Key Takeaways
Use smallness as an advantage by renting capability instead of owning infrastructure.
A different starting point. Tim, a veteran consultant at a giant firm, wanted to help clients adopt new technology. But his employer served large, cautious organizations, and its bureaucracy made change difficult. Tim moved to a small software company serving smaller clients, where he could help put new tools to work. His shift captures the book’s central argument: the New Small uses technology and leaner structures to do work that once required far greater resources.
Size is not the whole story. The New Small is not every small business. It describes companies willing to experiment, adapt, and make pragmatic choices. The author is pro-small, not anti-big: large firms can innovate too, but established systems and incentives can make adaptation harder.
The argument is strongest when smallness is treated as an organizational condition, not a virtue. Fewer layers can shorten the path from a customer problem to a decision, while rented services can let a small team access capabilities once reserved for large companies. This resembles a broader principle of organizational design: reduce coordination costs where speed matters. Yet small firms also have fewer reserves when a vendor fails or a key employee leaves. Agility creates an advantage only when it is paired with sound judgment and contingency planning.
Buy technology to remove a business bottleneck, not to follow fashion.
Start with the work. The book groups five types of tools that help small firms: hosted computing, subscription software, open-source applications, mobile access, and social platforms. These are useful only when they solve a real need, such as reducing cost, improving customer service, or making information easier to reach. The New Small does not buy a tool because a competitor has one.
A dental practice example. Hanover Pediatric Dentistry used open-source practice software and electronic records rather than expensive proprietary systems. With a founder’s IT-skilled husband helping, the practice launched key systems in about two weeks and reported saving more than $15,000 upfront and nearly $2,000 a month in support costs. Technology helped, but the practice still had to solve ordinary problems such as hiring and managing staff.
This problem-first approach is a practical defense against technology theater, where a new platform signals modernity but leaves the underlying work unchanged. A useful evaluation asks what task improves, for whom, and at what total cost, including training, support, and security. The dental example also shows why context matters: an informed helper and a new practice made adoption easier than it might be for a legacy institution. Low price alone is not a business case, especially when sensitive records or dependable service are at stake.
Let technology costs rise with demand instead of forecasting years ahead.
Pay for the capacity used. Cloud computing lets a company use remote servers and storage rather than buying and maintaining all its own equipment. Software as a service, or SaaS, similarly provides applications through a vendor, usually for a recurring fee. Both can make costs more flexible: a firm can add capacity when work increases and reduce it when demand falls.
Savings can be concrete. A law firm in the book moved much of its technology to hosted services and estimated first-year technology savings of 16 percent, with capital spending potentially reduced by as much as 85 percent in later years. Voices.com reported that moving file storage from dedicated servers cut its monthly bill from about $1,000 to $2.10 initially, then to around $100 as its stored files grew.
Flexible spending changes the risk profile of a young business. Instead of guessing how much hardware it might need years in advance, the firm can match some costs to actual usage. That is especially valuable when revenue is uncertain. But variable pricing is not automatically cheap: recurring charges can climb with users, storage, or activity, and dependence on a provider can make switching difficult. The sound decision compares the full life-cycle cost with the value of flexibility, including data portability, service reliability, and the cost of an outage.
Treat social media as customer service in public, not advertising in disguise.
Be useful, then be responsive. The book’s social customer is a buyer who can readily share praise or complaints online. Chef Tony, a restaurant owner, used videos, posts, and social networks to share food knowledge and build familiarity before customers arrived. When a diner criticized the restaurant online, Tony found the post, contacted the customer, and helped turn the experience around.
Attention can travel. DODOcase, a small maker of handmade tablet covers, spent only about $500 on street teams around the product launch. Online reviews and customer recommendations helped the company grow rapidly, reaching $1 million in revenue after four months with four full-time employees and two contractors. These cases show how useful content and personal responses can spread awareness without a large advertising budget.
The durable lesson is not that every business can trigger viral growth. Exceptional attention is difficult to reproduce, and favorable publicity cannot substitute for a good product. What is more repeatable is the behavior underneath it: listen where customers already speak, respond visibly, and offer something worth sharing. This also turns service into a public signal of how the company behaves. Social channels amplify both care and indifference, so joining the conversation creates an obligation to monitor it and answer with substance.
Trial tools with real users, then leave when friction outweighs value.
