Key Takeaways
Treat foreign-dictator admiration as a domestic argument about who deserves power
Hungary as a mirror. At a 2023 Heritage Foundation celebration, Hungarian political adviser Balázs Orbán was welcomed as a guide to America’s culture wars. The enthusiasm reflected Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, where the government promotes conservative family policies while weakening independent institutions and political competition. American visitors praised the country as a model, even though it is a small nation reliant on European Union subsidies.
The book’s central claim. Jacob Heilbrunn traces this attraction across a century: some American conservatives have admired foreign strongmen not just as strategic partners, but as examples of how to organize society at home. He calls this recurring outlook the illiberal imagination. The argument is not that all conservatives are fascists, or that every critic of intervention supports dictatorship. It identifies a persistent current within the Right.
The Hungary episode illustrates how political ideas travel through networks, not just policy papers. Conferences, media appearances, think tanks, and personal ties can make a foreign government seem like proof that a preferred political order works. Comparative politics often calls this diffusion: elites borrow models that validate their own projects. Yet admiration can blur crucial differences. Hungary’s policies operate within a European economic and legal setting that America does not share. The useful question is therefore not whether a country is a perfect template, but which institutions admirers praise, and which safeguards they are willing to discard.
When democracy disappoints, beware the paradise conservatives project onto dictators
The early admirers. During World War I, journalist H. L. Mencken defended Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany as culturally superior to the United States and treated its authoritarian order as evidence of political competence. George Sylvester Viereck went further, working with German propagandists to shape American opinion. Both recast Germany as a misunderstood victim and President Woodrow Wilson as the dangerous warmonger.
A revealing contradiction. Mencken despised American bureaucracy and mass politics while admiring Prussia, a highly organized state governed by a powerful elite. He imagined that order and personal liberty could coexist under aristocratic rule, without confronting how authoritarian power would constrain people who challenged it. The book distinguishes these men from Americans who opposed entering the war on pacifist or civil-libertarian grounds. Their distinctive move was to turn opposition to war into a defense of the Kaiser’s regime.
The appeal of a foreign model often begins with selective comparison. Admirers compare a messy democracy, with visible disagreement and policy failure, to an idealized version of authoritarian rule. That resembles a common cognitive bias: judging one system by its daily friction and another by its promised outcomes. The contrast can feel persuasive because democracies expose conflict publicly, while repression can hide it. Mencken’s case also shows why literary brilliance is not a safeguard against political blind spots. A sharp critic of propaganda can still become a willing consumer of it when the story flatters his status and tastes.
Question histories that turn aggressors into victims and intervention into America’s original sin
Revisionism after victory. After World War I, writers such as Albert Jay Nock and Harry Elmer Barnes portrayed Germany as unfairly blamed and the war as a trap set by foreign elites. The Treaty of Versailles was indeed punitive, and wartime repression by Wilson’s government deserved criticism. But revisionists often went beyond those arguments, minimizing German aggression and atrocities while casting Britain and liberal internationalists as the real villains.
A political use for the past. Newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst backed campaigns against supposedly pro-British history textbooks. The resulting story was that America had been duped into war by bankers, propagandists, and intellectuals. Heilbrunn argues that this account helped make isolationism seem like historical truth, while shielding authoritarian Germany from scrutiny. The same template could be reused whenever conservatives wanted to explain a foreign conflict as the product of liberal meddling.
Historical revision is essential when new evidence or neglected perspectives improve the record. The warning here is not to defend an official story automatically, but to notice when revision consistently absolves a favored power and indicts its opponents. This is close to motivated reasoning: evidence is filtered toward a conclusion that already serves a political identity. A strong test is symmetry. Would the same standard for wartime conduct, propaganda, or treaty-making be applied if the countries changed places? The book’s case is most persuasive when it separates legitimate criticism of Wilson from the selective absolution of imperial Germany.
Notice when racial hierarchy makes dictatorship look like cultural preservation
A racial theory of rule. In the 1920s, Lothrop Stoddard and Madison Grant argued that democracy and immigration threatened a supposedly superior white, especially Nordic, population. Their claims were dressed in the language of eugenics, then a mainstream movement that sought to manage reproduction according to heredity theories. Stoddard called for a hierarchical order and praised Italian Fascism as a tonic for democracy’s alleged weakness.
