Key Takeaways
Replace American dominance with cooperative, rules-based internationalism
Trade certainty for cooperation. Sachs argues that American exceptionalism, the belief that the United States has a special mission and a right to lead by force, is now dangerous as well as outdated. The country’s postwar strength helped it build the United Nations and other institutions, but the same confidence has also justified covert interventions and wars without broad international support. The alternative is internationalism: treating cooperation with other countries as a practical way to protect American security and shared prosperity, not as a sacrifice of patriotism.
Power needs restraint. The theologian Reinhold Niebuhr warned that military and economic success could make the United States mistake its own interests for universal virtue. Sachs sees that warning as urgent in a world facing climate change, disease, and poverty, problems no country can solve alone.
The argument is strongest when it treats humility as a strategic discipline rather than a moral pose. A state that assumes its intentions are benevolent can overlook how its actions appear to others, a problem familiar in organizational psychology as well as diplomacy. Internationalism also offers a positive account of national interest: institutions can multiply influence by coordinating action. Still, cooperation is not automatically fair or effective. Its legitimacy depends on who sets the rules, whose costs count, and whether weaker states have genuine influence.
Prepare for a multipolar world, not a new American or Chinese century
The center is shifting. Sachs calls the narrowing gap between richer and poorer regions global convergence. His historical figures show the scale of the reversal: Asia held about two-thirds of world population and output in 1500, while the industrialized West held 54 percent of global output by 1913 with only one-fifth of the population. In the book’s 2016 estimates, China’s share of world output had risen to 18 percent, slightly above the United States at 16 percent.
No successor rules all. Sachs expects the spread of technology and the growth of other regions to prevent any single country from dominating. The strategic task is therefore not to preserve a vanished monopoly, but to work with several powerful regions on trade, security, and global problems.
This historical lens corrects a common error: treating a temporary advantage as a permanent feature of the international system. It also usefully separates absolute prosperity from relative rank. A country can remain wealthy while losing the ability to dictate outcomes. Yet output shares do not measure every kind of power. Military reach, alliances, financial institutions, and technological leadership matter too, and the book’s figures depend on how economies are compared. Convergence makes cooperation more necessary, but it does not make competition disappear.
Read rivals' military moves through their fears before escalating
Threats can be reciprocal. A security dilemma occurs when one country’s defensive measures look like preparations for attack to another, prompting both to build up their forces. Sachs applies this idea to U.S. military deployments and Chinese and Russian responses. In 2015, he notes, the United States spent more than twice as much as China on its military and maintained bases in over seventy countries, while China had one overseas base.
Cooperate conditionally. Sachs favors beginning with diplomacy rather than assuming bad faith. In the named Tit-for-Tat strategy, a country cooperates first but responds firmly if the other side breaks the agreement. Kennedy’s 1963 nuclear test ban treaty illustrates his case that negotiated limits can reduce danger without requiring blind trust.
The security dilemma is a valuable corrective to the assumption that a rival’s capabilities reveal its intentions. It shifts analysis from moral labels toward interactions, perceptions, and incentives. That is especially useful when military decisions are made under uncertainty. The challenge is designing cooperation that can survive deception and domestic political pressure. Tit-for-Tat is a useful model, not a complete policy: real states face multiple actors, ambiguous violations, and escalation risks. Verification and communication are what make conditional cooperation more than wishful thinking.
Stop choosing wars that topple governments but cannot build peace
Victory is not a settlement. Sachs uses wars of choice to describe conflicts launched without a direct necessity of self-defense. He argues that the United States has repeatedly used force or covert action to replace governments, then failed to create stable political outcomes. He cites the 1953 overthrow of Iran’s elected government, the long war in Vietnam, and the post-2001 interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The short-term removal of a regime, he warns, can produce prolonged instability, civilian suffering, and resentment.
Make force accountable. The UN Charter permits force in self-defense or when authorized by the Security Council. Sachs calls for Congress to reclaim its role in decisions about war and for the CIA to focus on intelligence rather than covert military operations.
The distinction between defeating an army and building a legitimate political order is essential. Political science and post-conflict experience both caution against assuming that coercive capacity can manufacture consent. Sachs’s historical record makes a strong case for stricter scrutiny of intervention. The boundary is not always simple, however: governments can commit atrocities, and nonintervention also has human costs. A serious test must ask who authorizes action, what civilian protection requires, what political outcome is plausible, and how responsibility continues after the fighting stops.
