Key Takeaways
A shooting over seven dollars unraveled two hidden murders
A case changed shape. In June 1984, Paul St. Pierre shot his friend Andrew Webb during a drunken argument. Police initially treated it as a straightforward assault. Then an anonymous caller linked St. Pierre to Damon Wells, a young man missing since February. Roommates and an old friend, Roy Kissler, supplied details that strengthened the lead. Christopher St. Pierre eventually described Wells’s killing and identified a second victim, John Achord, who disappeared after a concert in May.
Evidence made the past visible. Police found blood traces beneath replaced carpet, recovered a knife, and followed Chris to the graves near Elbe. Wells’s body was inside a sleeping bag. Achord’s was headless. His severed head, sealed in a cement-filled bucket and thrown into a river, was recovered months later. What began as a single shooting had exposed two murders and a sprawling investigation.
The narrative’s opening turn shows why investigators must resist premature closure. An apparently ordinary assault can become a route into older, unreported crimes when new testimony is checked against physical evidence. The decisive move here is not simply getting a confession: detectives seek corroboration, recover bodies, and test claims against forensic findings. That discipline matters because early explanations are often convenient, especially when intoxication and familiar suspects make a case seem simple. At the same time, a dramatic discovery can create pressure to treat every subsequent allegation as true. The book’s own sequence suggests the better rule: let evidence expand the case, but do not let spectacle settle it.
Fear kept witnesses quiet until silence itself became dangerous
Threats shaped the silence. Damon Wells vanished after visiting the Pacific Avenue house, but the first investigation produced little. His family reported him missing; police initially treated the disappearance as a possible runaway. Roommates Mark Perez and Donald Marshall had seen signs of violence and cleanup, yet feared Paul St. Pierre and Andrew Webb. Marshall said Chris later warned him to keep quiet, displaying bullets as he did so. Others worried that speaking would put their families at risk.
A small opening mattered. After St. Pierre shot Webb, an anonymous caller told police that Wells had been killed. Kissler, who had heard St. Pierre describe a murder, then encouraged Marshall to come forward. The disclosures did not arrive as a single brave revelation. They accumulated through fear, partial knowledge, and people deciding that continued silence might allow another person to be harmed.
The case makes witness cooperation look less like a character test and more like a problem of safety and incentives. People who fear retaliation may know enough to help but still have rational reasons to stay quiet. That distinction matters for investigators and communities: asking for courage is not a substitute for protection, credibility checks, and sustained follow-up. The book also shows that informal networks can work both ways. Neighbors spread intimidation, but a trusted former friend can help a frightened witness reach authorities. The caution is that fear can distort memory as well as silence it, so testimony gained under pressure still needs independent corroboration.
Separate what each man did before calling them equal partners
Roles were not interchangeable. In Wells’s killing, Christopher St. Pierre admitted joining the beating and helping conceal the crime. He also led police to evidence and the graves. His account identified Webb as the man who chased Wells and cut his throat. Paul St. Pierre gave a different account of his own involvement, while Webb’s later plea statement implicated both brothers in the stabbing. Each account carried different motives and reliability problems.
Achord’s case was murkier. Chris said he believed Achord was already dead after Paul shot him, and that he was away from the room when the stabbing occurred. Webb’s statement claimed Chris urged the group to hide the death. Chris later helped bury the body and dispose of the head, conduct that was criminal and horrifying, but not automatically proof that he planned the killing. The legal outcomes reflected these distinctions, though not always consistently.
The distinction between presence, assistance, concealment, and intentional killing is central to both moral judgment and criminal law. Group violence can blur those categories, especially when participants share a home, a victim, and a cover-up. But treating a group as a single actor risks turning association into evidence. Conversely, narrowing attention to the person who delivered the fatal wound can erase the others’ contribution to coercion or concealment. The strongest analysis keeps both risks in view: individualize the evidence without pretending that coordinated acts have no collective consequences. This case is difficult precisely because the categories overlap, but they are not identical.
A plea bargain can protect a witness and distort the truth
The deal changed incentives. Andrew Webb faced a possible death sentence. Prosecutors agreed to reduce his exposure if he pleaded guilty and testified against Paul and Christopher St. Pierre. His statement described the brothers as participants in Wells’s killing. Yet Webb had already pleaded guilty to the murder, had a history of violent conduct, and faced a separate assault sentence he had not served.
His account kept shifting. Webb later said he would not testify, then admitted that he had implicated the St. Pierres partly from vengeance and partly to improve how the public saw him. He also told the prosecutor that parts of his statement were inaccurate, including the claim that the brothers stabbed Wells. The book closes this thread with a prosecutor’s later admission that trusting Webb before he testified was a mistake. A bargain secured testimony on paper, not dependable cooperation.
Cooperating witnesses create a genuine institutional dilemma. A deal may be the only way to obtain evidence against other participants, but the reward also gives the witness a reason to shape the story toward the prosecution’s needs. That does not make every such witness dishonest; it means the incentive structure belongs in the credibility assessment. Here, the bargain’s failure is unusually visible because Webb repudiated the terms and the account itself. A reliable process would make the exchange transparent, test the statement against independent evidence, and avoid treating a promised testimony as if it were testimony already examined in court.
