Key Takeaways
Build belonging before correcting beliefs, because propaganda sells a place to stand
Belonging comes first. As a British child in wartime Berlin, Sefton Delmer was bullied as an enemy, yet found himself swept up in German patriotic songs. He wanted to join the crowd even as he knew its message threatened his home country. The contradiction helped him see propaganda as more than false information: it can offer community and a feeling of personal importance to people who feel isolated or powerless. The sociologist Jacques Ellul called the mass media and cultural stories that bind people into shared social myths sociological propaganda. Those myths can offer belonging, but can also make dissenters seem like enemies.
Build a better bond. Delmer’s experience suggested that counter-propaganda cannot work by facts alone if it ignores what audiences need from a community. The book connects this to places where civic institutions have weakened and to post-Soviet Russia, where a new collective identity was deliberately constructed around Putin.
What's striking is the distinction between correcting a claim and answering the social need that makes the claim attractive. Social identity research likewise finds that people often defend a group’s status as much as they defend a proposition. That does not make belonging inherently dangerous: clubs, unions, congregations, and local institutions can provide it without demanding an enemy. The harder question is whether a counter-message can offer durable relationships, not merely a more appealing media experience. A radio voice can create recognition, but rebuilding civic trust also requires institutions people can participate in and influence.
Reveal the performance beneath certainty, so people can notice their borrowed roles
Certainty can be acted. Delmer watched Hitler shift from a tired, quiet man on a plane into a commanding figure before an audience. The transformation depended on practiced gestures, familiar symbols, and the crowd’s response. Delmer had seen similar role-playing in his own life: he moved between British and German identities, and in Berlin’s cabarets watched performers expose how supposedly natural social roles could be imitated. This made him wary of treating political followers as hypnotised objects. People can repeat a public script while privately doubting it, or perform enthusiasm because everyone else appears to do so.
Make the script visible. Delmer used an oddly played Nazi news tune and carefully exaggerated political language to let listeners glimpse the constructed quality of the regime’s performance. The aim was not simply to ridicule its supporters, but to create a moment of awareness in which another response seemed possible.
This approach resembles a useful idea from social psychology: norms become easier to question when people discover that apparent unanimity is partly performative. A public display can create a false impression that everyone privately agrees, encouraging more conformity. Humour and theatrical exaggeration may interrupt that cycle without demanding an immediate public renunciation. But exposure has limits. People can recognise that a leader performs and still admire the performance. Awareness creates an opening, not a guarantee of changed belief or behaviour.
Reach the emotional audience that fact-checks never meet
Arguments were not enough. British broadcasts often tried to reach the imagined Good German with humanitarian appeals, political reasoning, or calls for revolt. Delmer thought these messages mainly reached people already inclined to agree. He had seen how Nazi rhetoric moved crowds from humiliation and self-pity toward blame, hatred, and the exhilaration of collective power. A grievance story could explain personal disappointment by locating an enemy outside the self, while promising that a leader could restore lost status.
Enter the audience’s world. Delmer argued that counter-messaging had to understand such feelings rather than lecture from a safe distance. He answered Hitler’s 1940 peace appeal rapidly, in idiomatic German and with a deliberately abrasive tone, not as an abstract civics lesson but as a direct emotional confrontation. The larger lesson is that accurate information needs a form, voice, and point of contact that an audience will actually attend to.
The strategic insight is that persuasion has an emotional sequence, not just an evidentiary standard. Communication research distinguishes information processing from identity signaling: a message can be evaluated for accuracy, but it can also signal which group a person stands with. Delmer’s work takes the second function seriously. The danger is that meeting an audience inside its anger can intensify the anger rather than loosen it. A credible counter-message must make the feeling intelligible while redirecting blame toward accountable actors, not merely offering a rival target.
Turn a regime's own ideals against the insiders who betray them
Find the internal fracture. Delmer’s first clandestine station, Gustav Siegfried Eins, featured an invented Prussian military insider called der Chef. The character professed loyalty to Germany and respect for Hitler, but attacked Nazi Party officials for corruption, privilege, and neglect of soldiers. Delmer called the self-serving party clique the Parteikommune, contrasting it with ordinary Germans and the army. The move exploited a real resentment: soldiers were treated as heroes, while party functionaries were increasingly blamed for rationing, rules, and comfortable lives far from the front.
