Nations and Nationalism since 1780

1. The Modernity and Constructed Nature of Nations

The basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything connected with it is its modernity.

Recent invention. The concept of the "nation" in its modern, political sense is historically very young, emerging primarily from the late eighteenth century onwards. Before this period, terms like "nation" often referred to origin, descent, or smaller, self-contained groups, not a unified territorial state or its populace. For instance, the Spanish Royal Academy's dictionary didn't link "nation" with a supreme common government until 1884, and "patria" (homeland) was initially understood as one's local birthplace.

Social construct. Nations are not primordial, natural entities but rather artifacts, inventions, and products of social engineering. Nationalism, as a political principle, actively creates nations by sometimes transforming pre-existing cultures, sometimes inventing them, and often obliterating others. This means that, for analytical purposes, nationalism precedes nations, with states and nationalisms shaping nations, rather than the reverse.

Dual phenomena. Nations are constructed from above by states and elites, but their understanding requires analysis from below, considering the assumptions, hopes, and interests of ordinary people. National consciousness develops unevenly across social groups and regions, typically affecting the popular masses—workers, servants, peasants—last. Historians, therefore, must approach the subject with agnosticism, recognizing that "getting its history wrong is part of being a nation."

2. The Elusive Definition of a Nation

All such objective definitions have failed, for the obvious reason that, since only some members of the large class of entities which fit such definitions can at any time be described as `nations', exceptions can always be found.

Objective criteria fail. Attempts to define a nation using objective criteria like language, ethnicity, common territory, or shared history consistently fail because exceptions abound. Many groups fitting such definitions are not considered nations, while undoubted nations often don't conform to all criteria. This difficulty arises because nations are historically novel, emerging, and changing entities that resist universal, permanent frameworks.

Subjective definitions are tautological. Defining a nation by its members' consciousness of belonging to it, or by individual choice, is tautological and offers only an a posteriori guide. While sophisticated observers like Renan acknowledged objective elements, insisting on consciousness alone can lead to voluntarism, suggesting that mere will is sufficient to create a nation, which is rarely the case in practice. People also hold multiple, shifting identifications beyond a single "nationality."

Fuzzy boundaries. The criteria used to define nations are themselves fuzzy, shifting, and ambiguous, making them unreliable for precise classification. For example, a Tamil nationalist definition of a nation based on language, history, and territory in Sri Lanka obscures complex realities:

• Geographically separate Tamil-speaking areas.
• Significant Sinhalese and Muslim populations within claimed Tamil territory.
• Linguistic homogeneity that doesn't translate to social or political unity.
  This highlights how such definitions often serve propagandist rather than descriptive purposes.

3. Revolutionary Origins: Nation as Sovereign State and People

The `nation' so considered, was the body of citizens whose collective sovereignty constituted them a state which was their political expression.

Nation as sovereign people. The primary, modern meaning of "nation" emerged from the American and French Revolutions, equating "the people" with the state. This concept emphasized collective sovereignty and citizenship, making the nation "one and indivisible" and inherently linked to a defined territory. John Stuart Mill, for instance, defined a nation by its members' desire for self-government under a common authority.

Territorial, not ethnic. Early revolutionary nations were fundamentally territorial and political, not necessarily based on shared ethnicity or language. The French Revolution, for example, was initially hostile to the principle of nationality based on ethnic or linguistic grounds, viewing Alsatians or Gascons as French citizens regardless of their spoken language. The focus was on common interest and civic participation, not primordial ties.

New legitimacy. The post-revolutionary state, whether monarchical or republican, needed a new foundation for legitimacy as traditional sources like divine right or dynastic rule weakened. Identification with a "people" or "nation" became a convenient and fashionable solution, especially for newly formed states like Greece or Belgium. This shift meant that states increasingly had to consider the opinions and loyalty of their subjects, now evolving into citizens.