The dictator as family guardian. Other American admirers celebrated Benito Mussolini for restoring religion, discipline, and traditional family life. Richard Washburn Child, a former US ambassador to Italy, promoted Mussolini as a spiritual leader; Mussolini himself pushed policies to increase births and strengthen the state. Heilbrunn shows that this image concealed coercion and racial exclusion. The ideal of cultural preservation could make authoritarian rule appear protective, while defining whole groups as threats to the nation.
This history shows how supposedly private ideals, such as family life and cultural continuity, can become tools of state power. When a government claims that a group’s existence threatens national survival, exclusion can be framed as care for the majority. That logic is not unique to the 1920s, but its historical form matters: eugenics supplied an aura of scientific authority to prejudice. A useful distinction is between supporting families and granting the state control over who belongs, reproduces, or receives rights. The book’s examples expose how easily one can slide from the first claim to the second.
Treat claims of patriotic neutrality skeptically when foreign regimes are funding the message
A movement with outside sponsors. Before America entered World War II, isolationism included sincere opposition to another European war. But George Sylvester Viereck also worked for Nazi interests, passed propaganda through congressional offices, and used legislators’ free mailing privileges to reach voters. Other figures, including aviator Charles Lindbergh, attacked aid to Britain while promoting racial ideas that overlapped with Nazi ideology.
The contradiction at home. Some self-described defenders of American liberty praised Hitler, Franco, or Mussolini as barriers against communism, while supporting censorship, exclusion, or authoritarian rule. Government officials also abused wartime powers against dissenters, and the 1944 mass sedition trial of American fascists collapsed into a mistrial. The record is not a simple tale of democratic virtue versus disloyalty. It shows why foreign influence, political dissent, and state repression must be examined separately rather than collapsed into one accusation.
This distinction remains central to democratic debate: opposition to a war is not evidence of allegiance to an enemy, but covert sponsorship changes the character of a political campaign. Analysts benefit from tracing funding, coordination, and message distribution rather than judging by slogans alone. At the same time, the government’s own record matters. Wilson’s propaganda apparatus and later prosecution efforts show that states can invoke national security to punish dissent. A democracy protects itself most credibly when it investigates foreign influence with evidence and resists turning suspicion into a license for collective repression.
Watch anti-communists excuse authoritarian crimes while demanding liberty for their allies
Postwar reversal. After 1945, conservative writers recast the defeat of Nazi Germany as a mistake that had empowered the Soviet Union. Henry Regnery’s publishing house issued works alleging that Roosevelt had maneuvered America into war and that the Nuremberg trials were victor’s justice. Freda Utley and others equated Allied actions with Nazi crimes, including by questioning the evidence in the Malmedy massacre of American prisoners.
A new political weapon. Senator Joseph McCarthy used the Malmedy case to attack the Army and its investigators, while William F. Buckley Jr. defended McCarthy and helped make his campaign part of respectable conservatism. The focus then shifted to alleged communist influence in government. Heilbrunn traces a recurring asymmetry: rights and due process were invoked for foreign strongmen and accused collaborators, while minorities and political opponents at home could be treated as threats to be subdued.
The Malmedy controversy and McCarthy’s rise reveal how distrust can become a political instrument. Once institutions are described as captured by hidden enemies, ordinary standards of proof can be recast as weakness or complicity. This resembles a self-sealing conspiracy theory: contrary evidence becomes further proof that the system is corrupt. Yet skepticism of government is not itself authoritarian. The distinction lies in whether scrutiny is consistent, evidence-based, and open to correction, or whether it selectively protects allies and punishes opponents. That test is more useful than treating anti-communism, or any other ideology, as inherently democratic or anti-democratic.
