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SoBrief
The Submerged State

The Submerged State

How Invisible Government Policies Undermine American Democracy
Much of American government hides in tax breaks and private markets. Who gets to notice?
by Suzanne Mettler 2011 176 pages
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Key Takeaways

Treat tax breaks and private subsidies as government, even when they look like markets.

Government beneath the surface. The submerged state is government policy delivered indirectly, through tax advantages, loans, subsidies, and private organizations rather than a public office handing someone a benefit. Its reach is easy to miss. Employer health insurance, for instance, receives a large tax subsidy, while student loans are supported by federal guarantees and payments to lenders. People may see a bank or an employer and conclude that the market alone is providing the service.

A familiar blind spot. At a 2009 town hall, a constituent told Senator Mary Landrieu to keep government out of health care, overlooking the public programs, hospital funding, and tax subsidies already woven into the system. The book’s central point is not simply that government is large. It is that much of its activity is hard for citizens to recognize.

Analysis

What's striking is how the delivery mechanism changes the story citizens tell themselves. A benefit arriving through an employer or lender feels like a market transaction, even when public rules and money make it possible. That gap matters because democratic judgment depends on knowing what institutions are doing, not just whether a service works. The argument also cautions against treating every private provider as evidence of a retreating state. The state may be operating through that provider, with less visibility and less public accountability.

When aid is invisible, beneficiaries cannot credit government or defend its policies.

Benefits without attribution. In a 2008 survey, 43.5 percent of respondents said they had ever used a government social program. Yet 91.6 percent had used at least one of nineteen federal programs when asked about specific benefits. Many had received help without recognizing it as public help. Among student loan users, half described the program as private, although federal guarantees and subsidies made many of the loans possible.

Recognition shapes response. Mettler finds that using more visible programs, such as Social Security or unemployment insurance, was associated with a stronger sense that government had helped or provided opportunities. Comparable use of tax breaks and employer benefits was not. The policy may improve someone’s circumstances, but if its public source stays hidden, that experience does little to build confidence or motivate political action.

Analysis

This is a problem of attribution as much as information. People learn from experience, but experience cannot teach a lesson about public institutions if the institution disappears from view. The same logic applies beyond government: organizations gain trust when users can understand what they provide and how decisions are made. Still, recognition should not be confused with gratitude or consent. A person can understand a benefit’s public source and still oppose its design. Visibility creates the conditions for judgment, not a guarantee of approval.

Hidden benefits send public money upward while starving visible help for ordinary families.

Large sums, unequal gains. Social tax expenditures, the formal term for tax provisions that reduce public revenue to support chosen activities, grew from 81 provisions in 1981 to 151 in 2010. Their estimated cost approached $1.1 trillion in 2008. The biggest benefits often went to affluent households: in 2004, families earning at least $100,000 received 69 percent of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction and 55 percent of retirement tax benefits.

Opportunity has a tilt. The mortgage deduction offers more to households with higher incomes, larger mortgages, and enough deductions to itemize. It can also encourage buyers to purchase more expensive homes, pushing prices up and making ownership harder for others. In 2007, the deduction cost roughly four times as much as federal housing vouchers. Public resources therefore flow through policies many citizens barely notice, while direct aid for lower-income households remains comparatively small.

Analysis

The distributional point is especially powerful because familiar labels can conceal who gains most. A policy called support for homeownership sounds broadly shared, but the actual subsidy depends on income, tax status, and the size of a mortgage. That is a reminder to assess public programs by incidence, meaning who receives the economic value, rather than by their stated purpose. Yet distribution alone does not settle whether a policy is worthwhile. A serious evaluation must also ask what behavior it changes, what alternatives it displaces, and who bears the cost.

Policy design mobilizes industries, while leaving beneficiaries politically asleep.

Unequal political feedback. Policy feedback means that policies shape the political behavior and power of the people and organizations touched by them. Industries that benefit from the submerged state have clear incentives to monitor policy and defend it. The real estate, insurance, and finance sectors invested heavily in lobbying and campaign activity. By contrast, recipients of hidden benefits often did not even identify their support as a government program.

