Key Takeaways
Multipolar rivalry becomes dangerous when leaders mistake fear for destiny.
A monument of consequences. At Thiepval in France, a memorial lists more than 72,000 British soldiers missing from the Battle of the Somme. The battle caused over a million casualties. Among the dead were five young men named Alfred Webb, each about twenty-one to twenty-three years old. One, an Australian soldier, died on his first day of battle. Their fates were shaped by decisions made far from the trenches, sometimes confused or accidental.
History as a warning. Westad opens with these individual losses to make the stakes of Great Power conflict concrete. His argument is not that another world war is inevitable. It is that today’s crowded field of powerful states, rising nationalism, fragile trade, and mutual suspicion resembles the world before 1914 closely enough to demand deliberate work for peace.
What's powerful here is the shift from casualty totals to individual lives. Large numbers are cognitively easy to file away; named people restore the human scale that strategy can obscure. The memorial also makes a useful point about distance: decisions made in capitals have consequences borne by people with no voice in them. The historical analogy is most valuable as a warning about mechanisms, not as a prediction. A present-day crisis need not reproduce the Somme to cause catastrophic loss, and the differences between eras matter as much as the resemblance.
Use 1914 as a pattern, not a prophecy.
A century of relative peace. From 1815 until 1914, major European powers fought relatively few wars directly against one another. Memories of earlier devastation, attention to development at home, and Britain's role as a strategic balancer helped restrain them. Peace was not universal: violence continued in overseas empires, and several mid-century wars altered Europe's political map.
The conditions shifted. By 1914, British predominance was weakening, Germany had risen rapidly, Russia and Austria were anxious about their regions, and military power was spreading among more states. Yet the international system did not adapt through sustained consultation. Westad uses this history to show how a long period of peace can conceal changing pressures. The resemblance to today identifies risks, but it does not make a future war inevitable.
The comparison is useful because it directs attention away from simple claims that one rising power must cause war. International relations scholarship often distinguishes shifts in material power from the choices made to manage them. Westad's account gives those choices historical texture: a declining leader may feel insecure, while a newcomer may feel excluded, and both can interpret ordinary competition as deliberate containment. Still, the analogy has limits. Nuclear weapons, global institutions, and the economic interdependence of modern states change the stakes and the available tools. A pattern is a diagnostic aid, not a script.
Make room for rising powers before status anxiety hardens into hostility.
Power can move quickly. China’s transformation illustrates how dramatically the international balance can change. When Westad first visited Guangxi in 1980, farms lacked basic tools; today, farmers use modern machinery and productivity has risen enormously. China’s reforms combined room for private enterprise with state direction of infrastructure, education, credit, and exports. The result is a manufacturing power responsible for about 31 percent of global output.
Adjustment matters. Germany’s rise after unification in 1871 also changed Europe’s balance, but other powers treated the new state largely as a threat rather than building regular forums to accommodate it. Today’s world includes a rising China, an assertive India, a Russia seeking regional dominance, and other powers demanding greater autonomy. Their goals are not identical, but a system that offers no peaceful way to adjust influence makes competition more dangerous.
The account resists two easy stories: that China’s rise was purely a market miracle, or that it was simply a threat. Its combination of local initiative, government coordination, and access to international markets shows how power grows through several channels at once. Political science calls the resulting challenge a power transition, but the term can make change sound mechanical. The practical question is whether institutions and expectations can adapt before either side treats compromise as surrender. Accommodation should not mean granting a state control over its neighbors; it means making room for influence without abolishing the sovereignty of others.
Fix domestic fractures before blaming foreign competitors for them.
Decline can be relative. Before World War I, Britain remained wealthy and powerful, yet many citizens saw national decline everywhere. Its share of global manufacturing fell from about 23 percent in 1890 to 13.5 percent in 1913, while finance, shipping, and imperial reach remained formidable. Domestic weakness was more immediate: wages stagnated, inequality rose, and more than 40 million working days were lost to strikes in 1912.
