Key Takeaways
Treat global infrastructure as power, not neutral plumbing.
The hidden routes matter. The book’s central claim is that American power travels not only through armies and diplomacy, but through the systems that move information, money, and technology. Fiber-optic cables, payment networks, cloud services, and semiconductor supply chains can look like ordinary tools of commerce. Their routes and ownership, however, give governments opportunities to observe transactions, block access, or pressure companies across borders.
Markets acquired a center. These systems were largely built by private firms pursuing speed and profit, not by officials following an imperial blueprint. Yet their networks clustered around U.S. institutions and territory. Once the United States recognized that concentration, it could use the global economy’s everyday infrastructure as leverage, often without changing the machinery itself.
The useful shift is from asking who owns a product to asking who can interrupt the conditions that make the product usable. This resembles infrastructure studies, where roads and utilities are understood as political because access, maintenance, and routing shape who can act. The book also avoids a simple conspiracy story: market-driven systems can still concentrate power without a master plan. That distinction matters, because responding to accidental concentration requires more than exposing bad intent. It requires designing redundancy, rules, and accountability into systems whose convenience is precisely what made them dominant.
Efficiency quietly concentrates networks where governments can reach them.
A globalist built the pipes. Citibank chairman Walter Wriston believed that fast-moving money and information would weaken governments. He helped expand Eurodollar markets, where dollars circulated outside the United States, and tried to make Citibank’s own messaging system, MARTI, a standard for international banks. Other banks resisted dependence on one private firm and helped establish SWIFT instead. Yet dollar transactions still depended on U.S. banks and clearing arrangements.
Old routes attract new traffic. Internet exchanges, server farms, and cloud services also clustered where connections already existed. Northern Virginia’s Ashburn became a major digital crossroads because firms could connect to other firms there. Each new connection made the location more useful, drawing still more activity. The network that seemed decentralized therefore developed consequential hubs.
This is a classic network effect with a geopolitical consequence. A hub becomes valuable because others already use it, so switching away becomes costly even when users dislike the arrangement. The pattern is not unique to finance or the Internet: standards and shared infrastructure often create coordination benefits alongside dependence. That makes the policy choice difficult. Breaking up every hub could sacrifice speed and interoperability, while leaving hubs unchecked can turn ordinary efficiency into a single point of political pressure.
Map the chokepoints before a crisis turns infrastructure into surveillance.
The map revealed access. After September 11, the National Security Agency expanded its surveillance by using cable landing sites and Internet backbone connections on U.S. territory. A leaked map of the STORMBREW program showed seven access sites described as international choke points. The NSA could obtain broad streams of communications through telecommunications partners, then search for information it considered valuable.
The legal boundary moved. Officials argued that foreign communications passing through U.S. systems were available for intelligence collection, even when the people communicating were not in the United States. Programs such as PRISM also allowed authorities to seek more targeted information from technology companies. The result was a system in which geography, corporate infrastructure, and legal interpretation worked together to widen surveillance beyond U.S. borders.
The map is powerful because it turns an abstract debate about privacy into a question about routes, switches, and jurisdiction. It also shows how infrastructure can quietly define the practical reach of law: a communication’s path may matter more than the sender’s intention. A key complication is that surveillance can produce genuine security intelligence while imposing costs on people who have little control over the infrastructure. The difficult question is not simply whether collection works, but what limits, oversight, and remedies apply when one state can observe another population at scale.
Use dollar sanctions sparingly; coercive reach can outlast the policy.
Finance became a weapon. After the 9/11 attacks, Treasury officials sought access to SWIFT’s bank messages and built stronger sanctions tools. By restricting access to dollar clearing, the United States could make foreign banks fear losing their ability to do business in dollars. A designation against Banco Delta Asia frightened banks away from North Korean accounts, even beyond the immediate legal restriction.
Iran showed the reach. The United States blocked Iranian banks from dollar transactions, and SWIFT disconnected Iranian institutions under pressure from the United States and Europe. Iran’s oil exports fell from nearly three million barrels a day to as low as 750,000. The pressure helped bring Iran to nuclear negotiations, but businesses remained wary even after restrictions were eased. Fear had become easier to create than confidence was to restore.
Sanctions work partly by changing the expectations of intermediaries. Banks do not need to be directly targeted if they believe that a transaction could threaten their access to the wider system. This can make coercion unusually efficient, but it also creates a credibility problem: governments may find it hard to promise that a permitted transaction will remain permitted. The result resembles a commitment trap. Stronger enforcement can win immediate compliance while encouraging firms and states to invest in alternatives, especially if they see the rules as unpredictable or politically selective.
Control the tools behind a product, and you can control its production.
A new lever emerged. The United States’ campaign against Huawei began with concerns about telecommunications security and the company’s dealings with Iran. Meng Wanzhou’s arrest in Canada relied on alleged bank fraud involving HSBC, a bank exposed to U.S. authority through dollar transactions. The broader campaign then targeted Huawei’s access to advanced semiconductors.
