coordination.
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Review Summary

3.88 out of 5
Average of 42 ratings from Goodreads and Amazon.

The reviews for Dealmaking are mixed. While some found it interesting, others felt it lacked depth and relevance. One reviewer praised the first case study but found later sections on auction theory less helpful. They criticized the book's concepts as vague and obvious to those in the field. Another reviewer found it very interesting, while a third deemed it boring with too much reliance on limited case studies. The overall rating on Goodreads is 3.89 out of 5 stars based on 28 reviews.

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Glossary

Negotiauction

Mixed competition deal

A dealmaking situation where competitive pressure comes from both across-the-table bargaining and competition among parties seeking the same deal. The process may include private discussions, bidding rounds, and changing rules. It describes the middle ground between a pure one-on-one negotiation and a formal auction.

BASC framework

Process choice checklist

A framework for deciding whether to auction or negotiate. It examines the profile of potential bidders, characteristics of the asset, the seller's circumstances, and contextual factors such as secrecy or transparency. It is a way to structure judgment, not a mathematical rule that dictates one process.

BATNA

Best alternative to agreement

The best alternative available if a negotiated agreement is not reached. BATNA analysis asks what each party would actually do without a deal, including the consequences of later moves by other parties. It helps establish a walk-away point, though it is less straightforward when possible deals are not mutually exclusive.

ZOPA

Possible agreement range

The zone of possible agreement is the range in which parties' reservation values overlap. A seller's minimum acceptable value and a buyer's maximum acceptable value define the boundaries. If those values do not overlap, there is no price-only agreement, although changes to terms or assets may create new possibilities.

Negotiator's Dilemma

Tension between creating and claiming

The dilemma that parties may need to share information to discover trades that benefit both, while fearing that the other side will use that information to claim more of the value. Guarded bargaining can protect against exploitation but leave mutually beneficial opportunities undiscovered. The framework compares cooperative value creation with competitive value claiming.

MESOs

Equivalent offer packages

Multiple equivalent simultaneous offers are several packages of terms that are equally attractive to the party presenting them. Asking the other side which package it prefers can reveal its priorities without requiring a direct declaration of interests. The packages should differ on issues that matter to the parties.

Winner's curse

Overpaying through winning

The risk that the winning bidder has overestimated an asset's value, particularly when all bidders are estimating the same uncertain value. The winner's result is evidence: other bidders valued the asset less. A bidder with superior information or a unique source of value may be less exposed.

All-pay auction

Losing still has a cost

An auction in which bidders bear costs even if they do not win. In business deals, losing may damage a bidder by giving a competitor access to an asset or advantage. A bidder should account for that loss when calculating its reservation value, rather than treating defeat as costless.

Maximum bid of others (MBOO) analysis

Expected-profit bidding tool

A method for organizing a sealed-bid decision by estimating how the chance of winning changes with the bid, then comparing that probability with the profit available if the bid succeeds. The objective is to balance winning probability against profit, rather than automatically maximizing the chance of winning.

Affiliated signals

Bids reveal shared information

A condition in which one bidder's information or valuation is related to what other bidders know. Observing competitors bid confidently may help a participant update its own estimate of an asset's value. Visible auctions can therefore produce more aggressive bidding when participants learn from one another.

Setup move

Set entry conditions

A move that establishes the terms under which a participant will enter a competitive deal process. Examples include requiring exclusivity, a final bidding round, or protection against revealing a bid when no real competitor exists. Its success depends on whether the process setter prefers those terms to its alternatives.

Rearranging move

Reconfigure parties or assets

A move that changes the participants, the assets being transferred, or both, to create a more valuable combination. Buyers may form a consortium or divide business units among owners that value them differently. The move can create value, but the initiating party may capture much of the benefit.

Shut-down move

End rival competition early

A move designed to cut off competition from other bidders before the process naturally ends. It may involve a short-lived offer or a commitment to leave if the offer is rejected. It is effective only when timed well and supported by a credible threat that makes the seller's alternatives less attractive.

About the Author

Guhan Subramanian is the author of "Dealmaking." He is a business school professor with expertise in negotiation and deal-making. Subramanian's work focuses on analyzing complex negotiations and auctions, drawing insights from real-world case studies. He introduces the concept of "negotiauctions" to bridge the gap between auction theory and negotiation practice. Subramanian's approach involves examining set up moves, rearranging moves, and shutdown moves in deal dynamics. His academic background allows him to provide a theoretical perspective on practical business situations, though some readers find his analysis more academic than practical.

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