Never let an absent witness's story carry a conviction untested
The jury could not question Webb. After Webb refused to testify, prosecutors asked the court to admit his earlier account as evidence. The judge allowed it, finding enough corroboration and reliability to meet a hearsay exception. The defense argued that Webb’s changing versions were self-serving and that the accused could not challenge him through cross-examination.
Appeal separated the cases. Christopher St. Pierre’s conviction for felony murder in Wells’s death remained in place because his own statements established his participation in the underlying crime. But the Washington Supreme Court reversed his aggravated-murder conviction in the Achord case. It concluded that Webb’s statement about Chris’s alleged role did not have adequate signs of reliability and that admitting it denied Chris the constitutional right to confront a witness against him. The same statement could not bear the same legal weight in every charge.
The right to confront a witness is not merely courtroom ritual. Cross-examination lets jurors see whether a speaker can maintain a claim under scrutiny, and whether contradictions have plausible explanations. When the witness is absent, the court must decide whether other evidence can compensate for that lost test. The contrasting appellate outcomes show why this is a charge-specific inquiry, not a general endorsement or rejection of a defendant’s guilt. The point is not that hearsay should never be used. It is that a statement’s emotional force, apparent detail, or partial corroboration cannot replace careful evaluation of what the accused can actually challenge.
A court's legitimacy can be damaged before jurors hear evidence
Procedure became part of the story. Paul St. Pierre had formally demanded that lawyers be present during police questioning. When he later asked to speak with detectives, they consulted prosecutors, but his lawyers were not notified. Judge Thomas Sauriol criticized the prosecutor’s conduct, though he allowed the statement into evidence because St. Pierre had initiated contact. The same trial also saw a mistrial during jury selection after prosecutors asked questions that improperly prejudged jurors’ views on the death penalty.
Publicity raised the stakes. Prosecutor Bill Griffies and his deputy discussed the case in a television interview before trial. Judge Sauriol imposed a gag order, criticized the conduct, and ultimately withdrew from the case. These disputes did not prove the defendants innocent or the prosecution’s case false. They did, however, make fairness itself a contested issue alongside the murders.
A justice system depends on more than accurate fact-finding. It also depends on participants accepting that rules apply even when a case is shocking and the public wants a swift result. Procedural violations can weaken trust, invite appeals, and distract jurors from the evidence. The book’s details also argue against a simplistic view of misconduct: judges criticized prosecutorial choices but did not automatically suppress evidence or dismiss charges. Ethical concern and legal remedy are related, not identical. The practical lesson is institutional: transparency, timely notice to counsel, and restraint in public comment protect both defendants’ rights and the credibility of a legitimate conviction.
Distinguish diagnosis, trial competence, and criminal responsibility
Three questions collided. Experts described Paul St. Pierre as paranoid, suspicious, and prone to explosive behavior. They disagreed over whether he could assist in his defense, a question of competency to stand trial. That issue was distinct from whether mental illness prevented him from forming the intent required for a particular crime. At trial, psychiatrist Charles Tappin argued that St. Pierre’s mental disorder, combined with LSD and alcohol, impaired rational judgment. Another psychiatrist rejected the diminished-capacity argument.
The verdicts did not resolve the diagnosis. Jurors convicted St. Pierre of aggravated murder in both cases but chose life without parole rather than death, citing mental disturbance as a mitigating factor. He died in 1985, soon after transfer to a closely monitored prison unit. Authorities described the death as apparently self-inflicted; acquaintances questioned that account. The book offers no definitive resolution of the conflicting claims about his death.
This case illustrates why psychiatric labels cannot do the work of legal reasoning. A diagnosis may help explain behavior, but courts must separately decide whether someone understands proceedings, can assist counsel, and possessed a legally relevant mental state during an offense. Those questions require different evidence and standards. The rapid, contested evaluations in St. Pierre’s case show how institutional pressure can make clinical judgments appear entangled with trial scheduling. A further caution is that explaining impaired judgment should not be confused with minimizing the victims’ suffering or the defendant’s actions. Explanation informs responsibility; it does not settle it.
Treat family history as context, not a verdict on anyone's fate
The family accounts conflict. The book describes a Webb household marked by violence, rigid religious expectations, and allegations of sexual abuse across generations. Relatives disagree about what happened and how to interpret particular events. Andrew Webb also suffered head injuries and used alcohol and drugs. The author connects these experiences to later violence, while acknowledging that family members’ memories and claims do not always align.
Risk is not destiny. In the afterword, Barer argues that brain injury, abuse, and intoxicants can contribute to psychopathic behavior and calls for prevention. The case supplies troubling examples, but it cannot establish which factor caused Webb’s actions or predict what any person with a similar history will do. Chris St. Pierre’s trajectory, and the sharply different accounts of the St. Pierre and Webb families, resist a single-origin explanation. Background can illuminate vulnerability without becoming a diagnosis or a substitute for evidence.