Make switching possible. Voices.com first chose NetSuite for customer and financial management, but employees found its interface confusing and its accounting partner struggled with it. The company tested Salesforce, checked that its data could be moved, and switched. It was using basic features within a week. The company later reported a 62 percent increase in gross sales after deploying the system, a 215 percent increase in new business over three months, and a marketing return on investment close to 1,200 percent.
Treat the numbers carefully. These are company-reported results, not proof that the software alone caused the gains. The larger lesson is to test tools against actual work, plan how to retrieve data, and avoid contracts that make a poor fit permanent. Free trials and short agreements can lower the cost of learning, but migration still requires preparation.
This is a useful antidote to the sunk-cost trap: once a company has spent money and effort on a platform, leaders may defend it to justify the original decision. Real user friction is evidence, not disloyalty. At the same time, a quick switch is not a universal benchmark. Data quality, integration, compliance, and training can make migration consequential. A disciplined trial defines success before adoption and an exit route before commitment, so enthusiasm for a new tool does not simply replace attachment to the old one.
Offer autonomy, then hire people who thrive without rigid job scripts.
Trust needs structure. Fuentek, a technology-transfer consultancy, operated with a distributed team of more than 40 people. Its staff used a shared system to store client work, track projects, and flag hours that needed attention. The company paired remote flexibility with clear expectations and accountability. Its founder hired experienced people who could work independently, rather than trying to supervise every task from afar.
Work can be broader. The New Small often gives employees varied responsibilities, direct access to decisions, and room to learn. That can make work more engaging, but it suits people who tolerate ambiguity and are willing to help beyond a narrow job description. Fuentek’s model was not a universal template. The book notes that some work requires physical presence and that not every employee prefers a highly flexible, less scripted environment.
Autonomy works best when goals and responsibilities are legible. Remote work does not eliminate management; it shifts management away from watching presence and toward making commitments, progress, and results visible. This can support both flexibility and accountability, rather than treating them as opposites. The caution is important: broad roles can become a cover for understaffing, and flexibility can quietly turn into permanent availability. A healthy version gives people discretion over how to work while preserving reasonable boundaries and clarity about what success means.
Make collaboration a shared workflow, not a software purchase.
Change the default behavior. The book argues that email is useful for messages but poor as the sole home for project knowledge. Important decisions get buried, attachments multiply, and people may not know which version is current. Shared documents, calendars, task systems, and searchable knowledge spaces can give a team a common record of its work.
Habits make tools useful. Voices.com shared documents and calendars and held brief daily stand-up meetings. It also let employees submit and rank product ideas through a shared forum. These practices helped people contribute across roles. The New Small made collaboration part of normal work by having leaders model it, expecting timely updates, and linking email messages back to shared records. Simply buying collaboration software would not have produced the same result.
Collaboration is partly a technical problem, but more deeply a question of incentives and norms. A shared workspace works only if people trust it enough to contribute and believe that others will keep it current. Establishing one dependable record can reduce confusion and duplicated effort, especially in distributed teams. Yet collaboration should not become a reflexive demand for consensus. Clear ownership and individual decision rights still matter; otherwise, shared work can become endless discussion. The best tools make coordination easier without dissolving responsibility.
Grow carefully enough to preserve the service and work culture.
Do not chase every sale. RedSeven began by offering computers, parts, websites, and network services. That broad menu blurred its identity. The company eventually focused on support and computer leasing for small businesses, charging roughly $35 to $75 a month for equipment and help. Customers valued having someone else take responsibility for computer problems, and word of mouth helped the business grow.
Think beyond the next invoice. The book calls a long-term orientation “long-term greedy”: sometimes it is better to give honest advice or turn down unsuitable work than to maximize a short-term fee. New Small firms also grow cautiously because adding customers, staff, or complexity can weaken the service and culture that made the business attractive. Growth matters, but not every kind of growth improves the company.
This is a compelling challenge to the assumption that expansion is always success. A focused service can be more defensible than a larger menu, particularly when customers value trust and continuity. The same logic resembles a portfolio choice: a company protects the capabilities that generate repeat business instead of pursuing every available opportunity. Still, restraint has costs. Remaining small can limit investment, reach, and resilience. The goal is not to romanticize smallness, but to grow at a pace the operating model and people can sustain.
Turn failed experiments into reusable knowledge before defending the sunk cost.
