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SoBrief
An American Sickness

An American Sickness

How Healthcare Became Big Business and How You Can Take It Back
Learn where medical prices hide, what to ask before treatment, and how to challenge a bill.
by Elisabeth Rosenthal 2017 656 pages
4.29
8k+ ratings
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Key Takeaways

See American healthcare as a broken market, not a shopping problem

The price is unknowable. Rosenthal’s central claim is that American medicine increasingly follows commercial incentives rather than the needs of patients or the evidence of what works. In the book’s 2017 snapshot, the United States spent nearly one-fifth of its economy on healthcare, more than $3 trillion a year, yet generally had worse outcomes than other wealthy countries, which spent about half as much per person. Prices could vary several-fold for the same test, and patients often learned the cost only after treatment.

A bill reveals the system. Chemistry teacher Jeffrey Kivi received the same arthritis drug, at the same dose, from the same doctor after a clinic move. The new hospital’s bills rose from nearly $99,000 to more than $132,000 per infusion. Another hospital had charged about $19,000, and the drug’s wholesale cost was estimated at roughly $1,200. His insurer paid tens of thousands of dollars, leaving the true cost to surface through premiums and taxes.

Analysis

The book’s market critique is strongest when it distinguishes a market from a system that merely uses market language. A functioning market needs usable prices, meaningful alternatives, and the ability to decline a purchase. In emergencies, patients have little of any of these. Insurance also separates the person receiving care from the person negotiating payment, weakening ordinary price discipline. The comparison with other countries makes the scale of the problem concrete, though national spending and outcomes reflect many factors beyond prices alone. The recurring stories show how a structural failure becomes personal: a patient encounters a price only when there is no practical way to shop.

Remember insurance began as catastrophe protection, not a blank check

Coverage changed the incentives. Early Blue Cross plans grew from a simple bargain: Dallas teachers paid $6 a year for a limited hospital benefit, protection against a stay that might otherwise bankrupt them. During and after World War II, employers began offering health coverage when wage controls limited salary increases, and the federal tax treatment helped make employer insurance the norm. As medical care improved, insurance expanded beyond catastrophic hospitalization into routine services, while patients became less exposed to the prices being set.

Insurers do not absorb every cost. The original Blue plans were nonprofit and accepted members regardless of health. For-profit insurers competed by selecting healthier customers, and many Blue plans later converted to for-profit companies. Insurers’ medical loss ratio, the share of premium income spent on care, fell from about 95 percent in 1993 to roughly 80 percent on average. The ACA required most plans to spend 80 to 85 percent on care, but insurers can still pass higher payments into premiums and patient costs.

Analysis

This history explains why asking insurance to make healthcare inexpensive misunderstands its original design. Insurance pools risk and pays claims; it does not automatically lower the underlying price of treatment. Once coverage becomes routine, patients may have little reason to challenge a bill that is mostly paid by someone else, while the expense still returns through premiums, taxes, or employer costs. The story also cautions against treating nonprofit status as a permanent guarantee of public purpose. Yet insurance remains essential protection against financial catastrophe. The problem is not that risk is shared, but that coverage grew without a parallel system for setting or disclosing reasonable prices.

Track how payment rules turn more care into more revenue

Volume can pay better than judgment. Hospitals and doctors often earn more when they provide more billable services. A relative value unit, or RVU, is a measure used to value and reimburse a physician’s work. When doctors’ pay is tied to RVUs or productivity bonuses, a more complex code can mean more income. Rosenthal describes an emergency-room needle-stick visit coded at the most intensive level, plus a hospital facility fee of $2,198. The physician had needed a blood draw, not extensive treatment.

Small charges multiply. A facility fee is a hospital charge for using its space or equipment, sometimes added to a service that could be performed in a doctor’s office. Tests, scans, physical therapy, equipment, and extra physician visits can each become separate revenue streams. The book reports that 71 percent of physician practices supplemented salaries with productivity bonuses in 2015. Incentives do not prove that every service is unnecessary, but they can make more treatment financially attractive even when its benefit is uncertain.

