Key Takeaways
1. Early American Jewish Concern for Palestinians Faced Covert Israeli Opposition.
Despite the limited goals of the AJC’s philanthropic initiative, which was not radical and might well be considered to be in Israel’s interests, it—and Peretz—soon caught the attention of Israeli government officials.
Humanitarian impulse. In the immediate aftermath of Israel's 1948 creation and the ensuing displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, some American Jews felt a humanitarian imperative to address the crisis. Don Peretz, a young American Jew and conscientious objector, volunteered with the Quaker-affiliated American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) in 1949 to deliver aid to displaced Palestinians in northern Israel. His firsthand experience with their "illimitable misery" profoundly impacted him, leading him to pursue a doctoral dissertation on the Palestinian refugee problem—the first of its kind.
AJC's cautious engagement. By 1956, the influential American Jewish Committee (AJC), a non-Zionist organization, hired Peretz as its first Middle East consultant. The AJC, concerned by rising "Arab propaganda" and its potential impact on American Jewish-Christian relations, tasked Peretz with developing an Arab refugee relief initiative. This initiative, though moderate and focused on vocational training and education rather than repatriation, was seen by Israeli diplomats as a threat to their efforts to downplay the refugee issue.
Covert Israeli intervention. Declassified Israeli foreign ministry files reveal a concerted, covert campaign to undermine the AJC's initiative and remove Peretz from his position. Israeli diplomats, including future ambassadors, viewed any independent American Jewish engagement with the Palestinian question as a challenge to the consensus they sought to build around Israel's diplomatic priorities. This early intervention successfully sidelined the AJC's initiative and eventually led to Peretz's departure, demonstrating Israel's proactive role in shaping American Jewish discourse.
2. Independent Jewish Media Challenged Israeli Narratives, Leading to Diplomatic Suppression.
His insidious propaganda is providing material not only for anti-Zionists but is confusing Zionists.
A unique voice. William Zukerman, a veteran Yiddish journalist, launched the English-language Jewish Newsletter in 1948, aiming for "Independent Thinking on Jewish Problems." Unlike other Jewish publications, it consistently and sympathetically covered the Palestinian refugee problem throughout the 1950s, often critiquing Israeli government policies. Zukerman's background as a Yiddish-speaking immigrant and his initial acceptance within mainstream Jewish media gave him a unique platform.
Israeli alarm and action. Israeli officials, particularly future ambassador Avraham Harman, expressed alarm at Zukerman's influence, fearing his nuanced journalism was "confusing Zionists" and providing "ammunition to our attackers." They initiated a quiet campaign to pressure American Zionist leaders to act against him. This campaign involved:
- Circulating memos to Jewish communities.
- Encouraging "constant attack" on Zukerman in the Anglo-Jewish press.
- Lobbying editors to drop his material.
Marginalization and impact. These efforts succeeded in marginalizing Zukerman. He lost his position as the New York correspondent for the London Jewish Chronicle and ceased to be published in prominent American Jewish newspapers like The Jewish Advocate and The Jewish Exponent. This suppression effectively deprived mainstream American Jewish readers of a credible, critical voice on Israel's policies toward Palestinians, contributing to a narrowing of acceptable discourse within the community.
3. Mainstream American Jewish Liberalism Struggled with Israel's Treatment of its Arab Minority.
As an American, I have no right to point the finger at Israel.
Ethical and pragmatic dilemmas. The American Jewish Committee (AJC), a "non-Zionist" organization committed to liberal integration and human rights, faced a profound dilemma regarding Israel's treatment of its Arab minority. While advocating for minority rights globally, the AJC found itself in a difficult position when Israel, a self-declared Jewish state, implemented policies that discriminated against its Arab citizens, such as military rule, land expropriation, and restrictions on movement. This created a "disconnect" between the AJC's universalist values and Israel's ethno-national priorities.
The Kafr Qasim catalyst. The 1956 Kafr Qasim massacre, where Israeli border guards killed 49 Arab citizens, brought the issue to a head. The AJC's internal reports acknowledged the "greater tragedies" and "mutual attitude of the state and its Arab minority," noting that "the first attempt to integrate the Arab minority into Israel has been a failure." This event, coupled with rising "Arab propaganda" highlighting these issues, compelled the AJC to act, fearing that Israel's actions could harm the image and security of American Jews.
Limited influence and subtle shifts. In 1957, an AJC delegation, including President Irving Engel and James Marshall, directly confronted Prime Minister Ben-Gurion about the military government and land laws. While Ben-Gurion offered assurances and invoked Jewish historical experience, he largely dismissed their concerns. The AJC's subsequent efforts, including opening a Tel Aviv office in 1961 to promote liberal ideals and Arab-Jewish cooperation, focused more on education than direct lobbying. This subtle shift reflected the AJC's ultimate reluctance to publicly challenge Israel, prioritizing communal unity and Israel's image over a robust defense of Palestinian rights.
