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SoBrief
Taxing Ourselves

Taxing Ourselves

A Citizen's Guide to the Debate Over Taxes
Tax headlines hide who pays, what changes, and the real cost of collection.
by Joel B. Slemrod 2004 382 pages
3.78
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Key Takeaways

Judge tax plans by four tests, not by the rate printed in headlines.

Four tests matter. A tax system should be judged by how it shares the burden, how it affects economic choices and prosperity, how difficult it is to comply with and enforce, and whether it raises enough revenue. Political arguments often collapse these separate questions into a single claim that taxes are too high or too low. In 2014, taxes at all levels of U.S. government equaled 27 percent of GDP. The OECD average in 2013 was 34.2 percent, though the figures use slightly different definitions and years.

A simple tax can fail. In 1990, Britain replaced property taxes with a poll tax that charged every adult the same amount, regardless of income or property. The resulting protests helped destabilize Margaret Thatcher’s leadership. The episode shows that administrative simplicity cannot rescue a system people regard as fundamentally unfair.

Analysis

What's striking is how often tax debates confuse a choice about government size with a choice about tax design. Those are related, but not identical. A country can decide to fund the same public services through a better or worse tax structure. The four tests also expose real trade-offs: a change can simplify filing while shifting burdens, or improve incentives while raising too little revenue. Treating these dimensions separately makes public argument more honest, even when it cannot make disagreement disappear.

Choose openly how much progressivity fairness requires and what it costs.

Fairness has rival standards. Vertical equity asks how tax burdens should differ between people with different levels of well-being. Horizontal equity asks whether people in similar circumstances should pay similar amounts. The benefit principle links taxes to the value people receive from government, but that value is hard to measure. The ability-to-pay principle links taxes to economic well-being, but cannot specify exactly how much more the affluent should contribute.

Rules create trade-offs. The book illustrates this with two unmarried people earning $30,000 each. If each pays an average 15 percent tax, their combined bill is $9,000. If marriage moves their combined $60,000 into a 20 percent average rate, the bill becomes $12,000. Progressivity based on family income can therefore create marriage penalties. Deciding which inequities matter most is an ethical choice, not a calculation economics can settle.

Analysis

The useful move here is not to declare fairness subjective and stop thinking. It is to identify the moral rule hidden inside a proposal. A deduction for medical costs treats involuntary hardship differently from discretionary spending; a family-based tax treats household resources as shared. Each choice defines who counts as comparable to whom. Public policy becomes clearer when the principle is stated before the dollar effects are debated. The challenge is that no single principle resolves every case, especially when one person’s fairness is another person’s unequal treatment.

Track who ultimately bears a tax, not who sends payment to government.

Legal liability is not incidence. Tax incidence is the final distribution of a tax burden after people and businesses adjust prices, wages, and investment. A worker may never write a check to the government because an employer withholds tax, yet the worker can still bear the cost through lower take-home pay. Renaming a wage tax as a business tax does not change who is worse off if the underlying rules stay the same.

Markets shift burdens. A tax on one product is harder to pass to consumers when close substitutes are available. A tax on a business can spread beyond its owners as investment moves elsewhere and returns adjust. For corporate income taxes, analysts disagree about how much falls on shareholders, other owners of capital, or workers. One Tax Policy Center estimate assigns 60 percent to shareholders, 20 percent to capital generally, and 20 percent to labor. Those are modeling assumptions, not observable facts.

Analysis

This distinction is a small lesson in causal reasoning: the party named in a law is not necessarily the party whose options shrink. It also explains why tax plans need incidence estimates rather than simple lists of who remits each payment. The relevant question is how easily each side can change course. Still, long-run effects depend on assumptions about mobility, competition, and time. Presenting one incidence split as certain can make a contested model look like a settled accounting entry.

Look past statutory rates to the income the law actually counts.

Income is a choice of definition. Haig-Simons income, an economists’ benchmark, equals what a person consumes plus the change in wealth. It includes wages, employer-provided benefits, and increases in asset values even when those gains are not sold. The U.S. tax base diverges from this measure through exclusions, deductions, deferred taxation, and special treatment for assets such as homes and retirement accounts.

The base changes the rate’s meaning. During 1987-2013, roughly one-quarter of measured real capital and business income appeared on personal tax returns. That does not mean all the rest escaped every tax, since some business income faced corporate taxation. It does show why a headline marginal rate cannot describe the whole system. Two people with similar resources can face different effective rates because their income comes from different sources or receives different tax treatment.