Intellectual property became leverage. A U.S. export rule was expanded to cover some foreign-made products manufactured using U.S. technology. That reach mattered because American firms supplied crucial chip-design software and related technology, while Taiwan’s TSMC produced many of the most advanced chips. TSMC had to stop supplying Huawei’s leading products. Huawei’s global smartphone share fell from a peak of about 20 percent to 4 percent. A company need not manufacture everything to hold power over a supply chain.
This case exposes a form of power that is less visible than control of factories: control over indispensable knowledge and tools. The distinction between a domestic product and a foreign product becomes blurry when design software, intellectual property, equipment, and manufacturing cross borders. Such leverage may protect security interests, but broad restrictions can also encourage competitors to build substitutes and allies to question who sets the rules. The central analytical challenge is proportionality: how narrowly can a state target a genuine risk without turning a technical advantage into a standing license for economic domination?
Treat dependence as reciprocal only when both sides expect future trade.
Europe mistook commerce for insurance. Germany relied on Russian gas, while European firms depended on Chinese markets and the United States provided much of Europe’s security. The belief that trade would moderate political conflict helped justify projects such as Nord Stream 2, even as Russia’s gas supplies became a potential source of pressure.
The invasion shattered the assumption. After Russia attacked Ukraine, the European Union joined sweeping financial and technology sanctions, including restrictions on Russian access to SWIFT and foreign reserves. This was a dramatic change for an institution built to open markets, but Europe remained dependent on U.S. intelligence and vulnerable to energy disruption. The book’s point is not that interdependence always causes conflict. It is that mutual dependence deters coercion only while each side values the relationship’s future enough to preserve it.
Interdependence is often described as mutual, but its political effects depend on asymmetry and expectations. A supplier with few alternative customers may be restrained by lost revenue, unless leaders value strategic aims more than future profits. A buyer with few alternative suppliers may discover that its exposure is more urgent. Europe’s experience makes clear that economic ties are not automatic peace treaties. Resilience therefore means understanding who can wait, who has substitutes, and who bears the immediate costs, rather than assuming that shared commercial interests will reliably contain conflict.
Plan for political risk wherever your supply chain meets the state.
Neutrality has limits. In 2019, U.S. Iran envoy Brian Hook offered an Indian tanker captain millions of dollars to steer a ship carrying Iranian oil toward a port where it could be seized. The captain faced a choice between U.S. pressure and possible retaliation from Iran. His predicament captures the new political risk for businesses: governments can target not only companies, but the people whose decisions keep trade moving.
Even giants are exposed. TSMC’s customers worried about the company sharing supply-chain information with the U.S. government. Microsoft, meanwhile, struggled to reconcile U.S. demands for data with European privacy expectations. The company’s attempt to portray technology firms as neutral was tested when it helped defend Ukrainian government systems from Russian cyberattacks. Firms increasingly have to choose how to comply, whom to protect, and which market risks they can bear.
The captain’s choice resembles a principal-agent problem with unusually high stakes: a worker is asked to advance a state’s policy while bearing personal consequences that the state cannot fully insure away. For companies, the equivalent risk is often distributed across suppliers, employees, and customers. Political risk analysis therefore needs to extend beyond country ratings and asset seizure. It should examine legal exposure, data access, worker safety, and whether a firm’s public claims of neutrality are credible when its infrastructure becomes part of a conflict.
Decentralized technology often rebuilds the intermediaries it set out to remove.
Crypto promised an exit. Bitcoin and Ethereum supporters hoped that cryptography and distributed ledgers could reduce reliance on banks and governments. Ethereum also allowed users to create decentralized autonomous organizations, or DAOs, whose decisions followed programmed rules. Yet a major early DAO was drained through a flaw in its code. Restoring the funds required users to agree to alter the blockchain, revealing that collective governance had not disappeared.
New hubs returned. Many people using crypto relied on centralized exchanges, wallet services, and infrastructure providers. Those firms could be pressured by regulators. When the U.S. Treasury sanctioned Tornado Cash, a cryptocurrency mixer whose code ran on Ethereum, the dispute tested whether software could be beyond government control. Some companies cut ties with the service. The episode showed that decentralized design does not guarantee decentralized power, especially when users depend on a few practical gateways.
The crypto story distinguishes technical decentralization from political decentralization. A ledger may distribute record-keeping while access, governance, liquidity, or user support remains concentrated. Nor is the state’s role reducible to censorship: users also need mechanisms for fraud, theft, and disputed ownership. The harder question is who gets to decide when an exception is justified and how that decision can be challenged. A system that removes intermediaries may reduce some forms of control, but it can also hide authority in code, private platforms, or informal governance.
Build guardrails with rivals before economic coercion becomes a security spiral.
Fear can multiply itself. The United States and China increasingly interpret each other’s efforts at self-protection as preparations for domination. U.S. restrictions on Chinese technology encourage China to seek independence from U.S. systems; those efforts can then appear to Washington as further evidence of hostile intent. The result could be a cycle of retaliation, economic fragmentation, and pressure for military action.