The effort to understand violence is valuable when it identifies preventable harms, such as abuse and head injury. The danger comes when a narrative turns a cluster of risk factors into a near-certain causal chain. People exposed to trauma do not all become violent, and later violence cannot by itself prove a specific childhood history. The book’s conflicting family testimony is therefore not a minor complication; it is a reason for epistemic care. A responsible explanation distinguishes documented events, allegations, clinical interpretations, and hypotheses about causation. Prevention can be urgent without claiming that one family history explains every act.
Demand evidence of change, not only a compelling redemption story
Reform claims met resistance. At a clemency hearing, supporters portrayed Webb as a transformed Christian, mentor, and positive influence in prison. Victims’ relatives and a Pierce County prosecutor emphasized that Webb had broken his agreement, had not served the earlier assault sentence, and had helped conceal Achord’s death. They argued that his cooperation had benefited him while leaving the Achord family without a murder conviction against him. The board denied clemency.
The later picture stayed contested. The 2012 update reports that Webb was released, left Christianity, wrote about Norse religion, and took part in community and counseling work. His former wife continued to view him as manipulative; other accounts described constructive activity. Chris St. Pierre, who had cooperated with police but remained imprisoned for Wells’s death, was remembered by former acquaintances as a once-promising young man. No tidy ending reconciles punishment, rehabilitation, and lasting harm.
Claims of rehabilitation deserve serious consideration, but they should be assessed through sustained conduct, candor about past harm, and the effects on those harmed, not through charisma or a moving testimony alone. Equally, permanent condemnation can obscure genuine change if evidence of it is never examined. This case places those possibilities in uncomfortable proximity: Webb’s supporters saw service and transformation, while victims’ relatives saw evasion and an unfulfilled bargain. The contrast is a useful test for any redemption narrative. Does it include accountability to victims, or mainly a new identity that benefits the person telling the story?
Analysis
Head Shot is at once a double-homicide investigation, a study of witness incentives, and a record of courts trying to manage evidence whose reliability is contested. Its strongest structural choice is to make the same events recur through incompatible accounts. The reader sees how a beating, a killing, and a cover-up become different stories depending on whether the teller is a frightened roommate, a self-interested accomplice, or a defendant seeking leniency. This is not merely narrative suspense. It demonstrates that testimony is produced within relationships of fear, loyalty, bargaining, and self-preservation.
The legal proceedings provide the book’s clearest analytical frame. A confession is not automatically truth, cooperation is not automatically trustworthy, and guilt for participation in one crime does not prove guilt for another. The contrasting appellate outcomes make that precision concrete: Chris’s Wells conviction survived because his own statements established his participation, while the Achord conviction based on Webb’s unreliable account was reversed. The book thereby exposes a tension between the system’s need to resolve crimes and its obligation to test each claim fairly.
The family histories and psychiatric discussion broaden the inquiry, but they are less conclusive than the courtroom record. Memories conflict, allegations are disputed, and the afterword sometimes moves from plausible risk factors to strong causal assertions about brain injury, abuse, and psychopathy. A careful reader should separate the book’s documented evidence from its explanatory theory. Childhood violence can warrant prevention and support without implying that survivors are destined to become violent, or that a diagnosis can explain a particular homicide by itself.
The enduring value of the case lies in refusing a clean moral arrangement. Chris cooperated and still participated in grave crimes. Webb killed Wells, bargained, recanted, and later drew competing accounts of reform. Paul’s mental illness mattered, but did not erase the deaths. Justice here is not a single verdict or a satisfying ending. It is the difficult work of keeping individual actions, evidentiary limits, victims’ losses, and institutional responsibility visible at once.
Glossary
Competency to stand trial
ability to understand and assistA legal determination about whether a defendant understands the charges and proceedings and can assist counsel in preparing a defense. It is separate from whether the defendant was legally responsible when the crime occurred. In Paul St. Pierre’s case, experts disagreed about his ability to work with his lawyer, and judges revisited the issue.
Diminished capacity
impaired ability to form intentA legal argument that a mental disorder or other impairment prevented a defendant from forming a specific mental state required for a crime. It is distinct from competency to stand trial and from a finding of legal insanity. In the Achord case, the defense argued that St. Pierre’s mental illness, combined with intoxication, impaired his ability to form rational intent.
Indicia of reliability
signs a statement is trustworthyCircumstances that a court considers when deciding whether an out-of-court statement is reliable enough to be admitted despite the usual limits on hearsay. Relevant considerations in the St. Pierre trials included corroboration, consistency, motive to shift blame, and whether the accused could question the person who made the statement.
Hare Psychopathic Checklist
clinical checklist of psychopathic traitsA clinical assessment tool discussed in the book’s afterword and associated with researcher Robert Hare. It is used by qualified clinicians to evaluate a pattern of traits associated with psychopathy, including manipulativeness, persistent lying, aggression, and lack of remorse. The book presents it as a tool for professional assessment, not as proof that a person committed a particular crime.
Download PDF
Download EPUB
.epub digital book format is ideal for reading ebooks on phones, tablets, and e-readers.