Blame traveled outward. Politicians and commentators made Germany the culprit for problems rooted partly in Britain's own industrial and social choices. Westad sees a parallel in the United States, where lost manufacturing jobs and economic insecurity are often attributed to China. Foreign competition can cause real harm, but blaming an external rival can distract from failures to train workers, support transitions, or share prosperity.
This distinction between relative power and household experience is essential. A country can remain strong in aggregate while particular communities lose jobs, status, and security. Political narratives gain force when they connect those lived losses to a recognizable foreign antagonist. That does not make every complaint imaginary: trade shocks can be concentrated and severe. The more useful test is whether a proposed response repairs the underlying vulnerability or merely promises revenge. A tariff, for example, cannot by itself replace skills, income support, or investment in productive capacity.
Separate disputes before nationalism fuses them into one enemy.
Grievances become a package. Before 1914, leaders increasingly interpreted economic competition, military planning, alliances, colonial disputes, and nationalist rhetoric as proof of a single hostile design. Westad sees a similar pattern in US-China relations: actions involving trade, technology, naval policy, or partnerships are often treated in both capitals as evidence that the other side intends to contain or dominate them.
Identity raises the price of compromise. Nationalism can turn a negotiable policy disagreement into a test of national dignity. In China, official narratives emphasize foreign efforts to obstruct the country’s rise; in Russia, imperial nostalgia links regional influence to national survival; in India, Hindu nationalism can sharpen internal divisions while coloring foreign policy. When every dispute confirms the same story, leaders lose room to make limited agreements without appearing weak.
This resembles a well-studied cognitive problem: confirmation bias makes people notice information that supports an existing belief and discount evidence that complicates it. At the state level, public messaging can institutionalize that bias, so each new incident seems to validate a threat narrative. Separating issues is not a demand to ignore genuine conflicts or excuse coercion. It is a way to prevent one disagreement from contaminating every other channel. The challenge is political as much as analytical: leaders must explain why a narrow bargain can protect national interests better than an all-or-nothing contest.
Treat alliances as commitments to manage, not shields from risk.
A promise can entangle. In 1914, Germany backed Austria-Hungary as it confronted Serbia, while Russia supported Serbia and France relied on its alliance with Russia. Britain’s relationship with France remained uncertain. These commitments were meant to deter attacks, but their ambiguity and connection to offensive war plans made it harder for leaders to predict one another’s actions.
Planning narrowed choices. Germany’s military strategy depended on attacking France through neutral Belgium before Russia could fully mobilize. Once mobilization began, political leaders faced intense pressure to follow plans built around speed. The alliances did not mechanically cause war, but they helped make a regional crisis spread. Westad’s lesson is to make commitments clear, keep them defensive, and ensure leaders can consult before military timetables remove options.
The distinction between deterrence and entrapment is a central problem in alliance politics. A credible promise can discourage aggression, but an automatic or poorly communicated commitment can encourage partners to take risks, or make rivals fear that delay will leave them at a disadvantage. Institutions and military coordination can reduce uncertainty, yet they can also create routines that outpace diplomacy. The useful question is not whether alliances are good or bad in the abstract. It is whether their members have agreed on the limits of support, the purpose of joint plans, and the procedures for handling a crisis.
Slow crisis decisions when new weapons reward whoever moves first.
Speed became strategy. Before 1914, railways, long-range artillery, rapid-fire weapons, and new communications changed how armies could mobilize. Military planners feared that the side acting first would gain a decisive advantage. This belief, called the cult of the offensive, is the idea that rapid attack is the safest route to victory. It narrowed the time available for diplomacy and encouraged plans that assumed quick success.
The pressure persists. Today, cyber operations, drones, hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, and nuclear arsenals complicate decisions further. A fast-moving attack could damage communications or infrastructure, while leaders might have little time to assess whether an incident is limited or part of a wider assault. Westad argues that weapons do not determine war, but rapid technological change increases fears of falling behind and acting too late.
This is also a problem of decision design. In complex organizations, speed can improve performance when tasks are routine, but it can magnify error when information is incomplete and consequences are irreversible. Military systems that compress decision time therefore need safeguards, including reliable communication and clear human authority over escalation. The historical parallel is not exact: current weapons differ radically from early twentieth-century artillery and rail mobilization. The shared danger is that leaders may confuse a deadline imposed by their own plans with an unavoidable fact of nature.