Treat Russia's security concerns as real without excusing its aggression
A lost opening matters. Sachs recounts advising economic reforms in Poland and Russia after communism. In 1991, he and colleagues proposed a major Western support package for the Soviet Union, including roughly $30 billion per year; it was rejected. Sachs argues that the West’s failure to help Russia through economic crisis, followed by NATO expansion eastward, hardened distrust and helped set the stage for confrontation. He describes Russia’s view of NATO near its borders as a security concern that Washington underestimated.
History is contested. Sachs connects this period to Russia’s wars in Georgia and Ukraine and its intervention in Syria, while arguing that U.S. decisions also contributed to the spiral. His proposed alternative is a shared security and economic space across Europe and Eurasia.
The account makes a useful case for studying how humiliating transitions and excluded security interests can undermine cooperation. It also warns that alliances viewed as defensive by their members may appear threatening to outsiders. But explaining a state’s fears does not establish that its actions are justified, or that a different Western policy would have prevented conflict. Russia has agency, and neighboring countries have agency too. Durable security cannot be built by treating smaller states as buffers whose choices belong to larger powers.
Fix domestic saving and inequality before blaming trade partners
Trade deficits have domestic causes. Sachs explains that a country’s current account balance is closely related to the difference between national saving and domestic investment. In 2016, U.S. saving was 18 percent of GDP, below its 19.7 percent investment rate; the resulting gap helps explain the trade deficit. Blaming foreign countries alone misses the role of U.S. fiscal choices, including tax cuts that reduce government saving.
Protectionism promises too much. U.S. companies employed about 1.5 million workers in manufacturing affiliates in Mexico and China, roughly 1 percent of the U.S. labor force. Sachs estimates that moving this production home might restore only about half as many jobs, because U.S. production uses more capital and automation. He argues that worker support and redistribution address inequality more directly than trade wars.
The accounting identity is clarifying because it distinguishes a trade pattern from a verdict about fairness. It also redirects attention toward policy choices at home. But explaining a national deficit does not settle whether particular trade rules are equitable, or whether workers harmed by global competition have been treated fairly. Aggregate gains can coexist with concentrated losses. The practical test is whether governments pair openness with credible support for workers, regions, and public investment, rather than asking those who lose bargaining power to accept national growth as compensation.
Build regional ties before distant powers turn neighbors into proxies
Neighbors share practical problems. Sachs argues that countries next door can gain from linking transport, energy, trade, public health, and environmental systems. He calls for subsidiarity, the principle that problems should be handled at the lowest level capable of solving them. Local services belong close to communities; cross-border infrastructure requires regional cooperation; climate change requires global agreements.
Integration can change incentives. The European Union is his leading example: cooperation between France and Germany helped replace a history of conflict with shared institutions and trade. Sachs also points to China’s Belt and Road infrastructure initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which had $100 billion in capital. He sees Eurasian connections as an economic opportunity the United States risks missing through isolation and protectionism.
Regional integration addresses a basic collective-action problem: shared resources and cross-border risks are difficult to manage when each government acts alone. The EU example shows how repeated economic cooperation can make conflict less attractive, though it does not erase disputes. The same logic does not guarantee that every infrastructure initiative benefits all participants equally. Financing terms, local consent, environmental effects, and political leverage matter. The strongest version of Sachs’s proposal is not integration for its own sake, but regional institutions that distribute gains and resolve disagreements transparently.
Measure national strength by health, inclusion, and environmental safety
Growth is only one measure. The Sustainable Development Goals, or SDGs, are seventeen shared targets adopted in 2015 covering economic well-being, social inclusion, and environmental protection. Sachs calls these the three dimensions of sustainable development. In the book’s 2017 index, the United States ranked forty-second among 157 countries and thirtieth among 35 high-income OECD countries. Its wealth did not erase problems such as inequality, weak environmental performance, and poor health outcomes.
Security includes living conditions. Sachs argues that poverty, climate risks, and failing public health systems can undermine stability as surely as military threats. He identifies priorities including universal health care and education, decent jobs and infrastructure, sustainable land use, zero-carbon energy, and accountable government.