4. The Equation of Anti-Zionism with Antisemitism Emerged Amidst Rising Pro-Arab Advocacy.
The difficulty is, however, that in the arena of public opinion, such distinctions cannot be maintained, and in the end, Zionists and Jews become identical in all but the most careful minds.
Sayegh's challenge. Fayez Sayegh, the eloquent acting director of the Arab League's Arab Information Center in New York, became the most effective Arab spokesman in America during the mid-1950s. He skillfully distinguished between anti-Zionism and antisemitism, arguing that his critique of Israel was political, not anti-Jewish. On national radio, Sayegh famously used an Israeli prime minister's quote to argue that Zionists, not Arabs, were the ones raising "dual loyalty" concerns for American Jews.
ADL's aggressive stance. In contrast to the AJC's initial nuanced approach, the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) aggressively accused Sayegh's center of antisemitism, publishing a book, Cross-Currents, that alleged collaboration between Arab officials and right-wing antisemites. While some Arab diplomats did make antisemitic statements or inadvertently associate with bigots, Sayegh himself strictly forbade such contacts and publicly condemned them. The ADL's campaign, however, aimed to discredit all pro-Arab advocacy by linking it to antisemitism.
AJC's shifting position. Initially, the AJC sought to be an "impartial referee," even meeting with Sayegh to discuss how Arabs could critique Israel without fueling antisemitism. However, the persistent "dual loyalty" accusations from AFME allies, coupled with the undeniable instances of antisemitic rhetoric from some Arab diplomats, gradually eroded the AJC's neutrality. By 1958, the AJC abandoned its plan to publish a "Fact Sheet" criticizing Zionists for similar "dual loyalty" rhetoric, concluding that public criticism of Israel, regardless of intent, risked increasing anti-Jewish sentiment in America. This marked a pivotal moment in the conflation of anti-Zionism with antisemitism within mainstream American Jewish discourse.
5. Anti-Zionist Jewish Leaders Diverged on Palestinian Rights, Influenced by Israeli Engagement.
I believe that he is adopting his public positions on Zionism because he hates American Zionists, not because he hates Israel.
The Council's internal tensions. The American Council for Judaism (the Council), the leading anti-Zionist Jewish organization, initially focused on defending Judaism as a religion and American Jews' singular loyalty to the U.S., with little emphasis on Palestinian rights. However, its executive director, Rabbi Elmer Berger, became increasingly aligned with the Palestinian cause after extensive contact with Arab officials like Fayez Sayegh and firsthand visits to refugee camps in the mid-1950s. Berger's experiences led him to view Zionism's impact on Palestinians as a "moral degradation."
Israeli co-optation strategy. Israeli diplomats, recognizing the Council's influence in Washington and the prominence of figures like its president, Lessing Rosenwald (former chairman of Sears, Roebuck), adopted a strategy of direct engagement rather than outright confrontation. Avraham Harman, Israel's consul general, speculated that Rosenwald's anti-Zionism stemmed from a dislike of American Zionists, not Israel itself. He proposed "unobtrusively" meeting with Rosenwald to convince him that supporting Israel aligned with American interests.
A widening rift. This strategy proved effective. Rosenwald's 1957 trip to Israel, arranged by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion, resulted in a surprisingly laudatory report on the Jewish state, despite some criticisms. He praised Israel's accomplishments and its army, contrasting sharply with Berger's increasingly harsh anti-Israel rhetoric. This divergence culminated in 1968 when, amidst a wave of pro-Israel sentiment after the Six-Day War, Rosenwald and other Council leaders forced Berger's resignation, seeking to rebrand the Council as "anti-Zionist" without being "pro-Arab" or "anti-Israel."
6. Direct Experience in Israel/Palestine Transformed American Jewish Perspectives on the Conflict.
For me, my own liberation, and that of all people who are Jewish, is inexorably tied to the liberation of all man and woman-kind.
Firsthand encounters. For many American Jews, direct exposure to Israel and the Palestinian territories profoundly shaped their views on the conflict. Don Peretz's early work with Palestinian refugees in 1949, and Rabbi Elmer Berger's 1955 tour of refugee camps, were formative experiences that deepened their commitment to Palestinian rights. These encounters challenged prevailing narratives and instilled a sense of moral urgency.
The "second generation" in Israel. The period after the 1967 Six-Day War saw a significant increase in young American Jews traveling to Israel for study, kibbutz volunteering, or work. This "second generation" of dissenters, including future Breira leaders like Ian Lustick, Arthur Waskow, and Arthur Samuelson, often encountered Palestinians living under occupation or engaged in dialogue with Israeli leftists. These experiences led them to question the status quo and recognize the centrality of Palestinian national aspirations.
From Zionist affinity to critical advocacy. Many of these young American Jews, initially drawn to Israel out of Zionist affinity or a strong sense of Jewish identity, found their perspectives transformed. They witnessed firsthand the realities of military rule, land expropriation, and the Palestinian desire for self-determination. This often led them to advocate for a two-state solution, believing it was essential for Israel's long-term security and ethical standing, even if it meant challenging the prevailing consensus within the American Jewish community.