Analysis

Payment design is not a neutral accounting detail. It shapes what institutions build, what clinicians order, and which activities receive attention. The needle-stick example makes this visible: the code converts a brief encounter into a higher-paying service, and the facility fee magnifies the result. This resembles a broader organizational hazard: when a measurable proxy becomes the target, people optimize the proxy, not necessarily the underlying purpose. Still, volume incentives are not the only cause of overuse. Clinical uncertainty, defensive practice, and patient expectations also matter. The practical question is therefore not whether a clinician has an incentive, but whether the payment model rewards care that improves health.

Test a new drug or device before paying its premium

New does not mean better. Drugmakers can extend exclusivity by patenting changes to a formulation, delivery method, or packaging, even when the medicine’s active ingredient barely changes. Hope Marcus relied on mesalamine for ulcerative colitis. When its old version neared patent expiration, the maker replaced it with newly branded forms, delaying generic competition. The price of her long-established medicine rose sharply, while comparable treatment cost far less in Britain.

Approval is not a value judgment. Rosenthal contrasts Hetlioz, a prescription sleep drug priced at about $96,000 a year, with inexpensive melatonin. The FDA judged the drug against a placebo, not against melatonin. The book also describes devices cleared through the 510(k) process, which allows a product to reach market by being judged substantially equivalent to an existing device. That route can require much less evidence than a full review, despite the risks of permanently implanted products.

Analysis

The useful distinction is between regulatory permission, clinical benefit, and fair price. They are separate questions, but patients and clinicians often hear a single reassuring word, approved, and infer all three. Rosenthal’s examples show why comparisons with existing treatments matter: a product can outperform doing nothing and still offer little advantage over a cheaper option. The same logic applies to devices, where the consequences of failure may be difficult to reverse. At the same time, some innovations genuinely improve survival or quality of life, and a demanding standard should not become an excuse to block them. The task is to demand evidence proportionate to both the claimed benefit and the risk.

Judge medical institutions by incentives, not nonprofit or scientific branding

Labels do not enforce missions. Many hospitals retain nonprofit or religious identities while operating as large, revenue-seeking businesses. Their tax exemption is justified partly by charity care and community benefit, but the book describes wide disagreement over what counts. A California Nurses Association review found that 196 hospitals received $3.3 billion in tax exemptions while spending $1.4 billion on charity care, a gap of $1.9 billion.

Good causes can inherit conflicts. Disease foundations once funded basic research without expecting a financial return. The Cystic Fibrosis Foundation later made a major investment in Vertex, whose drug Kalydeco cost about $300,000 a year. The arrangement helped bring a treatment to patients, but the foundation benefited from royalties and had no power to set its price. Professional societies also write clinical guidelines and lobby on payment rules, sometimes in fields where their members earn income from the recommended procedures.

Analysis

Institutional purpose is better measured by conduct than by legal category or origin story. A nonprofit can provide vital care and still accumulate large surpluses; a foundation can finance a risky discovery and still face tension between affordability and investment returns. This is not an argument that commercial partnerships are inherently corrupt. It is a reason to ask who benefits, who bears the cost, and whether decision-makers disclose their interests. The examples also show how conflicts can become structural rather than personal: the organization may sincerely pursue its mission while depending financially on practices that frustrate it.

Expect consolidation to raise prices when patients cannot walk away

Scale can create leverage. Hospital systems often describe mergers as a way to coordinate care or reduce duplicated costs. Rosenthal shows how the same scale can strengthen bargaining power against insurers and employers. In 2014 the United States had 95 hospital mergers, and an analysis of 306 local markets found none highly competitive. Research cited in the book found that one dominant system could raise prices by 40 to 50 percent.

Sutter shows the local effect. In parts of California, Sutter Health acquired hospitals, clinics, and physician practices, sometimes offering insurers all-or-nothing network deals. Employers and insurers could not easily exclude the system when it controlled the only practical hospital in a region. Independent doctors and cheaper imaging centers lost referrals, while some patients faced long drives for alternatives. Consolidation may improve coordination when care is genuinely integrated, but market power alone does not guarantee lower prices or better treatment.