4. The Liberal Era's "Threshold Principle" for Nationhood

Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial for a Breton or a Basque of French Navarre to be ... a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world.

Viability as a criterion. During the liberal era (roughly 1830-1880), a central tenet of nationalism was the "threshold principle," which held that only nationalities of sufficient size and viability deserved to form independent states. This was often unstated but widely accepted, influencing figures like Mazzini and Mill. Small populations or those deemed economically or culturally unviable were expected to assimilate into larger nations.

Assimilation as progress. The prevailing liberal ideology viewed the nation as a stage in human evolution, progressing from smaller groups to larger, eventually global, units. From this perspective, the assimilation of smaller communities into greater nations was seen as beneficial and in tune with historical progress. For example, Mill argued that Bretons or Basques benefited more from French citizenship than from isolated existence.

Limited application. Consequently, the "principle of nationality" applied in practice only to a select few. Mazzini's 1857 map of future Europe, for instance, envisioned only a dozen states or federations, most of which would be considered multinational by later standards. This principle meant that many small nationalities and languages were considered "doomed to disappear," a view shared even by sympathetic observers like Frederick Engels and Karl Kautsky, who saw them as relics of the past.

5. Governments as Architects of National Loyalty

The very act of democratizing politics, i.e. of turning subjects into citizens, tends to produce a populist consciousness which, seen in some lights, is hard to distinguish from a national, even a chauvinist, patriotism...

Direct state-citizen links. The modern state, emerging from the French Revolution, established direct links with its inhabitants through universal administration and services. This involved regular censuses, compulsory primary education, military conscription, and a growing bureaucracy, making the state an inescapable presence in daily life. These interventions created a shared institutional "landscape" that fostered a sense of collective identity.

Cultivating civic religion. As traditional loyalties (dynastic, religious, hierarchical) weakened and political participation expanded, states needed to cultivate new forms of civic loyalty, a "civic religion" or patriotism. This was crucial for legitimacy and for mobilizing citizens, especially for purposes like taxation and military service. Even monarchies adapted, seeking a "national" foundation to supplement their traditional authority.

Mobilizing nationalism. Governments actively reinforced state patriotism by integrating symbols and sentiments of "imagined community," often leveraging existing xenophobic or chauvinistic feelings. The rise of mass media and international rivalries further facilitated this. While this ideological engineering was conscious, it also built on unofficial sentiments, creating forces that governments could not entirely control, sometimes becoming prisoners of the nationalism they unleashed.

6. The Rightward Shift and Mass Mobilization of Nationalism (1870-1918)

The nationalism of 188o-1914 differed in three major respects from the Mazzinian phase of nationalism.

Three key transformations. The period from 1870 to 1914 marked a significant shift in nationalism. First, it abandoned the "threshold principle," asserting that any group considering itself a nation had a right to self-determination and a separate state. Second, ethnicity and language became the increasingly decisive, often sole, criteria for nationhood. Third, and crucially, nationalism moved sharply to the political right, becoming a chauvinist, imperialist, and xenophobic movement, a trend for which the term "nationalism" was coined.

Rise of ethnic-linguistic focus. This era saw a proliferation of nationalist movements among previously overlooked peoples, often emphasizing language and ethnicity. For example, Irish nationalism only seriously embraced the Irish language after 1893, and Finnish nationalism became primarily linguistic in the 1860s. This was reinforced by mass migrations and the development of "scientific" racism, which linked nations to genetic descent and racial purity, often leading to anti-Semitism.

Middle-class engine. The socially modest but educated middle strata formed the core of this new nationalism. Provincial journalists, schoolteachers, and aspiring officials found their status and career prospects tied to the official use of the vernacular. Linguistic nationalism, in particular, became a battle for "office and school," reflecting the economic and social insecurity of these groups. This often manifested as a rejection of proletarian socialism and a militant, xenophobic defense of their perceived national identity.