7. A New Generation of American Jewish Zionists Advocated for Palestinian Statehood, Facing Backlash.
As Jews deeply committed to the welfare of Israel . . . we call upon the Israeli Government to pursue a policy of peace which will encourage the emergence of a non-belligerent Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
Breira's emergence. Founded in 1973, Breira: A Project of Concern in Diaspora-Israel Relations, became the first national American Jewish organization to advocate for a Palestinian state alongside Israel. Its founders, many of whom had spent formative years in Israel after 1967, were influenced by Israeli leftists and their own observations of the occupation. Breira aimed to provide an "alternative" to the prevailing "no alternative" slogan regarding the conflict, emphasizing that Palestinian self-determination served Israel's long-term interests.
Embracing Israeli doves. Breira sought legitimacy by amplifying the voices of Israeli "establishment dissidents" who supported a two-state solution and even negotiations with the PLO. Figures like retired IDF General Mattityahu Peled and Knesset members Shulamit Aloni and Uri Avnery became key speakers and contributors to Breira's publications. This strategy aimed to convince American Jews that advocating for Palestinian rights was not anti-Israel but rather a position shared by respected Israelis.
The PLO meeting and its fallout. In 1976, two Breira executive committee members met secretly with PLO moderates Issam Sartawi and Sabri Jiryis, who were also engaging with Israeli doves from the Israeli Council for Israeli-Palestinian Peace (ICIPP). When news of this meeting was leaked, apparently by Israeli officials, it triggered a massive backlash. Breira's defense of the meeting, citing its alignment with Israeli doves, led to accusations of being a PLO "front" and "anti-Zionist." This controversy, coupled with financial issues, ultimately led to Breira's collapse by 1978, demonstrating the severe consequences for American Jewish groups that dared to engage with the PLO.
8. Israeli Officials Consistently Sought to Manage and Control American Jewish Dissent.
Whether Israelis wish to admit it or not, the Palestinian question has always been their country’s most central, if not definitional, dilemma.
Strategic imperative. From Israel's precarious early years, its officials viewed American Jewry as a vital asset for financial, diplomatic, and political support. Any American Jewish dissent on the Palestinian question was perceived as a threat to this support and to Israel's international standing. This led to a consistent, multi-faceted strategy to manage and control American Jewish opinion.
Tactics of control:
- Undermining critics: Covertly working to remove figures like Don Peretz from influential positions and orchestrating campaigns against journalists like William Zukerman.
- Co-opting leaders: Engaging directly with anti-Zionist leaders like Lessing Rosenwald to soften their stance towards Israel.
- Influencing narratives: Promoting official Israeli narratives on the refugee issue and discouraging independent American Jewish research or advocacy.
- Leaking information: Publicly discrediting groups like Breira by leaking details of their meetings with PLO representatives.
The "pawns" of diplomacy. Even when American Jewish leaders sought to offer input or express concerns, as at the 1975 emergency conference in Jerusalem following the "Zionism Is Racism" resolution, they often felt treated as "pawns" rather than partners. Israeli officials prioritized displays of unity and fundraising over genuine dialogue about controversial political issues, particularly the Palestinian question. This demonstrated a conventional state-centric approach to diaspora relations, where non-citizens' Jewishness did not translate into real political power or influence on core policy decisions.
9. The Palestinian Question Became a Defining Ethical and Political Challenge for American Jewish Identity.
Is there no place in our society for those who dissent from the decisions of the majority and who, conscious of their collective responsibility, obey the command of conscience by lifting their voice, not for murder and destruction, heaven forbid, but for peace and understanding among the peoples?
A moral compass. Don Peretz's poignant quote from Judah Magnes encapsulates the enduring ethical dilemma faced by American Jews regarding the Palestinian question. For many, their Jewish identity, rooted in experiences of persecution and a commitment to justice, compelled them to speak out against policies they perceived as unjust, even when it meant challenging the majority consensus within their own community and facing accusations of disloyalty.
Evolving dissent. Over decades, American Jewish dissent on Palestine evolved from early non-Zionist concerns about "dual loyalty" and the impact on American Judaism, to later Zionist-aligned advocacy for Palestinian statehood. This evolution was often driven by direct exposure to the realities of the conflict and engagement with Israeli and Palestinian voices. The struggle was not merely political but deeply personal, reflecting a search for an "authentic" Jewishness that reconciled support for Israel with universal ethical principles.
An enduring challenge. Today, the Palestinian question remains a central, often divisive, issue for American Jewry. While some see support for Palestinian rights as a meaningful extension of their Jewish identity, others view it as a betrayal of Israel. The debates over anti-Zionism and antisemitism, and the role of American Jews in influencing Israeli policy, continue to define the transnational relationship between Jews. This history reveals that American Jewish engagement with the Palestinian question is not a recent phenomenon but a long-standing, complex, and often suppressed aspect of Jewish political life.
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