Do not mistake selective foreign intervention for a consistent defense of freedom
A doctrine of exceptions. In 1979, Jeane Kirkpatrick argued that right-wing autocracies could evolve toward democracy, while communist totalitarian states were unlikely to do so. Her distinction gave the Reagan administration a rationale for supporting authoritarian allies and anti-communist forces. The book examines the results: William F. Buckley Jr. defended Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet, and Kirkpatrick defended Argentina’s junta during the Falklands conflict, despite its brutal repression.
The freedom-fighter problem. US conservatives also promoted Angolan rebel Jonas Savimbi as a democratic hero. Savimbi presented himself that way to American audiences, but his movement was a dictatorship that killed internal dissenters and rejected an election result. The pattern was not simply intervention versus isolation. It was selective intervention for allies, paired with indifference to the rights of people those allies ruled.
Kirkpatrick’s distinction captures a real strategic question: regimes differ, and transitions to democracy are not equally likely in every setting. But policy categories can become moral exemptions when they are treated as fixed labels. The practical test is whether leaders judge an ally’s conduct by the same standards they apply to an adversary. The Savimbi example also demonstrates the importance of separating a movement’s international public relations from its practices on the ground. Diplomacy often requires imperfect partners, but calling them democratic without evidence turns strategic compromise into propaganda.
When a failed war discredits intervention, separate sound caution from dictator worship
The Old Right returns. After the Cold War, Pat Buchanan revived an America First foreign policy: withdraw from alliances, stop promoting democracy abroad, and put national interests above international commitments. His warning against endless wars gained new force after the Iraq invasion became a costly failure. Yet Buchanan also defended authoritarian leaders and opposed intervention in conflicts where civilians faced ethnic cleansing, presenting appeasement as realism.
Trump’s inheritance. Donald Trump attacked the Iraq War, questioned alliances, and praised Vladimir Putin as a strong leader. Heilbrunn presents this not as a sudden break with conservative history, but as a revival of older arguments that cast America’s liberal foreign-policy establishment as the true threat. Criticism of overreach can be principled. The danger is treating every commitment as a conspiracy and every dictator as a natural partner against liberalism.
Iraq strengthened the case for restraint because military power cannot reliably produce political legitimacy. That lesson should not be discarded simply because some critics also admire strongmen. Conversely, identifying a critic’s authoritarian sympathies does not invalidate every argument against intervention. A disciplined foreign policy asks what interests are at stake, what outcomes are plausible, and what costs fall on local populations. It also asks whether nonmilitary options exist. The book’s historical sweep is valuable precisely because it warns against using the language of realism as camouflage, while leaving room for genuine skepticism about wars of choice.
Inspect the institutions admirers of Hungary want weakened in America
Illiberal democracy in practice. Viktor Orbán’s government used its parliamentary majority to reshape Hungary’s judiciary and electoral rules, restrict academic and gender-related institutions, and build a conservative media and educational network. American conservatives praised this model through conferences, media visits, and organizations supported by Hungarian funding. The attraction was not only traditional social policy. Orbán appeared to show how a leader could use state power to entrench a movement.
The domestic application. Heilbrunn connects that admiration to proposals such as Schedule F, which would make many career civil servants easier for a president to replace with political loyalists. He also describes attacks on universities, public institutions, and the so-called deep state. His closing question is implicit: when politicians praise foreign leaders for concentrating power, which checks on their own authority do they hope to remove?
Democratic erosion often proceeds through legal changes that appear technical: altering appointment rules, weakening independent agencies, or tilting electoral conditions. That makes institutional detail more revealing than declarations of love for democracy. Comparative research on backsliding stresses that elected leaders can diminish accountability without abolishing elections outright. Still, not every effort to reform bureaucracy or challenge universities is authoritarian; institutions can be inefficient, partisan, or unaccountable. The relevant distinction is whether reforms create transparent, reviewable government or make public power more personally controllable by the executive. Hungary serves as a warning, not a shortcut to judgment.
Analysis
America Last is most illuminating as a history of political projection. Across distinct periods, some American conservatives have looked abroad and found a country that seems to embody what they believe the United States has lost: hierarchy, cultural unity, religious authority, racial dominance, or decisive leadership. The foreign regime is not merely evaluated. It becomes a mirror in which domestic frustrations are given a heroic shape. That helps explain why admirers can praise a dictator’s discipline while overlooking repression, or invoke American liberty while seeking to narrow who may exercise it.