The SDG framework broadens security beyond borders and military capacity, making visible the conditions that shape whether people can live healthy, secure lives. Its strength is also its breadth: the goals connect education, infrastructure, governance, and environmental systems rather than treating them as separate policy silos. Composite rankings should be read carefully, since choices about indicators and weighting affect results. Still, the larger question is hard to avoid: if national wealth does not translate into health, trust, and environmental resilience, what exactly is that wealth securing?
Fund scientific capacity as security infrastructure, not discretionary spending
Innovation takes institutions. Directed technological change describes a process in which government, researchers, and businesses target a major problem and jointly support research and development. Sachs traces this approach from wartime advances to institutions such as the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, and DARPA. The polio vaccine and the Internet illustrate how public funding can support discoveries that later transform civilian life.
Research supports shared security. Sachs warns that cuts to science and education weaken the foundations of future innovation, especially as China increases investment in research and technology. He argues for international scientific partnerships on low-carbon energy, disease control, agriculture, and other challenges that cross borders.
The chapter makes innovation policy concrete: breakthroughs depend not just on talented individuals, but on patient funding, institutions, and routes from discovery to use. This aligns with mission-oriented research, where public agencies help coordinate work that private markets may underfund because benefits are diffuse or distant. Public direction also needs safeguards. Political favoritism can distort research priorities, while basic science often produces value that cannot be predicted in advance. A resilient system supports both focused missions and open-ended inquiry, with transparent evaluation rather than partisan tests of scientific credibility.
Reduce forced migration through peace, development, and fair entry rules
Treat causes, not only arrivals. Sachs proposes three responses to migration: end conflicts that displace people, support development in countries people are leaving, and allow manageable migration under fair rules. He links U.S. interventions in the Middle East and Central America to instability that drives people from home. He also argues that migration policy should avoid bans based on religion or national origin and protect the schooling, health, and nutrition of migrant children.
Aid can be practical. The book puts U.S. development assistance at about 0.18 percent of national income. Sachs points to the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, which reported saving 22 million lives, as an example of pooled aid supporting local health work.
This approach connects migration to foreign policy, development, and domestic institutions instead of treating border enforcement as a complete solution. It also distinguishes voluntary movement from flight under threat, an important distinction for policy design. Aid can reduce specific barriers to well-being, but it cannot guarantee that people will stay, nor should development be framed as a tool for trapping them in place. A humane system combines prevention of avoidable displacement with lawful routes to move, clear limits, and equal protection from discrimination.
Treat the United Nations as leverage, not a budget line to cut
Institutions multiply influence. Sachs argues that the United States once strengthened its leadership by creating institutions for trade, finance, public health, and diplomacy. He sees its refusal to support treaties and multilateral agreements as a retreat from that role. In the book’s figures, the U.S. share of the UN regular budget was about $580 million per year, around $1.80 per American. Sachs compares that sum with the much larger cost of military operations.
Listen to dissent. For Sachs, opposition in the UN is not automatically hostility; it can be useful advice from allies and other states. He urges the United States to honor the UN Charter, support the SDGs and Paris Climate Agreement, ratify pending treaties, and pursue nuclear arms control through diplomacy.
International institutions can reduce the cost of coordination and give smaller states a venue to challenge powerful ones. That structure benefits a leading country too: legitimacy and predictable rules can make influence more durable than coercion. Institutions are not neutral or infallible, however. Their authority depends on representation, enforcement, and whether members apply rules consistently. Treating criticism as information rather than insult is a strong diplomatic habit, but it should be paired with serious scrutiny of how institutions themselves distribute power.
Analysis
Sachs organizes the book around a sharp historical reversal: the United States helped build a cooperative postwar order when its power was greatest, then increasingly treated military predominance as proof that it could act without cooperation. His central insight is that relative decline is not simply a loss of status. It changes the costs of unilateral action, while problems such as climate change, migration, and emerging disease make cooperation more valuable. The book’s strongest contribution is to connect foreign policy to domestic well-being. Military budgets, research institutions, development aid, and inequality become parts of one argument about what national security is for.
