Key Takeaways
Build durable local power before the insurgent moment passes
Insurgency needs roots. Ross Barkan traces the progressive surge to Bernie Sanders’s 2016 campaign and to Michael Harrington’s argument that leftists must compete in Democratic primaries rather than remain a third party. After Donald Trump’s victory, groups such as the Democratic Socialists of America, Justice Democrats, and the Working Families Party turned enthusiasm into door-knocking and candidates. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez defeated Joe Crowley in 2018; Jamaal Bowman unseated Eliot Engel in 2020.
Local credibility mattered. Crowley and Engel were vulnerable partly because they seemed detached from their districts. Bowman, however, faced a stronger opponent in 2024: George Latimer was locally familiar, while Bowman’s controversies and AIPAC’s roughly $15 million campaign against him helped produce a 17-point defeat. The insurgent era had met organized opposition, not merely a sleepy establishment.
What's striking is how much these contests resemble the difference between a protest and a political organization. A surge of attention can reveal latent demand, but durable power requires people who can recruit candidates, maintain local relationships, and keep showing up after the headlines move on. Political science often describes this as institutional capacity: the unglamorous routines that turn preferences into votes and policy. Yet local rootedness is not automatically virtuous. A familiar politician can defend a stagnant system as readily as an outsider can challenge it. The useful test is whether a campaign builds participation that survives its candidate.
Attention wins elections, but spectacle cannot substitute for governing
Trump understood performance. After surviving an assassination attempt in July 2024, Donald Trump raised his fist for the cameras, turning a violent moment into an instantly recognizable political image. Barkan sees this as a form of political genius: not command of policy or government, but an instinct for seizing attention and making himself the story. At the Republican convention, delegates celebrated him as a figure of destiny, even as his speech wandered through familiar grievances.
The performance had limits. Trump remained undisciplined, and his convention repeated messages that could repel voters beyond his base. His return to power, Barkan argues, also reflected Democratic failures: Hillary Clinton’s weak campaign, the party’s refusal to test Biden in a real primary, and Biden’s late withdrawal. Trump’s ability to dominate the spectacle did not make him a competent administrator, but it made his opponents’ failures impossible to ignore.
The distinction between attention and governing capacity is essential in an era when political visibility is routinely mistaken for power. A leader can dominate the public imagination while remaining weak at implementation, and a less theatrical opponent can still lose because voters never hear a persuasive account of what comes next. The risk is treating Trump’s performative skill as harmless simply because it is not policy expertise. Attention can legitimate institutions, mobilize followers, and make damaging actions feel like episodes in a show. Democratic competition therefore requires both compelling communication and credible administrative competence.
A party that hides decline loses the right to claim competence
Denial became a governing risk. Biden’s June 2024 debate with Trump exposed his difficulty speaking coherently, but Barkan argues that concerns were visible well before then. Democratic officials and prominent commentators had dismissed reports of his decline, while Biden’s aides limited access to him. After the debate, the same political and media figures who had defended him turned against his candidacy with startling speed.
The party narrowed its options. Biden’s team had also shaped the primary calendar, placing South Carolina first in a process designed around his reelection. The result was a largely uncontested nomination, not a genuine test of candidates or ideas. More broadly, Barkan describes a Democratic Party whose national committee has often been treated as a presidential fundraising arm, while state and local organizations weaken. A party that suppresses inconvenient information can arrive at a crisis with no trusted process for correcting course.
This is a case study in institutional feedback failure. Healthy organizations create ways for bad news to travel upward before it becomes undeniable; organizations built around loyalty often punish the people who deliver it. The same pattern appears in corporate governance, public health, and military planning. Still, retrospective certainty deserves caution: visible signs of aging do not, by themselves, establish incapacity, and observers can overread isolated mistakes. The sharper criticism concerns the absence of transparent assessment and open competition. A democratic party should not require a televised collapse before leaders can discuss a candidate’s fitness.
Make economic security the bridge across cultural disagreement
Backlash changed the agenda. Barkan follows the retreat of causes that surged in the 2010s and 2020: defunding the police, open borders, and strict pandemic policies. He argues that overreach and rigid messaging helped opponents turn legitimate concerns into political liabilities. The pandemic response, for instance, involved necessary early action, but later school closures and overconfident claims about vaccines damaged trust when evidence and circumstances changed.
Economic politics endured. Sanders and Occupy Wall Street helped put inequality and working-class insecurity back into debate. Even centrist Democrats in the 2020s generally supported infrastructure investment, climate spending, and skepticism toward corporate power rather than campaigning to shrink the safety net. Barkan calls the decline of austerity a left-wing achievement. Sanders’s appeal, in his account, came partly from connecting healthcare, wages, and corporate power to ordinary life, while resisting positions such as abolishing police departments and open borders that could alienate working-class voters.
