Key Takeaways
Washington armed political Islam against nationalists, then lost control of the bargain.
A recurring calculation. Dreyfuss argues that U.S. policy makers repeatedly treated Islamist movements as tools against forces they feared more: Arab nationalism, leftist parties, and Soviet influence. Washington sometimes acted directly, but often worked through Britain, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Israel. The result was not that the United States invented political Islam. It helped some of its organizations gain money, institutions, and room to expand.
The bargain reversed. The Muslim Brotherhood, Iran's clerical movement, and Afghan jihadis had their own aims, which their foreign patrons could not reliably control. The book's central story is a series of tactical partnerships that outlasted the immediate strategic purpose. That recurring pattern, rather than one master plan, links the episodes across six decades.
What's striking is the gap between enabling a movement and controlling it. Foreign policy often treats allies as instruments, but organizations have local supporters, internal rivalries, and goals that cannot be switched off by a patron. That makes blowback more than a morality tale: it is a predictable risk of delegating political work to groups with independent constituencies. The argument is strongest when it traces specific channels of support. It is less persuasive if every later Islamist victory is treated as a direct consequence of U.S. policy.
Distinguish Islam as faith from Islamism as a modern political project.
Faith and politics. Dreyfuss distinguishes Islam, a diverse religious tradition, from Islamism, a political movement seeking to organize society and government through a particular interpretation of Islam. He traces the movement's modern roots to late nineteenth-century pan-Islamic activism and to organizers such as Jamal Eddine al-Afghani, Mohammed Abduh, and Rashid Rida. Hassan al-Banna drew on this lineage when he founded Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood in 1928.
A contested ancestry. The author portrays British officials as having supported some early pan-Islamic activists when their politics served imperial interests. He also stresses that Afghani's own beliefs and alliances were complicated, rather than presenting him as a simple religious reformer. This history describes the construction of a political current, not the essence of Islam or the beliefs of Muslims generally.
This distinction guards against a basic category error: a political organization that claims religious authority does not represent an entire faith. The genealogy also helps explain how ideas become movements through publications, schools, and networks, rather than through doctrine alone. Yet intellectual lineages can be made too neat. Later organizations selected and reshaped earlier ideas, and the same religious tradition supports competing political positions. The book's account is most useful as a history of organized political actors, not as a complete map of Islamic thought.
Oil and anti-communism pushed Washington toward monarchies and against nationalists.
Oil shaped the alliance. U.S. involvement in the region grew alongside its interest in Saudi oil and the strategic importance of Gulf supplies to Europe and Japan. In 1953, the CIA and British intelligence helped overthrow Iran's prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, after he nationalized the oil industry. The author describes Iranian clerics, including Ayatollah Kashani, as part of the campaign against him.
Nationalism looked like danger. In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser sought independence from foreign influence and challenged the region's monarchies. Washington and London increasingly treated him as a threat, despite his opposition to Egyptian communists. The Muslim Brotherhood became one force used against him. Dreyfuss argues that Cold War fears often obscured the difference between a leader's independent nationalism and alignment with Moscow.
The cases expose how strategic labels can conceal material interests. A nationalist demanding control over oil could be treated as a communist danger even when the evidence for that label was weak. That does not make every nationalist policy wise or every monarchy merely an instrument of the West. It does show why analysts should ask who gains control of resources when an ideological threat is invoked. The book's counterfactual, that Washington should have accommodated Nasser and Mossadegh, is plausible, but the path and likely outcomes of such an accommodation remain uncertain.
Saudi money gave Islamist networks institutions, reach, and staying power.
From patronage to infrastructure. Saudi Arabia backed the Muslim Brotherhood and helped create international organizations that could carry Islamist ideas across borders. The Muslim World League, founded in Mecca in 1962, funded religious institutions, publications, and proselytizing. Saudi-backed universities also trained students and religious scholars from many countries, giving the movement durable networks beyond any single government.
Finance widened the base. In the 1970s, rising oil income supported Islamic banks and investment companies. These institutions could finance businesses, media, and social organizations as well as banking. The book reports that by 2004 more than 270 Islamic banks held assets of about $260 billion. Their existence alone does not establish support for violence, but Dreyfuss argues that the larger financial ecosystem strengthened Islamist political organizing.