Analysis

A tax base is not merely a technical container for a rate. It determines which kinds of income become visible, which activities receive an implicit subsidy, and which accounting decisions become valuable. This is why rate comparisons across systems can mislead: a lower rate on a broad base may collect as much as a higher rate on a narrow one. The benchmark is useful, but measuring imputed housing services or unsold gains can itself be costly and intrusive. The ideal definition is not automatically the best workable rule.

Treat growth promises as uncertain forecasts, never as automatic tax revenue.

Short and long runs differ. Tax cuts can support demand during a deep recession, especially when interest rates cannot fall further. That is a separate question from whether a tax system produces stronger long-run growth. For perspective, federal taxes averaged 17.2 percent of GDP from 1950 to 1973 and 17.6 percent from 1974 to 2014, while productivity growth averaged 3.2 percent in 1947-1973 and 1.9 percent in 1973-2014. The comparison does not prove taxes caused either growth pattern.

Behavior responds unevenly. Taxes can affect work, saving, investment, avoidance, and the timing of income. The evidence suggests some responses are modest, some differ sharply across groups, and some are difficult to separate from other changes. U.S. tax cuts in the 1980s and 2000s reduced revenue rather than paying for themselves. If spending remains unchanged, borrowing shifts costs forward and can crowd out future investment.

Analysis

The book’s most valuable discipline is refusing to turn correlation into a campaign promise. Economic outcomes reflect technology, demographics, recessions, public investment, and tax rules at once. This makes precise forecasts fragile, not useless. A sound estimate should make its assumptions visible and distinguish temporary stimulus from permanent changes in productive capacity. The same caution applies to claims that higher taxes necessarily crush growth. Evidence can narrow the plausible range, but it rarely eliminates the value judgment about how much distributional equity is worth a possible efficiency cost.

Every tax break shifts incentives and costs onto choices left outside it.

Preferences have a price. A deduction or credit makes one activity more attractive, but, if revenue must be maintained, other taxpayers or activities carry more of the load. The mortgage interest deduction illustrates the scale: it was estimated to cost $67 billion in fiscal year 2014, and about 82 percent of the benefit went to households with incomes above $100,000. The exclusion for employer-provided health insurance was estimated to cost $195 billion that year and can encourage unusually generous coverage, increasing medical spending.

Exceptions need a reason. Some preferences may correct a market failure, such as the spillover benefits of research, or account for unavoidable hardship. Others are weakly targeted or mainly reward choices people would have made anyway. The 1986 Tax Reform Act paired lower headline rates with a broader base and fewer shelters. Over time, political demands added new preferences, showing how difficult it is to keep a tax base clean.

Analysis

Tax benefits often hide spending choices inside tax forms. That can make a subsidy politically easier to preserve than an explicit government grant, even when both use public money. A useful test is whether a preference addresses a clearly identified problem, reaches the people or activities that generate the benefit, and outperforms a direct alternative. The test should not assume every exception is wasteful. It should, however, place the burden of proof on provisions that distort decisions, complicate compliance, and survive mainly because their beneficiaries are organized.

Count taxpayers' time as part of the price of raising revenue.

The IRS is not the whole cost. In 2010, individuals spent an estimated 1.8 billion hours complying with the federal income tax, an average of 12.5 hours per return. Including taxpayer and business compliance costs and IRS administration, the estimated annual cost was about $170 billion, or more than 15 cents for each dollar of federal income tax revenue that year. The code’s complexity comes not only from its length, but from measuring different kinds of income and tailoring liabilities to family circumstances.

Simplification involves trade-offs. A standard deduction saves millions of people from tracking every eligible expense, but it cannot finely adjust for every difference in ability to pay. Return-free filing systems can work for employees whose income is reported by employers, while business income and complex investments still require detailed accounting. Simplifying the tax form alone does not eliminate recordkeeping, tax planning, or the cost of navigating changing rules.

Analysis

Compliance time is an economic resource, even when no invoice records it. Treating it as free makes a complicated policy look cheaper than it is. At the same time, reducing paperwork is not the only measure of a good system: a voluntary or poorly monitored tax could be cheap to administer while placing the burden on compliant people. The productive question is which information requirements actually protect fairness and revenue, and which persist through habit or political bargaining. Digital filing helps with calculations, but it cannot make a bad rule coherent.

Make income visible to tax authorities before demanding harsher enforcement.

Information improves compliance. In the IRS’s 2001 estimates, reported compliance was about 99 percent for wages and salaries, which employers report, but only 28 percent for farm net income. In 1987, requiring Social Security numbers for dependent exemptions caused claimed exemptions to fall by 7 million; the change was estimated to raise about $3 billion annually. The larger lesson is that verification can outperform broad, intrusive auditing.