7. Post-WWI Nationalism: Triumph, Paradox, and Violence

The logical implication of trying to create a continent neatly divided into coherent territorial states each inhabited by a separate ethnically and linguistically homogeneous population, was the mass expulsion or extermination of minorities.

Wilsonian ideal, brutal reality. The end of World War I saw the theoretical triumph of the "principle of nationality," leading to a redrawing of Europe's map into numerous nation-states. However, this ideal proved utterly impractical. The new states, built on the ruins of multinational empires, were often just as multinational as their predecessors, merely reclassifying "oppressed peoples" as "oppressed minorities."

Ethnic cleansing. The pursuit of ethnically homogeneous territorial states led to horrific consequences, including mass expulsions and genocide. Examples include the Turkish extirpation of Armenians in 1915, the expulsion of Greeks from Asia Minor, Hitler's transfers and extermination of Jews, and the post-WWII expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe. This demonstrated that the vision of a homogeneous nation could only be realized through barbaric means.

Divergence of identity. The post-WWI era also revealed a significant divergence between official national definitions and the actual self-identification of people. Plebiscites showed individuals choosing states whose dominant language differed from their own, and the creation of Yugoslavia exposed the lack of a unified "Yugoslav" consciousness, leading to internal conflicts. Similarly, the partition of Ireland and India highlighted the complexities of national identity that defied simple territorial solutions.

8. Late 20th Century Nationalism: A Symptom of Disorientation

Nationalism was the beneficiary of these developments but not, in any serious sense, an important factor in bringing them about.

Unfinished business. The surge of separatist nationalism in the late 20th century, particularly after the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, largely represents the "unfinished business" of the 1918-1921 settlements. These new national questions were primarily European, stemming from the artificial constructs and unresolved tensions left by earlier geopolitical shifts, rather than new, globally transformative forces. For instance, the idea of Kazakh or Uzbek "nations" was a Soviet construct, not a primordial aspiration.

Reaction to collapse. The recent explosion of separatism was not a primary cause but a beneficiary of the Soviet regime's internal reforms and economic collapse. As central authority weakened and living conditions deteriorated, national or ethnic identity became a substitute for integration in disintegrating societies. This provided a means to define "the innocent" and identify "the guilty" for societal problems, often leading to xenophobia and blaming "outsiders."

Fear and weakness. Many contemporary ethnic identity movements are reactions of weakness and fear, attempts to erect barricades against the forces of the modern world. Whether in Quebec, Estonia, or the US "English-only" movement, these reactions are fueled by a combination of international population movements and rapid socio-economic transformations. This hunger to belong, expressed through "politics of identity," is more a symptom of social disorientation than a driving force for historical change.

9. The Diminishing Role of the National Economy

The nation' today is visibly in the process of losing an important part of its old functions, namely that of constituting a territorially bounded national economy' which formed a building block in the larger world economy', at least in the developed regions of the globe.

Transnational erosion. The traditional function of the nation-state as a territorially bounded "national economy" has been significantly undermined since World War II, particularly since the 1960s. Major transformations in the international division of labor, driven by transnational and multinational enterprises, have created global economic networks that operate largely beyond the control of individual state governments. This is evident in the proliferation of international organizations and unregulated financial markets.

Intertwined economies. While states' economic functions, such as public revenue, expenditure, and social redistribution, have grown, their national economies are no longer autonomous. Most small and medium-sized states find their economies deeply intertwined with, and often dependent on, the global system. Even large economies like the USA have ceded considerable control to foreign investors, highlighting the diminished sovereignty of national economic policy.

Irrelevant ideology. The ideology of nations and nationalism is increasingly irrelevant to these global economic developments. The rise of city-states like Hong Kong and Singapore, extraterritorial industrial zones, and offshore tax havens demonstrates a return to interstitial centers of world trade, reminiscent of the Middle Ages. These entities prioritize economic transactions over national boundaries, further illustrating the declining significance of the nation-state as the primary economic unit.

Last updated: January 3, 2026