The historical narrative is persuasive when it shows the repeated gap between winning battles and producing legitimate political settlements. Its treatment of the security dilemma also offers a useful method: assess how each side interprets the other’s actions, not only how one side describes its own. That method can expose avoidable escalation. It can also be misused. A rival’s fear may be real without making its response lawful, proportionate, or benign. Sachs is more attentive to U.S. provocations than to the choices and coercive behavior of some adversaries, and his account of NATO and Russia risks turning a contested history into a relatively direct causal chain.
The proposed alternative is coherent but institutionally demanding. Internationalism requires credible verification, domestic political support, and burden sharing, not merely goodwill. Regional cooperation can reduce friction, but it may also reproduce inequality unless weaker partners have voice and recourse. Sustainable development provides a compelling purpose for diplomacy, yet the book gives less attention to how governments should resolve conflicts when shared objectives do not produce agreement. Its durable lesson is therefore not that power has become irrelevant, but that power works better when constrained by diplomacy, public investment, and rules that others recognize as legitimate. The numerical claims reflect the book’s 2018 setting and should be understood in that context.
Review Summary
A New Foreign Policy receives mixed reviews, with an average rating of 3.80. Supporters praise its conversational tone, enlightening content, and progressive vision for U.S. foreign policy. Critics argue it lacks depth, is overly provocative, and misunderstands international relations. Some reviewers appreciate Sachs' emphasis on diplomacy, global cooperation, and addressing domestic issues. Others find his prescriptions naive or lacking detail. The book's focus on economics and criticism of Trump's policies are frequently mentioned, with opinions divided on their effectiveness.
People Also Read
Glossary
American exceptionalism
Claim of special national missionThe belief that the United States is uniquely virtuous or destined to lead, and may therefore claim unusual authority in world affairs. Sachs traces this belief through religious and national narratives, then argues that it has helped justify unilateral action, military dominance, and interventions that exceed American power or produce harmful outcomes.
Internationalism
Cooperation for shared interestsSachs’s preferred approach to foreign policy. Internationalists seek security and prosperity through active diplomacy, shared institutions, and cooperation on common challenges, rather than through permanent military dominance or an arms race. Cooperation is conditional, not an assumption of perfect trust: states can respond firmly when agreements are violated.
security dilemma
Defense mistaken for aggressionA recurring international-relations problem in which one state’s efforts to protect itself appear threatening to another state. The second state responds with its own defensive measures, which then heighten the first state’s fears. Sachs uses the concept to explain how military deployments and alliance decisions can produce escalation even when a government describes its actions as defensive.
Tit-for-Tat (TFT)
Cooperate, then reciprocateA conditional cooperation strategy discussed by Sachs. A state begins by cooperating, but responds to a counterpart’s defection with a tougher position. The strategy is meant to make diplomacy possible without relying on blind trust: cooperation remains attractive when both sides honor commitments, while violations carry consequences.
subsidiarity
Solve problems at the lowest levelThe principle that a problem should be addressed by the lowest level of government capable of handling it effectively. Sachs applies it to foreign and domestic policy: local authorities should manage local services, national governments should handle national matters, regional bodies should coordinate cross-border problems, and global institutions should address challenges such as climate change.
populist cycle
Short-term gains, eventual crisisSachs’s term for a political pattern in which leaders promise rapid improvements by distributing public resources rather than investing in long-term productive capacity. As reserves diminish and debt grows, governments can face a fiscal crisis, inflation, or default. Sachs applies this idea to policies that shift costs onto future taxpayers or damage environmental resources for immediate gain.
directed technological change
Research aimed at major challengesA model of innovation in which governments, scientists, universities, and businesses coordinate research and development around important goals. Sachs describes how public institutions helped support advances from wartime technologies to civilian applications such as the Internet and vaccines. The model combines public funding and direction with scientific and industrial expertise.
Sustainable Development Goals
Seventeen shared development targetsA set of seventeen goals adopted by UN member states in 2015 as part of Agenda 2030. The goals address economic development, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability, including health, education, poverty, infrastructure, climate, and accountable institutions. Sachs uses them as a common framework for domestic policy, foreign aid, and international cooperation.
Download PDF
Download EPUB
.epub digital book format is ideal for reading ebooks on phones, tablets, and e-readers.