Material politics can create a shared vocabulary among people who disagree about identity, religion, or social norms. A lower medical bill or a safer job is concrete in a way that abstract declarations of virtue rarely are. But economic appeals are not a solvent for every conflict: people can share class interests and still disagree sharply about immigration, policing, or civil rights. The book’s strongest point is therefore not that culture is irrelevant, but that cultural consensus cannot be presumed. Effective coalitions need policies that address material needs without treating social differences as either distractions or moral defects.
Leaderless protest can expose injustice, but rarely institutionalize change
Horizontal movements resist hierarchy. In 2011, civil rights leader John Lewis arrived at Atlanta’s Occupy encampment hoping to speak. The group’s consensus process had not scheduled him, so he was asked to return another time. The episode captured a movement wary of leaders and protective of participatory decision-making. Barkan sees the same tension in later activism: movements can spread rapidly without producing lasting organizations or widely recognized representatives.
The Palestine Left lacked a tribune. After the 2023 Hamas attack and Israel’s devastating war in Gaza, many activists distrusted mainstream institutions and avoided established political figures. The 2024 Uncommitted campaign registered protest votes and won about thirty convention delegates, less than 1 percent of the total, but had no presidential candidate to carry the movement into a national contest. Online decentralization and fears of doxxing help explain this reluctance, but they also make coordination and public accountability harder.
Leaderlessness can protect a movement from charismatic capture, internal celebrity contests, and the risk that one compromised spokesperson defines everyone else. It can also broaden participation by lowering the cost of joining. Yet collective action requires more than shared anger: groups need ways to set priorities, negotiate, preserve knowledge, and hold representatives accountable. Those functions do not require a single heroic leader, but they do require some structure. The useful distinction is not leader versus no leader. It is accountable representation versus unaccountable hierarchy, a distinction movements can design for rather than avoid.
Treat Israel criticism and antisemitism as distinct, not interchangeable
Israel divides Democratic coalitions. The book links Jamaal Bowman’s defeat to his criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza and to AIPAC’s unprecedented spending against him. It also describes a generational shift: many younger voters are more critical of Israel, while older Democrats retain memories of a left-wing Zionism that once seemed compatible with liberal politics. Barkan’s account holds two facts together: Hamas’s October 7 attack killed civilians, and Israel’s retaliation killed tens of thousands of Palestinians.
The distinction is politically consequential. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, a long-standing supporter of Israel, called for new Israeli elections and criticized Netanyahu’s government as an obstacle to peace. Barkan reads this as evidence of changing Democratic opinion, though not as proof that US policy had shifted. Criticism of a government is not automatically hostility toward Jews; at the same time, real antisemitism can attach itself to anti-Zionist politics. Collapsing either distinction makes honest debate harder.
The section’s most useful conceptual move is separating a people, a religion, a state, and a government, categories that political rhetoric often fuses together. That separation protects both legitimate criticism of state policy and the ability to identify antisemitism when it is actually present. It also cautions against assuming that Jewish Americans share one political view or responsibility for another country’s decisions. The difficult question is how to judge political language in context, especially when slogans carry different meanings for speakers and listeners. Neither blanket accusation nor blanket exoneration can do that work.
Protect the middle layer where culture can grow beyond platforms
Culture has three layers. Barkan uses macroculture for large institutions such as Hollywood, major publishers, and legacy media; microculture for creator-driven platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, and Substack; and mesoculture for the smaller but influential spaces between them, including independent music, print journals, blogs, and local arts scenes. He argues that mainstream media has become less financially secure and less willing to take creative risks, while online creators attract growing audiences.
Growth is not the whole story. Stripe data cited in the book shows fifty creator platforms added 668,000 creators and paid out $10 billion in 2021; in 2023 they added more than 1 million and paid out over $25 billion. But most creators do not earn a stable living, and platforms control distribution. In-person venues and independent publications could provide a missing middle: more communal than social media, and more accessible than major cultural institutions.
The mesoculture is valuable because it can connect experimentation to an audience before either is legible to a large corporation. Historically, scenes, small publications, and local venues have helped new forms develop through repeated contact, not just viral discovery. Still, aggregate creator payouts do not show how income is distributed, and the platforms that host microculture can change their rules overnight. A flourishing middle layer needs more than enthusiasm: it needs venues, predictable funding, and routes from local discovery to wider distribution. The book’s model is a useful reminder that culture depends on infrastructure as well as talent.