The public stays outside. In the 2008 survey, people who had used more visible programs were more likely to say government had helped them and to take policy-related political action. Use of tax breaks barely motivated such action. Meanwhile, the organizations representing industries could maintain relationships with lawmakers year after year. The result is a political imbalance: concentrated beneficiaries of a policy are organized, while the broader public often has neither clear information nor a reason to mobilize.

Analysis

This feedback loop helps explain why policy can remain durable without broad public enthusiasm. Organized groups have continuity, expertise, and a specific stake; individual beneficiaries face dispersed benefits and may not know what to defend. That pattern resembles a collective-action problem: the gains to each person are hard to perceive, while the gains to an organized sector are worth sustained effort. The framework is useful without assuming that every lobbyist dominates every decision. It instead directs attention to whose participation is routine and whose participation requires unusual effort.

Tell people who benefits, and they form sharper, more equitable policy opinions.

Information changes the answer. Mettler and Matt Guardino tested how policy descriptions affected public opinion in a national online experiment with 526 adults. Some participants received no information, some received a basic description, and others also learned which income groups received the largest benefits. Basic descriptions tended to increase support for tax policies. Distributional information changed the pattern: support for the upwardly tilted mortgage and retirement policies fell, while support for the Earned Income Tax Credit, which primarily benefits lower-income workers, rose by 22.7 percentage points.

More people take a position. Information also cut the share of participants answering that they had no opinion, sometimes by more than half. The changes were especially clear among people with low or moderate political knowledge. Learning who gained helped participants connect a complicated policy to their own interests and values.

Analysis

The experiment shows why transparency must include consequences, not just a policy’s official purpose. A neutral description can make a program sound appealing without revealing its distributional choices. The design also challenges the assumption that people cannot reason about complicated policies: a short explanation helped many form a view. The caution is that an immediate response in a survey does not establish lasting knowledge, durable opinion, or political participation. Information is a starting point. Repetition, trusted messengers, and opportunities to act determine whether it becomes civic capacity.

Reform the networks behind policy, not just the policy language.

Interests defend established arrangements. Obama’s effort to end bank-based federal student lending faced lenders that had built political influence over decades. Their business depended on public subsidies and guarantees, but opponents cast direct lending as a government takeover. The financial crisis weakened lenders and made their model harder to defend, while the existing direct loan program offered a workable alternative.

A narrow victory. Congress eventually ended the bank-based system and shifted new lending to direct federal loans. But passage depended on budget procedures, party votes, and a close Senate margin. The expected expansion of Pell Grants and community college support was also reduced during negotiations. The episode shows that changing a policy’s formal rules is only part of reform. Officials must confront the organizations, political alliances, and administrative arrangements that have grown around the old system.

Analysis

The student loan case makes institutional power visible: policies create constituencies, jobs, expertise, and relationships that can outlast the original rationale for a program. Reform therefore requires a feasible replacement, not merely a persuasive critique. The crisis weakened opposition, but relying on crisis is not a durable strategy. There is also a useful distinction between removing an intermediary’s subsidy and improving the benefit for users. Ending lender advantages mattered, yet the reduced funds for grants show how savings can be redirected or diluted during legislative bargaining.

Health reform advanced by bargaining, but preserved much of private delivery.

A coalition for change. The Affordable Care Act succeeded where earlier reform efforts had failed partly because the administration negotiated with hospitals, doctors, drug companies, insurers, and labor organizations. These groups accepted or supported parts of the law in exchange for concessions. Insurers, for example, opposed the public option but supported a requirement that individuals obtain coverage, which promised them millions of new customers. The law was therefore not a sudden government entry into an untouched market. It reshaped a system already sustained by public subsidies and rules.

A mixed public role. The law expanded Medicaid and regulated insurers, while also directing many newly covered people toward private plans. It aimed to extend coverage to 32 million people, but much of the system remained indirectly administered. This helped secure political support, yet left many citizens unsure how the law would affect their own households.