Analysis

The book identifies a crucial difference between organizational efficiency and consumer benefit. A larger system may simplify administration or coordinate care, but those gains do not automatically reach patients when competition is weak. In healthcare, the usual advice to switch providers can be unrealistic: a patient may need a nearby maternity ward, emergency department, or specialist now, not after a new competitor enters the market. That makes antitrust analysis more than an abstract concern about market shares. Still, size is not itself evidence of abuse. The relevant test is whether integration improves care enough to justify its effects on price, choice, and access.

The ACA widened coverage, but left the pricing machine running

Coverage and affordability diverged. The Affordable Care Act barred insurers from rejecting people for preexisting conditions, limited lifetime benefit caps, required essential benefits, and helped reduce the uninsured share from 18 percent in 2013 to 11.9 percent in 2016. These changes mattered. But the law did little directly to restrain the prices charged by hospitals, doctors, drugmakers, or device manufacturers, in part because winning support from those industries required compromises.

Rules can be gamed. Insurers responded to cost pressure with higher deductibles and narrower networks. The book cites research finding that patients moved into high-deductible plans did not become better shoppers; many simply avoided care. Providers also reclassified some preventive colonoscopies as diagnostic procedures, leaving patients with large bills despite the law’s promise of free screening. The ACA improved access to insurance, but insurance coverage by itself could not make care affordable when prices and billing practices remained opaque.

Analysis

The distinction between insurance access and healthcare affordability is central to evaluating reform. A policy can reduce the number of uninsured people while leaving the price of a scan, drug, or hospital stay untouched. High deductibles then place more financial responsibility on patients without giving them the information or alternatives needed to act like informed consumers. The book’s colonoscopy example captures a familiar implementation problem: broad rules meet complex billing definitions, and patients discover the distinction only after care. The ACA’s gains and limits should be assessed separately. Expanding coverage is valuable, but it is not a substitute for changing the incentives that set prices.

Ask what changes treatment before agreeing to another test

Make the purpose explicit. Before accepting a test or procedure, ask what decision its result will change, whether an equally effective lower-cost option exists, where the service will be performed, and who else will bill. Rosenthal argues that many complaints, such as a cough, rash, or back pain, can be watched for a time rather than investigated immediately. Watchful waiting means monitoring a problem and acting if it persists or worsens, rather than testing at once. Urgent symptoms still require prompt medical attention.

More information can create a cascade. Scans sometimes reveal incidental findings, abnormalities unrelated to the symptom that prompted testing. These can lead to diagnoses and interventions without improving health. One surgeon interviewed by Rosenthal estimated that three-quarters of patients sent to him for a second opinion about back surgery did not need the operation. In a study described in the book, two-thirds of parents chose a cheaper appendicitis procedure when told it was equally effective.

Analysis

A good question does not undermine medical expertise; it clarifies the reasoning behind a recommendation. Asking how a result changes care separates useful information from testing done because it is customary, convenient, or billable. The idea also connects to a general decision principle: information has value only when it can improve a choice enough to justify its costs and risks. But watchful waiting requires a clear safety net, including what symptoms should trigger action and when to check back. Without that plan, restraint can become neglect. The strongest patient participation combines skepticism about low-value care with trust in qualified clinical judgment.

Challenge bills before paying, and verify every network boundary

Request the evidence. Ask for a complete itemized bill and compare it with the care actually received. Medical coding translates diagnoses and services into billing codes; a wrong or inflated code can change what is charged. Rosenthal recounts Wanda Wickizer’s nearly $357,000 hospital bill after emergency brain surgery. Medicare would have paid roughly $65,000 to $80,000 for the hospitalization, and billing advocates found errors in the records provided to her. She was uninsured and faced pressure to pay, despite offering her retirement savings.

Check the rules before admission. Confirm that the hospital and the clinicians involved are in network, and ask whether a hospital stay is inpatient or observation. Observation status means the patient is treated as an outpatient, even while staying in a hospital bed, which can raise out-of-pocket costs and affect Medicare coverage of rehabilitation. If a bill seems wrong, dispute it in writing, keep records, and negotiate rather than assuming the listed charge is final.