The important mechanism here is institutional persistence. Money can build universities, charities, media, and professional networks that remain active after a particular political crisis has passed. This is a broader lesson in political sociology: movements gain influence not only by winning office or fighting, but by shaping the organizations people rely on in daily life. The book sometimes places charitable, commercial, and militant activity close together. Those links matter, but proximity is not proof that every Islamic bank or charity supported extremism.
The 1953 Iran coup strengthened forces Washington could not later read.
A risky precedent. During the 1953 overthrow of Mossadegh, the CIA and MI6 worked with religious leaders and street networks opposed to him. Dreyfuss highlights Kashani, an Islamist cleric and mentor to the younger Ruhollah Khomeini, and the Devotees of Islam, a militant organization. The book does not show that the CIA directly funded Khomeini. It does show how foreign support helped restore the shah while strengthening political actors who opposed secular rule.
A failure of interpretation. Decades later, U.S. officials underestimated the strength of Khomeini's movement. Intelligence assessments in 1977 and 1978 expected the shah to remain in power or a more moderate transition to follow. Instead, the Islamic Republic emerged. The book presents this as a failure to understand religious networks and popular politics, not simply a shortage of information.
The episode illustrates a familiar intelligence problem: evidence is filtered through assumptions about what is politically possible. Officials who regarded clergy as marginal could observe growing religious mobilization and still misread its significance. The deeper lesson is that a prior operation does not give its sponsor privileged insight into the forces it helped empower. At the same time, a direct line from the 1953 coup to the 1979 revolution would be too simple. Domestic grievances, the shah's repression, and the opposition's own organizing also shaped the outcome.
Sadat used Islamists against the left, then underestimated their independence.
A controlled opening. After taking power in 1970, Anwar Sadat released imprisoned Brotherhood members and permitted Islamist groups to grow in universities and professional associations. Their student organizations challenged left-wing rivals, while Saudi funds and returning exiles helped expand their influence. Sadat also presented himself as a pious leader and cast the 1973 war with Israel in Islamic terms.
The movement grew beyond him. The Brotherhood's older leaders could appear cooperative, but younger activists and underground factions developed separate aims. Islamic organizations gained influence in campus life, publishing, banking, and religious institutions. In 1981, Sadat was assassinated by Islamist militants. Dreyfuss presents the episode as the danger of using religious mobilization as a short-term political weapon: the movement acquired social roots that the president could not simply command.
Sadat's strategy resembles a common authoritarian tactic: permit one opposition force to weaken another, assuming the first can be managed afterward. The risk is that a tolerated organization gains skills, members, and legitimacy while the state narrows other channels for dissent. That dynamic can make a movement more consequential than its formal leadership suggests. Still, the account should not collapse the Brotherhood, campus groups, and assassins into one actor. Their overlap mattered, but differences in aims and methods mattered too.
Afghanistan turned proxy warfare into a transnational jihadist infrastructure.
A war with networks. The United States began covert aid to Afghan opponents of the Soviet-backed government in 1979, before Soviet forces invaded that December. During the war, Pakistan's intelligence service controlled much of the distribution, and two-thirds of U.S. support reportedly went to Islamist parties. Saudi Arabia matched U.S. funding, while Egypt and other countries supplied weapons, recruits, or training.
The battlefield outlasted the war. Foreign volunteers, known as Arab Afghans, joined the conflict and built contacts through organizations such as Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden's Services Bureau. The war spread training, fundraising, and militant connections across borders. Dreyfuss argues that this helped create conditions for later transnational terrorism. It did not mean every Afghan fighter became a terrorist, or that the United States directly built every later organization.
This is a classic principal-agent problem: a sponsor funds intermediaries who choose which local actors receive resources, while those actors pursue their own objectives. The danger grows when a temporary alliance creates transferable skills and international relationships. Those networks can persist after the sponsor's goal has changed. Yet the chain from Afghan warfare to later terrorist attacks is not automatic. Local conflicts, political choices, and other sources of support also shape what veterans do after a war.
Israel and Jordan backed Islamists against rivals, helping Hamas gain ground.
Useful against the PLO. After Israel occupied Gaza and the West Bank in 1967, it permitted Islamist institutions to expand. In the 1970s, Israeli authorities licensed organizations associated with Ahmed Yassin, seeing them as a counterweight to the secular Palestine Liberation Organization. Hamas, founded in 1987 by Muslim Brotherhood activists, grew from this Palestinian Islamist environment, but also developed its own constituency and political aims.