Use familiar language differently. Der Chef did not ask listeners to become liberals or socialists. He used nationalist and military assumptions to expose the gap between the regime’s promises and its conduct. The broadcasts mixed accurate insider details with deliberate inventions, making the Party appear to violate the very patriotic standards it claimed to embody.
The method resembles coalition politics: a powerful movement can be weakened when its own constituencies notice that leaders are breaking their shared bargain. Specific evidence of unequal sacrifice is more persuasive than an outsider’s general condemnation because it names a grievance the audience already recognises. Yet this tactic also risks deepening factional distrust or validating the ideology used as cover. Its ethical value depends on whether exposing hypocrisy opens space for independent judgment, rather than simply helping one faction defeat another.
Give listeners a low-risk action that weakens obedience
Change conduct first. Delmer cared less about converting every listener to a new political creed than about making people act against Nazi interests. His team circulated a forged medical guide, Krankheit rettet, or Illness Saves, which taught German soldiers how to imitate symptoms and seek removal from the front. The guide framed self-preservation as patriotic duty and even included carefully drawn plants that could produce symptoms. Delmer hoped the advice would encourage soldiers to leave combat and make military doctors more suspicious of the regime’s handling of their health.
Small acts can matter. Other broadcasts encouraged listeners to buy scarce clothing or take sleeping drugs, behaviours that could disrupt supply and discipline. The methods could also harm people: deliberate mistrust between doctors and patients might endanger genuine patients. Delmer’s operations show how propaganda can target behaviour directly, but also how easily a useful tactic can carry costs beyond its intended target.
Behavioural science offers a reason to take this strategy seriously: acting differently can change what a person feels capable of doing, even before beliefs shift. A small refusal or an act of self-protection can weaken the sense that obedience is inevitable. But this is also where counter-propaganda most clearly resembles manipulation. The intended action may serve the audience’s safety, while the operator’s purpose is military disruption. Ethical assessment therefore needs more than good intentions: it should consider foreseeable harms, proportionality, and who bears the risk.
Make dissent feel safe enough to attempt, even before belief changes
Give listeners cover. Delmer’s later Soldatensender Calais was a live radio service that sounded enough like a German station to be plausible on an ordinary medium-wave radio. It carried music, official speeches, timely news, and practical information for soldiers and their families. Its editors often knew about Allied bombing locations and military developments before German broadcasters did. Listeners could suspect or know that the British were behind it, yet still explain to neighbours or officers that they thought it was a normal German station.
Make choice possible. This was different from a simple attempt to fool the audience. The station offered an alibi, useful content, and room to participate in a quiet departure from official propaganda. In interviews of captured German prisoners, reported listening rose to 41 percent by 1944. Those figures reflect prisoners, not the whole German public, but they show that the station reached beyond a tiny circle of committed opponents.
The station’s design anticipates a modern principle of choice architecture: people may take a first step when the social and practical costs are reduced. Its audience did not need to announce a political conversion; it only needed a plausible reason to keep listening. This is a powerful model for communication in high-risk environments. It also complicates the word deception. A listener who understands the disguise is not simply duped, though the operator still controls the information environment. Safety and agency can coexist, but they are not the same thing.
Track the afterlife of every lie you deploy
Success can boomerang. Delmer used false stories and fabricated roles to undermine Nazi morale, including the suggestion that parts of the German army opposed the Party. After the war, the image of a principled Wehrmacht resistance helped former officers and Nazi-era elites return to influence. Delmer came to fear that his own wartime fiction had been retold as historical fact, supplying a convenient story for people who wanted to separate the army from Nazi crimes.
Victory does not erase framing. The operations were also exposed, and Delmer’s use of pornography and other tactics provoked sharp criticism inside the British government. His postwar effort to build more accurate German journalism was curtailed, while his wartime methods remained open to exploitation by others, including East German disinformation workers. A tactical lie can outlive its original target and shape what a society is willing to remember.