Failure can pay twice. Voices.com once spent $20,000 on a direct-mail campaign that produced almost no response. The company still salvaged value from the effort: it reused the campaign’s graphics to build a recognizable visual identity. The New Small treats mistakes as information, asking what failed, what can be recovered, and what should change next time.
Fail safely, not blindly. The book favors experimentation, staged adoption, and iterative development over committing everything to a large, one-time rollout. Small tests can expose confusing interfaces or weak demand before they become expensive problems. But experimentation needs boundaries. A failed marketing test is different from a preventable data loss or a security breach. The right lesson is neither “never take risks” nor “move fast at any cost,” but to match the scale of the test to the consequences of failure.
The distinction between learning and merely celebrating failure matters. An experiment is valuable when it produces evidence that changes a decision, not when a team uses failure as a fashionable excuse. Psychological safety, meaning confidence that people can raise concerns without humiliation, can help teams surface problems early. Accountability remains necessary: teams should record what they learned and change the process that produced the mistake. In high-consequence areas, such as legal records or customer data, safeguards should come before speed.
Analysis
The book’s central contribution is not a list of fashionable tools. It is a picture of technology as organizational design. Hosted services, open software, mobile access, and social platforms matter because they let small firms alter who can work, where work happens, how costs behave, and how customers enter the conversation. The strongest cases show these elements working together: a dental office pairs inexpensive software with an informed helper; a virtual consultancy combines shared systems with employee trust; a product company uses online attention to reach buyers without a conventional marketing budget.
The account is persuasive as a collection of operating examples, but its evidence has limits. The companies were selected for interesting technology use, and many reported their own gains. There is no systematic comparison group establishing that technology caused their growth, or that small firms generally deploy it better. The stories are better read as demonstrations of possibility than as a forecast of average results. They also come from a 2010 technology landscape, so some named products and claims are historically specific. The underlying questions remain useful: who controls the data, how easy is exit, and what work actually improves?
A deeper lesson is that tools redistribute dependence rather than eliminate it. A firm that stops maintaining its own server depends more on a provider; a company that relies on social platforms depends on channels it does not control. This can be a smart exchange when the provider offers scale or expertise the firm cannot build itself, but it requires attention to continuity, privacy, and portability.
Smallness is therefore an opportunity, not a guarantee. Less bureaucracy can mean faster learning, while limited cash and thin staffing make errors more consequential. The New Small succeeds when it combines flexibility with discipline: solve a real problem, test assumptions, protect customer trust, and change course without confusing loyalty to a tool with loyalty to the business.
Review Summary
Glossary
The New Small
Adaptive small businessesThe author’s label for relatively small companies that use emerging technologies pragmatically, experiment with new approaches, and adapt when existing tools or practices stop working. The term describes an outlook and way of operating, not simply a company’s headcount. These businesses often value flexibility, close customer relationships, and meaningful work.
Five Enablers
Five technology categoriesThe book’s collective name for the technology areas helping small businesses access capabilities once associated with larger organizations: cloud computing, software as a service, free and open-source software, mobile technologies, and social technologies. The author presents them as options to solve business problems, not as tools every company should adopt wholesale.
freemium
Free service, paid upgradesA business model that offers a basic product or service free, then charges for premium features, greater capacity, or an enhanced version. The book presents freemium as a way for small businesses to try tools and attract users at low initial cost. It also warns that a free tier may offer inadequate support or may not be financially sustainable for its provider.
social CRM
Customer engagement across social channelsSocial customer relationship management applies customer-focused business practices to conversations that happen through social networks, blogs, reviews, and other online channels. It treats customers as active participants who can praise or criticize a company publicly. Businesses must listen, respond, and make useful information available, rather than treating social media only as a broadcast advertising outlet.
long-term greedy
Favor durable trust over quick revenueThe book uses this phrase for decisions that may sacrifice immediate income to protect a stronger long-term business relationship. For example, a consultant may recommend a less expensive product instead of billing for unnecessary custom work. The idea is pragmatic rather than charitable: honesty can build trust, referrals, and future opportunities.
90s Sites
Static brochure-style websitesThe author’s term for basic company websites that mainly present a home page, product or service information, contact details, news, testimonials, and an about page. Such sites may explain what a business does, but often offer little reason for visitors to return. The book contrasts them with useful, searchable, interactive sites that regularly provide relevant content.
Download PDF
Download EPUB
.epub digital book format is ideal for reading ebooks on phones, tablets, and e-readers.