Power needs rules. The authors propose that governments map their shared vulnerabilities, coordinate with allies, and discuss limits with adversaries, drawing on the Cold War experience of managing nuclear risks. They also see a possible constructive use for network power: coordinated pressure on tax evasion, corruption, or carbon-intensive production. Such a commonwealth would be imperfect and selective, but it could connect power to widely shared goals rather than relying only on punishment.
The book’s strongest policy insight is that interdependence requires strategic communication, not just faith in commerce. In game-theoretic terms, states need ways to distinguish defensive measures from preparations for attack and to make commitments believable. That does not mean every security concern can be negotiated away, or that rules eliminate power asymmetries. It means unmanaged ambiguity is itself dangerous. Shared climate or anti-corruption goals may offer a basis for cooperation, but legitimacy depends on transparent standards, meaningful participation, and restraint in applying measures to weaker states.
Analysis
The book’s most important move is to treat global networks as institutions of power rather than neutral conduits. Its historical narrative explains how this power emerged without requiring a secret design: businesses pursued efficiency, infrastructure accumulated around existing hubs, and governments learned that a central position could be converted into surveillance or coercion. The result is a persuasive account of path dependence with unusually concrete political stakes.
Its strongest cases are those where a technical dependency becomes legible through a human decision: a bank’s fear of losing dollar access, a company’s dependence on U.S. chip-design tools, or a European government’s reliance on Russian gas. These stories show that leverage is not simply possession of a resource. It is the ability to make others anticipate exclusion, while passing much of the cost onto intermediaries. The distinction helps explain why a measure can be powerful even when the targeted state is not directly governed by the sanctioning state.
The argument also carries a tension. The same network centrality that enables coercion can be useful for coordinating action against threats that cross borders, from terrorism to corruption and climate change. But benevolent intent alone cannot solve the legitimacy problem. Other states have reason to ask who defines the threat, what evidence supports the intervention, and whether the rules will survive a change of administration. A system that relies on trust cannot be sustained by repeatedly treating trust as expendable.
The book’s caution about escalation is therefore more than a warning against excessive sanctions. It suggests a need for a shared theory of economic security, comparable in ambition to the strategic thinking developed around nuclear deterrence. That theory would have to account for firms, technical standards, supply chains, and civilian exposure, not only state capabilities. The central policy challenge is to preserve useful interdependence while making its coercive uses more predictable, constrained, and contestable. There is no clean return to a borderless market, but neither is economic separation a reliable substitute for rules.
Review Summary
Underground Empire explores how the US leverages global economic networks for geopolitical power. Reviewers praise its accessible explanation of complex topics like financial systems, internet infrastructure, and sanctions. Many find it eye-opening and relevant to current events. Some criticize its lack of depth or historical context, while others appreciate its policy recommendations. Overall, readers find it a valuable introduction to the hidden mechanisms of US economic influence, though opinions vary on its conclusions and proposed solutions.
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Glossary
weaponized interdependence
Network connections turned into leverageA way to understand how states use their position inside global economic networks to gain power over others. A government that can monitor flows through a network or restrict access to a central hub can use those capabilities for surveillance or coercion. The concept emphasizes that interconnection can create concentrated vulnerabilities, not only mutual benefit.
dollar clearing system
Dollar transactions routed through U.S. banksThe arrangements through which banks settle transactions denominated in U.S. dollars, often using correspondent accounts and clearing institutions connected to U.S. banks. Because international businesses and banks rely heavily on dollar transactions, U.S. authorities can use access to this system as leverage. Exclusion can affect institutions operating outside U.S. territory.
SWIFT
Bank-to-bank payment messaging networkThe Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication provides standardized, secure messages that banks use to coordinate international financial transactions. SWIFT does not itself move money, but its messaging is central to many cross-border payments. Its importance makes access consequential and has exposed the organization to political pressure from governments seeking financial information or sanctions enforcement.
chokepoint
A critical network junctionA location, service, or organization through which important flows must pass, or for which few practical substitutes exist. Examples in the book include Internet exchanges, dollar-clearing arrangements, and specialized semiconductor design tools. A chokepoint can create economic efficiency, but it can also give the actor controlling or influencing it the ability to observe, delay, or block activity.
foreign-produced direct product rule
U.S. controls on some foreign-made goodsA U.S. export-control rule extended to cover certain foreign-made products that are produced using U.S. technology, software, or equipment. The rule allowed U.S. authorities to restrict exports to designated companies even when manufacturing took place abroad. In the book, it became a key tool for limiting Huawei’s access to advanced semiconductors.
strategic autonomy
Capacity to act independentlyA European Union policy aspiration to reduce dependence on outside powers and retain the ability to make independent choices in security and economic affairs. The term became prominent as European officials confronted U.S. sanctions, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and reliance on Russian energy and Chinese markets. Disagreement over its meaning reflected competing views of trade, sovereignty, and collective security.
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