This is a problem of institutional memory as much as media ethics. Messages do not disappear when a campaign ends; they can become evidence, precedent, or a political convenience. Modern communication strategies should therefore include an account of what happens if a claim is believed, repeated, or stripped of its original context. The challenge is not to demand impossible purity in wartime, but to create safeguards: preserve records, mark uncertainty where possible, and distinguish operational fiction from historical explanation before others collapse them together.
Measure changed conduct, not presumed conversion or victory
Influence has limits. Delmer hoped to split the German army from the Nazi Party and used the July 1944 assassination attempt against Hitler to suggest a broader revolt. The coup failed, and the attempt initially increased public displays of loyalty. The Allies also insisted on unconditional surrender, leaving little room for a separate peace that might have rewarded German opposition. Delmer could point to desertions, listening, and moments when his material helped soldiers imagine surrender, but he could not isolate his broadcasts from battlefield conditions or other causes.
Do not claim miracles. British historians and officials disagreed about whether propaganda to Germany had succeeded. The evidence supports influence on some audiences and actions, not proof that Delmer’s broadcasts won the war. This distinction matters: propaganda can erode confidence or make a choice easier, but it cannot substitute for military outcomes or political decisions.
The book’s most useful discipline is its refusal to equate a compelling operation with decisive impact. In evaluation research, causal attribution requires comparing exposed and unexposed groups while accounting for competing factors. Delmer had no such experiment, and wartime records were fragmentary. That uncertainty should not erase plausible effects, but it should restrain grand claims. A serious assessment tracks intermediate outcomes, such as listening, desertion, or compliance, and keeps them distinct from the ultimate result of a war.
Start with concrete interests, then create room to reconsider
Ordinary needs are entry points. The book returns to Delmer’s own susceptibility to group pressure: as a boy he wanted to join the patriotic crowd, and as an adult he understood that propaganda could draw on the same ordinary need to belong. In Ukraine, activists trying to reach Russians found that calls about destruction and suffering were often rejected quickly, while messages about personal costs, including taxes and travel restrictions, held attention longer. The point is not that self-interest is noble, but that it can open a channel where moral appeals have failed.
Make reality usable. Delmer’s best work gave people details about their own lives, practical choices, and reasons to question the official story. For contemporary media, that means moving beyond fact-checks aimed only at people already persuaded. It also means building trusted, useful forms of communication that can reach audiences without asking them to abandon their identity on the first encounter.
The final lesson is deliberately unsentimental: people often notice threats to their family, money, safety, and status before they respond to distant moral abstractions. That insight can guide better journalism, but it should not reduce audiences to bundles of appetites. Concrete relevance can earn attention; careful evidence and accountable institutions must earn trust. The Ukrainian examples also caution against treating one response pattern as universal. Different audiences require testing, listening, and revision, rather than a single clever message applied everywhere.
Analysis
Pomerantsev’s account is both a biography of Sefton Delmer and a history of psychological warfare, but its most useful argument concerns the audience rather than the propagandist. Delmer’s childhood makes that argument personal: his shifting national identity left him acutely aware that belonging can overpower judgment. His career then turns that vulnerability into a method. Rather than assume Germans were either fully brainwashed or secretly liberal, he looked for mixed motives, private resentments, and small opportunities to act independently.
The book’s strongest contribution is its distinction between persuading people to adopt a correct doctrine and helping them create distance from a coercive one. Der Chef used familiar patriotic assumptions to expose corruption. Soldatensender Calais offered listeners a low-risk way to hear information outside the official system. These methods were not simply clever messages. They were designed around the social conditions of listening: fear of punishment, desire for useful information, and the need to preserve an acceptable account of one’s own conduct.
That design also creates the book’s central ethical tension. Delmer’s operations sought to restore agency by manipulating audiences, sometimes through fabrications that encouraged risky or harmful behaviour. Wartime necessity explains the context, but does not make every technique harmless. The postwar rehabilitation of former Nazis shows the larger cost: a fictional division between the Party and a virtuous army could become a public alibi. Propaganda’s afterlife matters as much as its immediate reach.