Keep Taiwan, Korea, and the South China Sea from becoming linked showdowns.
Local disputes have wider paths. Taiwan combines a sovereignty conflict, rising Chinese nationalism, a more distinct Taiwanese identity, and uncertainty about whether the United States would intervene. About 65 percent of people on the island identify primarily as Taiwanese, according to the figures cited in the book. In Korea, a North Korean crisis or sudden regime collapse could draw in both China and the United States. In the South China Sea, competing claims overlap with waters carrying roughly one-third of global trade.
Other flashpoints matter too. Westad also examines the Himalayas, Ukraine, and the Middle East. Each has its own history, but in a more contested world, regional conflicts can engage outside powers through alliances, strategic interests, or fear of losing influence. These are risk scenarios, not predictions. The central danger is that a local confrontation can become a test of status and credibility for several Great Powers at once.
The value of this map is that it treats escalation as a chain of decisions rather than a sudden leap from peace to world war. A clash might prompt a response, which an ally interprets as a wider attack, and then other governments mobilize to protect their positions. That sequence is plausible, but not every flashpoint is equally likely, and listing many risks can blur meaningful differences. Taiwan's political status, a North Korean collapse, and maritime encounters require distinct crisis plans. Preparedness improves when officials model the pathways separately instead of treating every tension as one global showdown.
Pair credible deterrence with deals that let rivals step back.
Restraint needs credibility. Westad argues that believable deterrence can prevent aggression: Germany might have acted differently in 1914 if it had been certain Britain would intervene. Today, US defense commitments in South Korea and NATO’s mutual-defense pledge are intended to make attacks less attractive. But deterrence works only if leaders communicate what actions would trigger a response and avoid rhetoric that makes retreat politically impossible.
Open a way out. Deterrence should accompany negotiation, not replace it. Leaders need dependable crisis communications, regular contact, and limited agreements on issues such as arms control, trade, or shared risks. A hotline that goes unanswered cannot buy time. Nor can a personal bond between leaders substitute for durable arrangements. Understanding an opponent’s fears does not require endorsing them; it can help identify a deal that reduces danger without asking either side to abandon every principle.
This balance is stronger than either pure coercion or wishful engagement. Deterrence changes the expected cost of an attack; negotiation creates a possible benefit for choosing restraint. Research on bargaining emphasizes that conflict can persist when states cannot credibly signal their intentions or commit to future promises. Communication and monitoring can reduce those problems, though neither guarantees agreement. A further test is whether a bargain protects smaller states rather than trading away their choices for Great Power convenience. Peace is more durable when restraint is reciprocal and the affected parties have a voice.
Let global power adjust gradually instead of defending every privilege by force.
A changing order needs rules. Westad argues that the rise of multiple powers cannot simply be reversed. The choice is whether influence shifts through gradual accommodation or through conflict. He calls for practical compromises on territorial disputes, ending active wars, maintaining trade, limiting arms races, and cooperating where interests overlap, including on climate, pandemics, and space.
Institutions must catch up. The United Nations and other international bodies could provide forums for powers to manage disputes, but they lose authority when major states ignore rules whenever those rules become inconvenient. Westad points to the need for reforms that give rising powers, including India, a meaningful place in global decision-making. On Taiwan, he discusses a possible US-China understanding that could preserve space for a peaceful settlement. The aim is not to freeze the old order, but to prevent change from becoming a license for domination.
This is the book's most demanding political proposition: accept that influence changes while refusing to let might alone determine who controls whom. Institutions can help by making bargaining more predictable and giving states repeated ways to signal interests. Yet institutional legitimacy depends on more than representation; rules must apply to powerful states as well as weaker ones. Gradual adjustment also risks becoming a euphemism for imposing outcomes on those most affected. A credible peace strategy therefore needs both flexibility among major powers and safeguards for the sovereignty and agency of smaller states.