A parallel struggle in Syria. Jordan allowed Syrian Muslim Brotherhood militants to find shelter and training on its territory as they fought Hafez Assad's government. Israel also supported anti-Assad forces through its allies in Lebanon. Dreyfuss argues that Washington knew about these activities and did not press its allies to stop. These episodes show how states could support Islamist groups against one opponent while underestimating the consequences for local politics.
The case is a warning against treating opposition movements as disposable tools. Support can alter the balance between local factions, but it does not erase the agency of the people receiving it. Hamas's development cannot be reduced to Israeli policy: Palestinian experiences of occupation, internal political competition, and the group's own organizing all mattered. The book is especially valuable when it shows that governments may tolerate a movement's growth for tactical reasons, even when that movement's long-term goals conflict with their interests.
After the Cold War, Washington still treated Islamist power as a local tool.
No settled policy. In the 1990s, U.S. responses to political Islam varied from country to country. In Algeria, Washington initially supported the military's cancellation of an Islamist electoral victory, then explored dialogue with Islamist representatives. In Egypt, U.S. officials differed over whether the Muslim Brotherhood was a legitimate opposition force or a threat connected to militant groups.
Old habits persisted. The United States also supported the Taliban politically through Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, partly because officials hoped the movement would stabilize Afghanistan and enable a pipeline project that bypassed Iran. Dreyfuss argues that the Taliban's rise reflected the persistence of Cold War habits: viewing Islamist actors as useful against a rival, rather than judging the political order they were building.
The inconsistency is not merely bureaucratic confusion. It reflects a genuine policy dilemma: some Islamist organizations participate in politics, while others use coercion, and the boundaries can shift. Country-by-country analysis can respect local differences, but it can also miss transnational ties and shared resources. Conversely, treating all Islamists as one network creates its own errors. The Taliban example also cautions against assuming that commercial projects produce political stability. A pipeline may serve external interests without resolving the internal conflicts that threaten a country.
Target terrorist networks without turning Muslim politics into a civilizational war.
Name the threat accurately. Dreyfuss distinguishes Al Qaeda, a specific terrorist organization, from the wider and much more varied field of Islamist movements. He argues that intelligence, law enforcement, diplomacy, and selective self-defense are better suited to disrupting terrorist networks than conventional wars against states with no proven connection to them. He criticizes the invasion of Iraq as unrelated to Al Qaeda and likely to intensify anti-American anger.
Reduce the fuel. The book calls for addressing grievances, pursuing a viable settlement for Palestinians, reducing the visible U.S. military presence, and avoiding threats to impose political outcomes from abroad. It also advocates support for secular civic institutions and locally led debate about religious interpretation. These are the author's proposals, not guarantees that a less interventionist policy would end terrorism or produce liberal government.
The distinction between a clandestine terrorist network and a broad political current is essential for proportional policy. Treating them as identical can alienate potential partners and turn a limited security problem into a much wider conflict. The book's emphasis on political grievances complements law enforcement, but grievances do not excuse attacks on civilians, and resolving them cannot guarantee that violence ends. Its call for local political development also contains a tension: outside powers must avoid imposing outcomes, yet can still decide whether and how to support civic groups.
Analysis
Dreyfuss's central contribution is a political history of patronage: it tracks how governments seeking immediate leverage helped Islamist organizations accumulate money, legitimacy, organizational capacity, and international connections. The argument is more useful than a simple claim that the United States created terrorism. It distinguishes creation from enablement, and shows how Saudi financing, British imperial policy, Pakistani intelligence, and U.S. Cold War strategy sometimes converged without sharing identical goals. The recurring mechanism is institutional. A movement becomes difficult to manage when support reaches beyond individual operatives and sustains schools, charities, banks, publications, and political networks.
The book's evidence is vivid, especially its use of declassified cables and interviews with diplomats and intelligence officers. Its strongest cases show specific decisions and identifiable channels of support. Its weakest claims sometimes infer coordination from parallel interests, or treat uncertain intelligence allegations as settled. Evidence that a government knew of, tolerated, or indirectly enabled an organization is not always evidence that it controlled that organization. Nor can a single ideological label make the Muslim Brotherhood, Iranian clerical politics, Saudi Wahhabism, Hamas, and Afghan factions interchangeable.