Evasion is substantial but uneven. For 2008-2010, the IRS estimated a gross federal tax gap of $458 billion per year, with $406 billion expected never to be collected. Most underreporting came from income with little or no third-party reporting. Stronger enforcement can improve fairness, but it costs resources, raises privacy concerns, and can undermine trust if applied carelessly. Withholding and information reports make collection more reliable by placing documentation where transactions occur.

Analysis

This is a design insight as much as an enforcement insight. The system works best when it builds verification into ordinary transactions instead of asking an auditor to reconstruct them years later. In modern administrative systems, reliable data can reduce both fraud and innocent mistakes. But data collection creates its own power imbalance: agencies need safeguards, clear procedures, and ways to correct errors. Compliance is not produced by surveillance alone. People are more likely to accept enforcement when they believe rules are intelligible and applied evenhandedly.

Use consumption taxes to stop taxing normal returns to saving, not labor.

Timing is the key difference. With a 20 percent income tax, a person who receives $100 and saves the $80 left after tax at 10 percent interest has $86.40 after tax the next year. Under a 20 percent consumption tax, the person can spend $80 today or save the full $100, let it grow to $110, and spend $88 after tax next year. The consumption tax leaves the reward for postponing consumption intact; the income tax reduces it.

The change is not painless. A consumption tax still reduces what work can buy, and it may tax existing wealth when that wealth is eventually spent. The transition can therefore burden people who saved under the old rules, especially older or wealthier households, unless relief is provided. Relief may ease losses but can preserve complexity and reduce the reform’s revenue. Consumption taxation is a different tax base, not a free lunch.

Analysis

The intertemporal distinction is powerful because it identifies exactly what changes: the tax price of consuming now versus later. It does not establish that everyone will save more, or that more saving automatically improves welfare; people may value present consumption, and observed saving responds to many forces. The transition also raises a rule-of-law question: how much should policy protect expectations created by the old system? A credible reform must price both the long-run incentive change and the short-run redistribution, rather than treating transition rules as an afterthought.

Compare VAT, sales-tax, flat-tax, and X-tax plans by collection and distribution.

Similar bases, different machinery. A retail sales tax is collected at the final sale, while a value-added tax collects in stages and lets firms credit tax paid on business inputs. More than 160 countries use a VAT; the United States has not adopted one. A national sales tax large enough to replace income taxes would require rates above those used in state systems, intensifying evasion and taxation of business inputs. The Hall-Rabushka flat tax divides a VAT-like tax between businesses and workers. The X-tax uses the same broad idea but allows graduated rates on labor income, preserving more progressivity.

The choices can be separated. A single rate, a consumption base, and removal of deductions are distinct reforms, not an indivisible package. The 1986 reform showed that rates can fall as the base broadens, but subsequent law accumulated new exceptions. A voter should ask who gains, who pays, what revenue is lost, and which transition rules are required.

Analysis

The comparison shifts attention from labels to operating systems. A VAT’s staged collection can make evasion harder than under a retail sales tax, while an X-tax preserves more room for progressive treatment than a uniform consumption tax. Neither administrative elegance nor theoretical neutrality guarantees political durability. A system that is rejected as unfair can be amended into complexity, while a system that feels opaque can lose legitimacy. The book’s strongest practical lesson is modular reform: assess each rate, base, and collection choice separately, then make the trade-offs explicit.

Analysis

This guide’s central achievement is to make tax policy legible without pretending that technical analysis can settle moral disagreement. It separates four questions that political messaging routinely fuses: how much revenue government needs, who bears the burden, how incentives change, and what compliance and enforcement consume. That separation is more than a teaching device. It is a defense against proposals whose appealing headline rate conceals a narrower base, a regressive shift, or a future deficit.

The book is especially strong when it follows mechanisms rather than slogans. Tax incidence explains why the party legally responsible for remitting a tax may not bear its cost. The Haig-Simons benchmark reveals that taxable income is a constructed measure, not a neutral fact. The comparison between income and consumption taxation then becomes precise: the latter removes tax on the normal return to postponing consumption, but does not eliminate taxes on work or resolve distributional conflict.

Its caution about economic evidence is also important. Historical comparisons and behavioral studies can discipline claims, but neither a graph nor a model can isolate every causal channel. This humility should not become paralysis. It instead supports transparent ranges, clear assumptions, and a distinction between findings that are robust and those that depend heavily on model choices.

The main limitation is temporal. The edition’s statistics and policy proposals largely describe conditions through 2016, so they should not be mistaken for current tax law or present-day estimates. Its analytic method remains useful, but any contemporary application requires updated data. The lasting message is methodological: evaluate tax policy as an institutional bargain among fairness, efficiency, administrability, and democratic consent, not as a contest over which side can promise prosperity without naming who pays.