Let voters test candidates before party elites declare them inevitable
Primaries are a sorting process. Biden’s decision to seek another term kept other Democrats from competing for the nomination. After he withdrew in July 2024, party leaders rapidly rallied around Vice President Kamala Harris. She was better able than Biden to campaign against Trump, but voters had not chosen her in a primary, and the hurried process gave her little chance to establish an independent case for the presidency.
Competition reveals strengths and weaknesses. Barkan argues that a real primary could have tested Harris or opened the field to governors and senators with experience in competitive states. A candidate might have emerged with a clearer message and a stronger claim to represent the party. He does not claim a different nominee would certainly have won. His point is that the party chose to avoid uncertainty, then faced a general election in which many voters did not know what Harris wanted to do beyond defeating Trump.
A primary is not merely a popularity contest. It can function as an information system, forcing candidates to explain priorities, withstand scrutiny, and reveal how they perform outside elite settings. It also gives voters a stake in the nominee. Yet open competition is no guarantee of a strong candidate: it can reward fundraising, media spectacle, and factional purity as much as governing skill. The institutional lesson is to create a credible process early, with rules that permit real debate. Avoiding a contest may look orderly, but it transfers uncertainty into the general election.
Compete for working-class voters without surrendering economic populism
Coalitions are not permanent. Trump made gains among Latino, Asian, and some Black voters, undercutting explanations of his appeal that relied on white backlash alone. Barkan argues that many voters were also reacting to inflation, immigration, and a sense that Democrats had little to offer them. His contrast is between cultural condescension and policies that make daily life materially better.
Candidates can mix economic and cultural views. Dan Osborn, a Nebraska mechanic and labor leader, came within seven points of defeating an incumbent Republican in a state Trump carried by more than twenty. He supported higher wages, stronger unions, railway safety, and Social Security, while backing a border wall and gun rights. His campaign suggests Democrats may compete in conservative areas without abandoning economic populism. A candidate’s local credibility and ability to speak naturally may matter as much as a carefully polished national platform.
Osborn illustrates why political coalitions cannot be mapped neatly onto a single left-to-right scale. Voters may support labor protections while holding conservative views on guns or immigration, and they need not resolve that tension before choosing a candidate. This resembles multidimensional models of political behavior, where economic and cultural preferences vary independently. The case is suggestive, not a formula: one Senate race cannot establish which positions travel nationally, and an independent candidate differs from a party nominee. Still, it challenges the assumption that working-class outreach requires either abandoning economic policy or copying every Republican position.
Replace online outrage with organized resistance rooted in daily life
Posting is not organizing. Barkan uses the term hyperpolitics for intense, fast-moving political engagement centered on online attention. In the Trump years, social media helped people mobilize quickly, but it also rewarded outrage, offered few lasting structures, and made participation feel like an end in itself. The Women’s March and other high-profile waves struggled to sustain leadership and organization after their initial surge.
Opposition needs a positive program. Barkan argues that repeatedly calling Trump a fascist, or demanding that media outlets condemn him more loudly, did not build a persuasive alternative. He does not minimize the dangers of Trump’s policies, including threats to rights and social programs. Rather, he urges opponents to connect resistance to concrete concerns such as housing, healthcare, wages, and local civic life. Durable groups, credible candidates, and disciplined public communication can keep opposition from becoming a cycle of online anger.
The distinction between expressive and instrumental participation is useful: one communicates identity or emotion, while the other changes decisions, institutions, or resource flows. Digital expression can be a gateway to action, but it becomes politically thin when it has no route into meetings, elections, unions, or local organizations. The argument also carries a caution. Material policy cannot answer every threat to democratic rights, and a movement should not wait for a perfect economic platform before defending people at risk. Effective resistance needs both a clear account of what is being opposed and a concrete vision of what is being built.
Analysis
Barkan’s central diagnosis is not simply that Trump is dangerous or that Democrats are inept. It is that political disorder grows when institutions lose the capacity to hear voters, develop leaders, and turn public energy into lasting power. The book repeatedly contrasts spectacle with organization: Trump captures attention, insurgent candidates exploit weak local machines, online movements spread without durable leadership, and a party that insulated Biden from scrutiny reaches a succession crisis with no tested alternative. The recurring problem is failed mediation between citizens and institutions.
That structure gives the book unusual breadth. Its chapters move from New York primaries to Gaza, social media, cultural production, party committees, and the 2024 election, but the subjects connect through questions of representation and trust. Who speaks for a movement? Who gets to define a party’s priorities? Which institutions still reach people outside elite political circles? The attention to local political roots and the missing cultural middle helps explain why national messaging alone cannot repair those relationships.