Analysis

The case illustrates a real tradeoff between political feasibility and institutional transformation. Bargaining can assemble a coalition large enough to pass a reform, but concessions may preserve private actors’ central role and complicate public understanding. That does not make negotiation a failure: wider coverage and stronger protections can matter even when delivery stays mixed. It does mean that success should be measured on more than passage. Coverage, cost, accountability, and public comprehension are distinct outcomes, and a law can improve one while leaving others unresolved.

Tax breaks are easy to pass, hard to see, and costly to democracy.

A quiet form of spending. The 2009 stimulus package included $288 billion in tax cuts, 37 percent of its total cost. Its Making Work Pay credit reduced taxes for most working Americans, often through slightly larger paychecks rather than a visible payment. One year later, only 12 percent of those surveyed knew taxes had fallen for most Americans; 53 percent thought they had stayed the same, and 24 percent thought they had risen.

Easy to expand, hard to defend. Tax breaks can be added to large revenue bills without passing through the same stages as direct spending programs. They also appeal across party lines because they can support favored activities without creating a visible public agency. But the hidden delivery obscures both public costs and who benefits. Obama’s attempts to limit especially generous deductions for affluent households met strong opposition from real estate and philanthropic organizations, while no comparably powerful public constituency emerged.

Analysis

Tax policy reveals how political optics can diverge from fiscal substance. A reduction in taxes is still a public choice about who keeps resources and which other uses become harder to finance. The paycheck approach may support spending in the short term, but it removes the moment when a recipient might connect the benefit to government. This is not an argument that every tax credit is ineffective or unfair. It is a case for evaluating tax provisions alongside spending programs, with clear estimates of cost, distribution, and results.

Make each benefit legible at enrollment, delivery, and tax time.

Reveal through design. The book’s remedy is to make public policy easier to recognize, not merely to advertise it after the fact. Direct benefits, clear statements, and understandable procedures can show citizens what government provides. Where private organizations deliver services, policies can still disclose the public role and make private actors more accountable. The delivery of student loans, for instance, could explain how federal backing changes the borrower’s costs compared with an unsubsidized private loan.

Keep explaining after passage. The book proposes annual statements that clarify government’s contribution to health coverage or retirement benefits, and tax summaries that show the value of claimed provisions. State and local governments, unions, civic groups, and other organizations can also help people find benefits and understand them. The goal is not publicity for its own sake. It is giving citizens enough information to judge policy and participate in decisions about it.

Analysis

Legibility is a design choice, not a decorative layer added after legislation passes. A benefit statement can make hidden support comprehensible at the moment someone uses it, when the information has practical meaning. The deeper principle is to connect public responsibility with public experience. Yet clearer forms alone cannot repair distrust or equalize political influence. Information needs to be paired with accessible participation, meaningful oversight, and fair policy outcomes. Otherwise transparency risks becoming a polished explanation of arrangements citizens still cannot change.

Analysis

Mettler’s central contribution is to shift attention from the size of government to the visibility and distribution of its work. The state can expand through tax provisions, guarantees, and private delivery while public rhetoric describes markets as though they operate independently. Citizens then encounter an odd democratic mismatch: people may depend on public arrangements without recognizing them, while organized industries understand those arrangements intimately and defend them effectively.

The book’s cases show that visibility is not a public-relations problem alone. It is built into policy architecture. A tax reduction blended into payroll withholding communicates differently from a direct grant, even when both cost the public and benefit a household. Likewise, a bank originating a federally supported loan makes the public contribution less apparent than an agency issuing it. These designs affect who notices policy, who claims credit, and who has a reason to organize.

The argument is strongest when it links these design choices to unequal political voice. It also makes a persuasive case that straightforward information about beneficiaries can improve opinion formation. But visibility is necessary, not sufficient. Citizens may understand a subsidy perfectly and still disagree about its purpose, or lack the time and organizational resources to influence it. Transparent administration can expose a skewed policy without correcting the skew. Conversely, direct public provision is not automatically fair, competent, or trusted.