Summary in 30 Seconds
A tax system must be judged by distribution, economic effects, revenue, and administrative burden. Legal liability does not reveal who ultimately pays. In 2010, compliance consumed 1.8 billion hours and about $170 billion. Reported wages achieved roughly 99 percent compliance, compared with 28 percent for farm income. Consumption taxes can protect normal saving returns, but they still tax spending and raise transition and fairness problems.
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Review Summary

3.78 out of 5
Average of 143 ratings from Goodreads and Amazon.

Reviews of Taxing Ourselves are mixed, averaging 3.78 out of 5. Many readers appreciate its accessible yet informative coverage of tax policy, calling it essential reading for citizens and policymakers alike. Some find it dense and dry, better suited for those with existing interest in taxation. Critics note it feels textbook-like and occasionally elementary. A minority feel it underemphasizes taxation's social benefits and is biased toward consumption taxes. Overall, it's widely regarded as a solid primer on tax systems, reform options, and policy trade-offs.

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Glossary

Haig-Simons income

Comprehensive economic income

A benchmark measure of income defined as the value of what a person consumes during a period plus the change in that person’s wealth. It includes wages, benefits, and increases in asset values even when assets are not sold. Actual tax systems depart from this definition because some income is difficult to measure, excluded by law, or taxed at a different time.

Tax incidence

Who ultimately bears taxes

The final distribution of a tax burden after people and businesses respond by changing prices, wages, investments, or other choices. Incidence can differ from legal responsibility: a business may remit a tax while consumers, workers, or investors bear some of its cost. Estimating incidence requires assumptions about how readily each group can change behavior.

Tax shifting

Passing a tax burden onward

The process by which a tax initially levied on one party changes market prices or returns and transfers some of its burden to another. A tax on a business may raise consumer prices, reduce wages, or lower returns to investors. The amount shifted depends in part on the alternatives available to buyers, workers, firms, and investors.

Vertical equity

Fairness across income levels

A standard for judging how tax burdens should differ among households with different levels of economic well-being. If well-being is measured by income, vertical equity concerns how much tax families at low, middle, and high incomes should pay. It does not prescribe one correct degree of progressivity, which ultimately depends on ethical judgments.

Horizontal equity

Fairness among comparable households

A standard concerned with whether households that are similarly well-off should face similar tax burdens. It raises questions about which differences matter, such as unavoidable medical costs, family size, or income source, and which reflect personal preferences. Tax provisions that favor some choices can create unequal treatment among households with similar incomes.

Value-added tax (VAT)

Staged tax on consumption

A consumption tax collected from businesses at each stage of production and distribution. Under the common credit-invoice method, firms remit tax on sales while claiming credits for tax paid on business inputs. Those transactions offset across the production chain, leaving the tax on final consumption. A VAT can reduce some collection problems associated with a retail sales tax.

Hall-Rabushka flat tax

Business tax plus wage tax

A consumption-tax design that divides a VAT-like system into a business tax and a personal tax on wages and salaries. Businesses deduct purchases and employee compensation, while workers pay tax on labor income above an exemption. The plan also generally allows immediate deduction of investment and excludes interest, dividends, and capital gains from personal taxation.

X-tax

Progressive Hall-Rabushka tax

A consumption-tax design with the same broad business base as the Hall-Rabushka flat tax, but with graduated personal tax rates on labor income. The business tax rate is generally aligned with the top personal rate. The graduated schedule allows more progressivity than a single-rate flat tax while retaining a consumption base.

Tax gap

Taxes owed but unpaid

The estimated difference between the tax that should be reported and paid under the law and the amount actually reported and paid. The estimate includes nonfiling, underreporting, and underpayment. Because hidden income is difficult to measure, tax-gap figures rely on audits and other evidence and should be treated as estimates rather than exact totals.

Tax expenditure

Revenue lost through tax preferences

A reduction in tax revenue caused by a deduction, exclusion, credit, or other provision that departs from a chosen benchmark tax system. Many tax expenditures function much like government subsidies, but are delivered through the tax code. They can encourage selected activities, redistribute benefits, complicate compliance, and require higher taxes elsewhere if revenue is held constant.

About the Author

Joel B. Slemrod is a Professor of Economics at the University of Michigan, where he also holds the Paul W. McCracken Collegiate Professorship at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business. He earned his B.A. from Princeton University in 1973 and his Ph.D. in economics from Harvard University in 1980. A leading expert on taxation, particularly personal income tax, he co-authored Taxing Ourselves with Jon Bakija and edited Does Atlas Shrug? In 2001, he shared an Ig Nobel Prize, and in 2012 received the Daniel M. Holland Medal from the National Tax Association.

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