The argument is strongest when it identifies mechanisms, such as weak party infrastructure, elite control of nominations, and the conversion of protest into online performance. It is less conclusive when it infers why diverse voters shifted toward Trump or how much particular activist positions cost Democrats. Those explanations are plausible, but electoral choices also reflect candidate judgments, economic conditions, and differences between local and national races. The narrative sometimes moves quickly from correlation to diagnosis.
The title’s stark pairing of fascism and genocide names two fears that have become entangled in American politics, but the book’s deeper subject is the political machinery that makes both arguments combustible. Its implied prescription is not moderation for its own sake. It is a democratic system capable of testing leaders, acknowledging conflict, building organizations, and making material claims that ordinary voters can recognize as relevant to their lives. That is a more demanding standard than either permanent outrage or elite reassurance.
Review Summary
Fascism or Genocide receives mixed reviews, averaging 3.41/5 stars. Critics describe it as more of an essay than a book, noting the author's reluctance to directly engage with the titular topics of fascism and genocide. While it offers useful political analysis including Biden's 2024 campaign issues and critiques of Israel's ethno-state claims, reviewers find the arguments unoriginal. The work suffers from excessive liberal perspective, dismissal of leftist alternatives, and idealistic views about democratic electability, making it difficult to follow despite covering important subjects.
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Glossary
Progressive Primary Era
Progressive insurgency in primariesBarkan’s name for the period of progressive electoral breakthroughs associated with Sanders’s 2016 campaign, Ocasio-Cortez’s 2018 victory, Bowman’s 2020 win, and the growth of groups such as DSA and Justice Democrats. He argues that the era ended as establishment candidates learned to campaign harder and outside spending helped defeat progressive challengers.
leaderless left
Decentralized left activismBarkan’s description of left movements wary of hierarchy, famous spokespeople, and concentrated authority. This tendency appears in Occupy, Black Lives Matter, and Palestine activism. It can broaden participation and reduce reliance on a single figure, but it can also make it harder to set shared priorities, negotiate with institutions, and preserve influence after protests fade.
Palestine Left
Pro-Palestinian activist currentBarkan’s term for the diverse, largely youth-led movement that became prominent during Israel’s war in Gaza. It includes activists and organizations calling for Palestinian rights, a ceasefire, or an end to US military support for Israel, though participants do not share a single program. The book emphasizes its limited connection to established Democratic leaders and its lack of a national electoral standard-bearer.
Blue Liberals
Party-aligned anti-Trump liberalsBarkan’s label for a Democratic-aligned liberal current focused chiefly on defeating Trump and defending democratic institutions. In his account, Blue Liberals are often more comfortable with established political figures and media personalities than the leaderless Palestine Left, and they frequently treat elections as existential contests. The two groups can oppose the same Republican leaders while prioritizing different issues.
hyperpolitics
Fast, online political intensityA term Barkan attributes to academic Anton Jäger, used for an intense but often short-lived form of political engagement centered on digital platforms. Hyperpolitics enables rapid communication and mobilization, yet can reward constant outrage and symbolic participation without building durable organizations. In the book, it helps explain why social media resistance can feel powerful while producing limited institutional change.
macroculture
Large-scale cultural institutionsBarkan’s term for major cultural producers and distributors, including Hollywood studios, large publishers, legacy media, and major streaming or recording companies. He argues that these institutions remain influential but have become financially insecure and less willing to take creative risks. Their weakening affects not only entertainment but also the range of work that can support a professional middle class.
microculture
Creator-driven online cultureBarkan’s term for culture produced and circulated through platforms such as YouTube, TikTok, and Substack. It is less dependent on traditional gatekeepers and can allow new creators to find audiences directly. Its growth does not guarantee stable livelihoods, however, because attention and revenue are unevenly distributed and creators remain dependent on platform owners.
mesoculture
Independent cultural middle layerA term Barkan adopts from culture writer Mo Diggs for the spaces between large cultural institutions and online creator platforms. Examples include independent music, small magazines, local arts scenes, and in-person literary events. The mesoculture can nurture experimentation and shared community, but it needs publications, venues, and reliable funding to connect emerging work with broader audiences.
new romanticism
Revolt against algorithmic rationalismBarkan’s name for a possible cultural reaction to the dominance of technology, data, and algorithmic systems. He compares it with nineteenth-century Romanticism, which challenged the social costs of industrial rationalism through art, emotion, and spiritual exploration. The contemporary version includes renewed interest in spirituality and offline life, though the book cautions that irrational belief is not automatically liberating.
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