The practical implication is a two-part standard for reform. Ask first whether a policy distributes resources fairly and achieves its stated purpose. Then ask whether people can identify the public role, understand who benefits, and hold decision-makers accountable. Mettler’s account treats those questions as inseparable: a policy that improves material outcomes while remaining politically unintelligible may be fragile, while a visible policy that entrenches unequal benefits is no democratic solution. Durable reform must join effective provision to public understanding and meaningful opportunities for citizens to respond.

Summary in 30 Seconds
Tax advantages, loan guarantees, and privately delivered benefits are public policy, even when recipients mistake them for market services. In a survey, 91.6 percent had used at least one federal program, but only 43.5 percent recognized having used government aid. Hidden benefits can direct large sums toward affluent households while weakening public understanding and political participation. Clear information about who benefits can shift policy opinions, while durable reform also requires confronting the industries and networks invested in existing arrangements.
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Review Summary

3.88 out of 5
Average of 267 ratings from Goodreads and Amazon.

Reviewers largely praise The Submerged State as an illuminating, well-researched exploration of how hidden government programs undermine democratic engagement. Most appreciate Mettler's core argument—that invisible tax expenditures and subsidies prevent citizens from recognizing government's role in their lives—while finding her case studies on student loans, healthcare, and tax reform compelling. Common criticisms include the book feeling overly academic, repetitive, or unnecessarily padded beyond its central thesis. Several reviewers note a perceived liberal bias, and some feel the content has become dated since publication.

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Glossary

Submerged state

Hidden public policymaking

The submerged state is the collection of government policies that provide public support indirectly, often through tax advantages, guarantees, subsidies, or private organizations. Because the public encounters an employer, lender, or market transaction rather than a government office, the state’s role can remain difficult to recognize, even for people who benefit from it.

Social tax expenditures

Tax-based public benefits

Social tax expenditures are provisions in the tax code that reduce taxes for households or organizations engaged in activities policymakers choose to support. They function as public benefits by lowering tax bills or producing refunds, rather than by directly issuing a government payment. Their budgetary cost is revenue not collected, which can make their scale and beneficiaries less visible.

Policy feedback effects

Policies shape political behavior

Policy feedback effects are the ways existing policies influence later political behavior, attitudes, and organization. A program can create beneficiaries who become more engaged, or it can leave users unaware of government’s role. Policies can also strengthen organizations that benefit from them, giving those groups a continuing incentive and capacity to defend the arrangements.

Policy visibility

How apparent government seems

Policy visibility describes how readily people can see that a public policy exists, understand how it works, and recognize government’s role in providing it. Visibility varies by design and delivery. Direct benefits may be easier to identify, while tax advantages or services delivered through private actors can make public support harder to perceive.

Government by proxy

Public services through intermediaries

Government by proxy refers to the provision of public goods and services through intermediaries such as contractors, nonprofit organizations, private businesses, or recipients of tax benefits and loans. The government may finance or structure the activity without directly delivering it. This arrangement can obscure public responsibility and make accountability harder for citizens to follow.

Choice architecture

Designing the options people face

Choice architecture is the design of the setting in which people make decisions, including defaults, procedures, deadlines, and how options are presented. Behavioral economists use the concept to explain how policy arrangements can encourage choices such as saving for retirement. Mettler argues that policy design should also be judged by whether it helps citizens recognize government’s role.

About the Author

Suzanne Mettler is the John L. Senior Professor of American Institutions in the Government Department at Cornell University, where she specializes in American politics and public policy. She has authored several acclaimed books, including The Government-Citizen Disconnect, Degrees of Inequality: How the Politics of Higher Education Sabotaged the American Dream, and The Submerged State: How Invisible Government Programs Undermine American Democracy. A distinguished scholar, Mettler has received a Guggenheim Fellowship, a Radcliffe Institute Fellowship, and multiple book awards. In 2017, she was elected to the prestigious American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

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