Analysis

These tactics convert a confusing bill into a contestable claim. Itemization, codes, and written disputes matter because the provider holds more information than the patient, while automated billing can detach charges from what actually happened. Network status is equally important: a patient may choose an in-network hospital yet have no meaningful choice over an out-of-network anesthesiologist or radiologist. The method has limits. A patient in an emergency may be unable to inspect paperwork, and a successful appeal often takes time and persistence. That burden should not fall on sick people alone, but a paper trail can strengthen their position while system-level protections remain inadequate.

Replace haggling with visible prices and payments tied to outcomes

Set clearer prices. Other countries use tools such as national fee schedules and negotiated drug prices to reduce the endless one-to-one bargaining that consumes time and obscures costs. Rosenthal points to Japan, where a heart ultrasound cost less than $150 under a national schedule, compared with $1,000 to $8,000 in the United States. In California, CalPERS set a $30,000 reference price for joint replacements. Hospitals responded by offering lower-priced options, and the program saved money on several procedures without reported changes in outcomes or patient satisfaction.

Pay for a whole episode. Bundled payments give a provider one set amount for a defined course of care, rather than separate payments for every test, visit, and therapy session. This can reduce incentives to add services, as Medicare’s bundled dialysis payment reduced use of the anemia drug Epogen. But bundles need clear boundaries and quality safeguards, or providers may avoid complex patients or shift charges outside the package.

Analysis

The proposed reforms change the rules of the transaction rather than asking every patient to become a skilled negotiator. Reference prices preserve some choice while defining a reasonable contribution; bundled payments make providers responsible for coordinating a complete episode of care. Both approaches can redirect effort from maximizing billable units toward managing resources. Their design matters. A price cap set too low can threaten access, while a bundle that rewards savings without measuring outcomes can encourage undertreatment. The book’s examples suggest that transparent prices and accountability should advance together: neither cost control nor clinical quality is reliable when measured in isolation.

Make digital medicine share records and prices, not just capture data

Technology should remove friction. The federal government spent tens of billions of dollars encouraging electronic medical records, but the systems often failed to share information across hospitals and doctors. Patients could face repeated tests because records were trapped in incompatible systems. Some systems also defaulted test orders to their own labs and imaging centers, steering revenue toward the health system that owned the software.

Useful digital tools answer practical questions. Rosenthal argues that technology should let patients see current provider networks, compare prices and co-payments, schedule appointments, and share records securely. Wearables may help people with conditions such as abnormal heart rhythms or unstable diabetes, but they are not automatically useful for everyone. A consumer sleep tracker, for instance, may offer little reliable medical information. Digital health earns its place when it improves decisions or coordination, not merely when it adds another app, device, or data broker.

Analysis

The chapter’s digital lesson is architectural: a clever interface cannot fix incentives that reward secrecy or fragmentation. In other industries, technology often makes comparison and payment easier; healthcare systems can use the same tools to make their own services the default and keep competitors at a disadvantage. Interoperability and actionable price information would shift power toward patients and clinicians, but privacy and data security must be designed in from the start. The value of a wearable also depends on whether its readings are accurate enough to guide treatment. More data is not the same as better care.

Analysis

Rosenthal organizes the book as a clinical history and treatment plan. First she traces how insurance, hospitals, physicians, drugmakers, device manufacturers, contractors, and consolidated systems adapted to the same central incentive: revenue grows when care is expensive, fragmented, and difficult to compare. The stories are not merely colorful examples. They show recurring mechanisms, including payment for volume, opaque negotiated prices, patent extensions, facility fees, and market concentration. The final section changes register from investigation to practical instruction, then to policy design.

The most valuable analytical move is to treat healthcare’s failures as interlocking rather than assign blame to one villain. Insurers pay claims but may pass costs onward. Hospitals can be nonprofits yet wield monopoly power. Clinicians can be motivated by patient welfare while working under compensation rules that reward additional services. The result is a system in which individual actors may behave rationally within their own incentives while patients experience irrational prices and fragmented care. This is a classic institutional problem: good intentions cannot reliably overcome rules that reward the opposite behavior.

The book is also an argument about information. Patients cannot shop effectively when prices are hidden, quality is hard to measure, and treatment is urgent. That makes consumer choice a partial remedy, not a substitute for regulation or collective bargaining. Price transparency, antitrust enforcement, negotiated rates, and bundled payments target the system’s structure rather than asking each patient to fight every bill alone.