The book’s strongest analytic contribution is its attention to repetition. The names change, from Kaiser Wilhelm to Mussolini, Franco, Pinochet, Putin, and Orbán, but several rhetorical moves recur: describe democracy as mob rule, portray intervention as elite manipulation, claim that a strongman represents the authentic people, and dismiss evidence of abuses as hostile propaganda. The historical examples make these moves legible before they become familiar slogans.
The broad lineage also needs careful handling. Opposition to war, distrust of bureaucracies, criticism of liberal internationalism, and admiration for authoritarian rule are not interchangeable positions. The book acknowledges this distinction, and it is essential to preserve it. Otherwise, analysis risks repeating the very habit it condemns: treating political labels as proof instead of examining conduct and argument. Nor does continuity mean that every contemporary admirer inherits the motives or racial theories of earlier figures. The more defensible claim is that a usable repertoire of illiberal arguments has persisted and can be redeployed by new movements.
The most practical lesson is therefore institutional. Strongman admiration matters not only as foreign policy rhetoric, but as a clue to domestic preferences about courts, civil services, universities, elections, and minority rights. The decisive question is whether power remains contestable. A government may win elections and still weaken the conditions that allow its opponents to compete fairly. Heilbrunn’s history asks readers to judge political actors by the institutions they strengthen, the safeguards they accept for opponents, and the evidence they permit to challenge their preferred story.
Review Summary
America Last explores the American right's longstanding admiration for foreign dictators, from Kaiser Wilhelm to Putin. Readers found it informative, if sometimes dry, highlighting how this affinity has shaped conservative politics. Many praised its historical perspective, though some felt it lacked nuance or balance. The book draws parallels between past and present, showing how authoritarian tendencies have persisted in right-wing circles. While some found it eye-opening, others felt it covered familiar ground or wished for more depth on certain topics.
People Also Read
Glossary
illiberal imagination
Authoritarian longing within politicsHeilbrunn’s term for a recurring outlook in which political thinkers and leaders distrust mass democracy and imagine that a more hierarchical, authoritarian society would better protect order, tradition, or national identity. It helps connect otherwise different episodes of American admiration for foreign dictators, without claiming that all conservatives share the outlook.
Menckenized History
Revisionist history favoring GermanyA label used in the book for accounts of World War I that cast Germany as an unfairly accused victim and portray Britain, liberal internationalists, or American elites as the true culprits. These accounts often emphasized the Treaty of Versailles and wartime propaganda while minimizing German aggression and atrocities.
Kirkpatrick Doctrine
A defense of allied autocraciesThe foreign-policy distinction associated with Jeane Kirkpatrick’s 1979 essay. It held that traditional right-wing authoritarian regimes could sometimes evolve toward democracy, whereas communist totalitarian regimes were unlikely to liberalize. The distinction offered a rationale for supporting anti-communist autocrats while opposing communist governments.
illiberal democracy
Elections without liberal safeguardsA political system that retains elections or democratic language while weakening institutions that protect political competition, individual rights, and independent scrutiny. In the book, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary is presented as an example: the government maintains electoral politics while reshaping courts, rules, and public institutions to favor its ruling party.
The Remnant
An elite guarding civilizationAlbert Jay Nock’s name for a small, discerning minority he believed could preserve Western civilization from mass politics and mediocrity. Nock’s skepticism of democracy and admiration for an intellectual elite influenced William F. Buckley Jr. and helped shape a strand of conservative thought that distrusted popular government.
America First
National priority over foreign commitmentsA political slogan used by several generations of American isolationists and nationalists. Its advocates commonly argued that the United States should avoid foreign wars and put national interests first. Heilbrunn shows how the slogan could express sincere antiwar caution, but could also accompany sympathy for authoritarian states and opposition to democratic international commitments.
Download PDF
Download EPUB
.epub digital book format is ideal for reading ebooks on phones, tablets, and e-readers.