The narrative is appropriately cautious about whether Delmer changed the outcome of the war. Listening figures, prisoner testimony, and documented acts suggest influence, but cannot isolate it from military events, coercion, or Allied policy. That caution strengthens the modern argument. Counter-propaganda cannot be judged by theatrical ingenuity alone. It must be judged by whether it reaches people who disagree, supports meaningful choices, preserves a route back to shared facts, and avoids leaving behind stories that excuse future abuses. The book’s ending is therefore not a recipe for better tricks. It is a demand to understand ordinary susceptibility without pretending that any audience is merely a target.
Review Summary
How to Win an Information War explores British WWII propagandist Sefton Delmer's efforts to counter Nazi messaging. Pomerantsev examines Delmer's tactics, drawing parallels to modern disinformation. Readers found the book fascinating, praising its historical insights and contemporary relevance. Some felt the modern connections were forced or underdeveloped. Many appreciated Pomerantsev's analysis of propaganda's psychological appeal and tactics. The book was seen as timely and thought-provoking, though opinions varied on its effectiveness in providing solutions for today's information wars.
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Glossary
Sociological propaganda
Social myths that bindA term used by Jacques Ellul for the cultural material that integrates people into shared social myths. Films, television, art, literature, and everyday institutions can reinforce ideas about national identity, progress, or a way of life. Unlike a discrete political campaign, this influence is woven into ordinary culture and can make challenges to the shared myths seem alien or threatening.
Volksgemeinschaft
Nazi ideal of national communityThe Nazi vision of a unified German people, bound together across class and regional differences under the regime. The claimed community depended on defining who belonged and excluding those labelled enemies or outsiders. Radio, public ceremonies, shared slogans, and mass participation helped make the ideal feel like a lived social reality, even as Nazi rule enforced it through coercion.
Parteikommune
Self-serving Nazi party cliqueDelmer’s label for Nazi Party officials portrayed as a privileged group acting for itself rather than serving Germany. Der Chef used the term to distinguish ordinary people and soldiers from party leaders accused of corruption, profiteering, and avoiding the dangers borne by the military. The contrast was designed to exploit existing resentment without requiring listeners to adopt an opposing political ideology.
Schweinehund
Self-interested inner rebelA German insult meaning roughly a person’s weaker or selfish side. Delmer repurposed the idea as a source of potential resistance: ordinary self-interest, fear, resentment, or desire for survival could lead someone to disobey a regime that demanded sacrifice. This did not mean every such impulse was virtuous. It meant counter-propaganda could use motives that official idealism tried to suppress.
Black propaganda
Covertly disguised persuasionPropaganda that conceals or falsifies its origin, often pretending to come from an enemy, an internal dissident, or another source. Delmer’s team used fake radio stations, invented speakers, forged documents, and planted rumours to influence German audiences. The disguise could make messages more credible or safer to receive, but exposure and later misuse created serious risks.
Research Units
Covert resistance radio stationsA British wartime code name for clandestine radio stations that appeared to broadcast from Nazi-occupied Europe but were operated from Britain by exiles and other personnel. These stations targeted audiences in occupied countries and Germany. Delmer was assigned to create and run a German right-wing station, eventually developing more elaborate broadcasts for soldiers and civilians.
Soldatensender Calais
Disguised German-language radio serviceA live British-run station aimed at German soldiers and listeners at home. It mixed music, news, official Nazi speeches, and practical information, while presenting itself in a way that gave listeners an excuse to tune in. Many suspected its foreign origin, but its useful content and plausible cover helped make listening feel safer than openly choosing an enemy broadcast.
Evidence of reception
Indicators of audience responseA wartime intelligence method for estimating whether propaganda reached and affected its intended audience. British analysts combined reports from prisoners of war, opened letters, agents, travellers, and other sources. The evidence could reveal listening, rumours repeated, or apparent behavioural effects, but it was indirect and incomplete. It could not establish with certainty that broadcasts caused the actions observed.
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