A careful reader should distinguish the strength of the mechanisms from the breadth of each conclusion. Rosenthal’s investigative cases vividly document abuses and incentives, while individual cases cannot establish how often every practice occurs or how much each contributes to total spending. The book itself supplies broader data and comparative examples, but its polemical framing can make the system appear more uniformly predatory than clinical reality. Its lasting insight is more precise: a system can produce excellent medical science and still distribute it through rules that reward waste, conceal cost, and make patients financially vulnerable.

Summary in 30 Seconds
The United States spent more than $3 trillion on healthcare in 2017, yet opaque prices and uneven outcomes persisted. Payment systems that reward volume, patent extensions, and hospital consolidation can make care more expensive without making it better. Insurance coverage alone cannot control prices. Before treatment, ask what a test will change and who will bill; afterward, request itemized charges and dispute errors. Clear prices, competition, and payments tied to outcomes can curb waste.
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Glossary

chargemaster

hospital list prices

A hospital’s master list of billed prices for services, supplies, drugs, and procedures. It can contain thousands of entries, often expressed in codes or abbreviations that are difficult for patients to interpret. The listed charge is not necessarily the amount an insurer pays, because insurers negotiate separate rates with providers.

medical loss ratio

premium share spent on care

The proportion of an insurer’s premium income spent on medical care, rather than administration, marketing, lobbying, or other expenses. The book uses the ratio to illustrate how insurers’ spending priorities changed over time. The Affordable Care Act required most plans to spend 80 to 85 percent of premiums on care, depending on the market.

relative value units (RVUs)

measure of physician work

A system for assigning relative values to physician services, based on factors including physician work and time, practice overhead, training, and malpractice costs. The value helps determine reimbursement. Because compensation can be tied to RVUs, the system can also influence which services physicians provide and how complex an encounter is coded.

facility fee

charge for a care site

A charge imposed by a hospital or facility for the use of its space, equipment, or services. It may be added to a physician’s professional fee, including for outpatient care that could sometimes be provided in an office. The book argues that facility fees can make otherwise similar care much more expensive.

upcoding

billing a higher service level

Assigning a medical billing code that describes a more complex or intensive service than the care delivered or documented supports. A higher-level code can increase payment to the physician and, when tied to a facility fee, the hospital as well. Upcoding can be fraudulent when intentional and unsupported, though clinicians may also learn to maximize codes within existing rules.

510(k)

device clearance pathway

A U.S. Food and Drug Administration pathway that allows certain medical devices to reach the market by demonstrating substantial equivalence to a device already marketed for a similar purpose. Unlike the more demanding route for some high-risk devices, 510(k) clearance may involve limited clinical testing. The book questions whether that standard adequately protects patients when devices are implanted or otherwise risky.

reference pricing

fixed contribution benchmark

A payment approach in which an insurer or employer sets a benchmark amount for a procedure. Patients who choose a provider at or below the benchmark face ordinary cost sharing; patients who choose a more expensive provider may pay the difference. The CalPERS example used a $30,000 reference price for joint replacement to encourage hospitals to offer lower-priced packages.

bundled payment

one payment for an episode

A single payment covering a defined course of treatment, such as a procedure and the related services for a set period. The provider or group must manage the episode within that payment rather than bill separately for every component. Bundling can reduce incentives to add services, but requires clear coverage boundaries and safeguards against avoiding complex patients or reducing necessary care.

pharmacy benefit manager (PBM)

drug purchasing middleman

A company hired by employers or insurers to manage prescription drug benefits and negotiate with pharmacies and drug manufacturers. PBMs can influence which medicines an insurance plan covers and how much patients pay. Rosenthal argues that their business arrangements and control over pricing information can make the drug supply chain less transparent to patients.

product hopping

shift to a repatented version

A strategy in which a drugmaker replaces a medicine nearing generic competition with a modified version, such as a different formulation or delivery method, and withdraws the original product. Because generic substitution generally depends on matching the brand’s dosage and form, the change can delay competition even when the replacement offers little additional benefit.

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