That distinction matters for causal judgment. The book's argument is not that U.S. policy alone produced the Iranian revolution, Hamas, or Al Qaeda. Domestic repression, occupation, economic change, and local political competition shaped each. The more defensible conclusion is narrower and more consequential: repeated short-term alliances helped strengthen actors whose aims were not aligned with their sponsors, while official analysis often discounted those actors' capacity for independent action.
The final warning about a civilizational war follows from this history. If policy collapses a diverse religious and political field into one enemy, it repeats the same analytical error that Dreyfuss identifies in earlier decades. But his prescriptions also warrant scrutiny: reducing foreign military pressure may diminish recruitment opportunities without resolving internal authoritarianism or sectarian conflict. The book is most persuasive as a study of strategic miscalculation, not as a complete blueprint for Middle East policy.
Review Summary
Devil's Game receives mixed reviews, with many praising its detailed account of U.S. support for Islamic fundamentalism during the Cold War. Readers appreciate the historical context provided, though some criticize factual errors and perceived bias. The book explores how Western powers, particularly the U.S., nurtured radical Islam to counter Soviet influence, detailing relationships with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Taliban. While some find it eye-opening, others argue it oversimplifies complex issues. The book's examination of long-term consequences of using religious extremism in foreign policy is widely noted.
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Glossary
Islamism
Political movement using Islamic authorityIn Dreyfuss's usage, Islamism is a modern political creed that seeks to organize public life and government according to a particular interpretation of Islam. It is distinct from Islam as a diverse religious tradition. The book uses the term for movements ranging from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Afghan jihadist organizations, while emphasizing that they are not all identical.
Muslim Brotherhood
Transnational Islamist organizationFounded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became a major Islamist movement with branches and allied organizations across the Middle East and beyond. It combined religious and political organizing with social institutions and, at different times and places, clandestine or militant activity. Dreyfuss traces its influence through Saudi, Egyptian, Jordanian, Palestinian, and Afghan networks.
Wahhabism
Saudi-linked puritanical Islamic currentWahhabism is the austere religious current associated with the eighteenth-century preacher Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and the alliance between his followers and the Al Saud family. It became central to the Saudi state and was promoted internationally through Saudi institutions and funding. Dreyfuss distinguishes its religious establishment from the more explicitly political work of the Muslim Brotherhood, while describing their cooperation.
pan-Islam
Political unity among MuslimsPan-Islam is the idea that Muslims across national and ethnic boundaries should be united through a shared political and religious identity. Dreyfuss traces its modern political form to Jamal Eddine al-Afghani and his successors, whose proposals included broad Islamic alliances and systems of Islamic rule. The concept could be advanced by Muslim activists or promoted by imperial powers for strategic purposes.
Muslim World League
Saudi-backed international Islamic organizationFounded in Mecca in 1962, the Muslim World League became a major channel for Saudi-supported religious outreach and Islamist institution-building. It funded publications, religious organizations, and projects in many countries, and its leadership included figures connected to the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist currents. Dreyfuss describes it as a durable international network, not simply a department of the Saudi government.
economic Islam
Islamist financial and business networkDreyfuss uses economic Islam for the growth of Islamic banks, investment firms, and business networks that connected Gulf wealth with Islamist political organization. These institutions presented finance as consistent with Islamic law, including restrictions on interest. The author argues that they also supported social and political activity, although participation in Islamic finance alone does not imply support for militancy.
Arab Afghans
Foreign Arab Afghan-war volunteersArab Afghans were volunteers from Arab countries who joined the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. They were distinct from the Afghan population and fighters, though they fought alongside Afghan groups and built cross-border connections. Dreyfuss emphasizes that some acquired military experience and networks used in later militant activity, without claiming that every volunteer became a terrorist.
arc of Islam
Anti-Soviet strategy using Muslim networksThe arc of Islam describes a U.S. strategic idea of using Muslim populations and Islamist movements along the Soviet Union's southern border to contain or weaken Soviet power. The concept gained force after the Iranian revolution and shaped support for Afghan resistance groups and efforts in Central Asia. Dreyfuss presents it as an extension of Cold War planning, not as a coherent or universally accepted policy.
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