Analysis
Westad’s central achievement is to connect structural change to human decisions without making either level disappear. A rising China, an anxious United States, and a more assertive set of regional powers create pressure, but pressure does not itself declare war. The book’s account of 1914 shows the intervening mechanisms: leaders interpret other states through accumulated suspicion, alliances create expectations that are poorly understood, military plans make delay feel dangerous, and domestic politics punish visible compromise. This is a richer explanation than saying that a power transition automatically produces conflict.
The historical comparison is most persuasive when treated as a set of questions. Are rivalries being bundled together? Are leaders acting on a feared deadline? Can they explain a limited concession at home? Does an ally’s commitment deter aggression or encourage risk-taking? Those questions travel across eras better than any direct analogy between Germany and China or Britain and the United States. The cases differ in political systems, nuclear capabilities, trade structures, and international institutions. Those differences can restrain conflict, but they can also generate new kinds of miscalculation.
The argument for compromise is not a call for moral equivalence. Recognizing a rival’s security narrative does not make its claims legitimate, especially when smaller states bear the cost. The difficult policy problem is to combine credible defense with negotiations that preserve other countries’ agency. Deterrence without an exit can make threats self-fulfilling; accommodation without credible limits can invite coercion. The most plausible peace strategy is therefore specific and procedural: maintain crisis communications, separate disputes, clarify commitments, and create monitored agreements with reciprocal obligations.
The book also places responsibility on domestic politics. A state that refuses to address economic insecurity may find foreign blame politically useful, while a state that treats national status as sacred can make ordinary adjustment look like humiliation. That insight reaches beyond diplomacy. Public legitimacy is part of strategic capacity: leaders need enough trust to explain why avoiding war may require restraint. History offers no guarantee that such leadership will appear, but it shows why its absence can matter as much as weapons or alliances.
Review Summary
The Coming Storm draws comparisons between today's multipolar geopolitical landscape and the pre-WWI era, arguing that similar conditions — rising powers, shifting alliances, nationalism, and economic rivalry — make major conflict increasingly plausible. Reviewers praised its accessibility, concise writing, and timely relevance, while criticisms focused on its brevity, underdeveloped solutions, and occasionally weak analogies. Most agreed the contemporary analysis outshines the historical sections, and that despite its limitations, the book serves as a compelling and sobering warning.
Glossary
Great Power
A state with major influenceA state with enough economic, military, and political strength to shape international affairs beyond its immediate borders. In Westad’s account, Great Powers compete for regional influence and global standing, and their conflicts can draw in other states. Their decisions matter disproportionately because a war among them can expand in scale and consequence.
multipolarity
Several major power centersAn international arrangement in which several powerful states influence world affairs, rather than one dominant power or two rival superpowers. Westad uses the term for the emerging order that includes the United States, China, India, Russia, and other consequential actors. More centers of power can create choices and partnerships, but also make intentions and commitments harder to interpret.
cult of the offensive
Belief in attack's advantageA military belief that acting first and attacking rapidly offers the best chance of victory. Before World War I, new weapons, faster rail transport, and detailed mobilization schedules strengthened this belief among military planners. It reduced the time available for negotiation and made leaders fear that waiting would leave their country at a decisive disadvantage.
strategic ambiguity
Unclear commitment to interveneA policy of deliberately leaving uncertain whether a state will use military force in a particular crisis. The United States applies this approach to Taiwan by supporting the island’s self-defense while not stating unequivocally whether it would fight a Chinese attack. Ambiguity may discourage both an attack and a unilateral change in Taiwan’s status, but its effectiveness depends on what Beijing believes.
Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)
Systems that restrict military accessMilitary capabilities designed to prevent an opponent from entering a region or operating freely once there. Westad discusses China’s missiles and related systems as part of an effort to constrain US military access to the western Pacific during a conflict. Such capabilities affect planning by raising the cost and risk of intervention, especially around contested areas such as Taiwan.
Shanghai +
Proposed US-China Taiwan understandingA proposed understanding between Beijing and Washington, named in reference to the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué. In Westad’s discussion, it would involve the United States declining to support Taiwanese independence so long as China does not use military force against the island. It is presented as a possible way to lower immediate tensions and preserve time for a peaceful settlement, not as an existing agreement.
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